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Fileless GitHub-C2 and Hybrid Lateral Movement: Inside a 1,824-Record Workbench

How one exposed staging server pairs memory-only Linux agents, Oracle database-link pivots, rival eviction and search-bot cloaking

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
29 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

Between 13 and 16 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense observed an exposed staging server, 38.60.227[.]210, holding 1,824 records across five open ports. The scripts combine memory-only Linux agents, Cloudflare R2 delivery, Oracle database-link pivots, Windows SMB tooling, rival-malware eviction and search-bot cloaking. They show intent and tooling, not confirmed activity on targets. Hunt executable memory regions paired with temporary file locks, audit Oracle database links, and block the listed staging hosts.

Most toolkits do one job. This one does several. The same server holds enterprise lateral-movement scripts for Oracle, Zimbra and Windows, and the tools that turn a breached server into income: cryptocurrency mining and search-engine spam. This report explains how each part works and what defenders should look for.

All findings come from scripts and configuration files on the attacker's own server. Victim domains, database schemas, internal addresses and secrets are withheld.

1

Memory-only agents and kernel file locks are designed to evade Linux process scans.

Comments in the root bootstrapper describe a GitHub-named agent that deletes its own file, blanks its command line and poses as the system init binary. Three persistence hooks check whether it is alive through a file lock, not a process name. A separate launcher serves unprivileged accounts from a Cloudflare R2 bucket.

2

Lateral scripts target Oracle database links, Zimbra servers and Windows SMB shares.

Thirty middleware scripts, 26 of them for Oracle Database, RAC and E-Business Suite, are written to run remote DDL over database links. Zimbra scripts keep or lock a configuration re-entry channel. Windows scripts copy files over SMB, add a hidden administrator and overwrite AnyDesk password hashes.

3

Rival eviction and cloaking scripts are designed to keep hosts quiet and profitable.

A watchdog is configured to kill 13 rival process patterns and quarantine 11 rival file names every two minutes. It never edits web server configuration, so sites stay up. Three PHP implants serve spam only to search bots and selected mobile visitors.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Correlate Linux executable memory with kernel file locks. Process names are not enough. Alert when an anonymous executable memory region and a temporary advisory lock appear together, and exclude kernel workers, user service managers and non-executable shared memory.
  2. Audit Oracle database links and restrict middleware egress. Inventory privileged database links. Alert on remote directory or Java creation in Unified Audit logs, and block unapproved cloud-bucket downloads from database and middleware servers.
  3. Inspect PHP prepend hooks, backup JVMs and night-time Windows tasks. Replay web checks with search-bot headers. Hunt encoded PowerShell started by Java, hidden local accounts, and SYSTEM tasks running from a temporary folder.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
1,824Records exposed across five staging ports (1,171 unique paths)
99 / 94Script and JSON configuration instances retrieved (94 unique SHA-256 digests)
3Linux persistence hooks (systemd, cron, profile) gated by one advisory file lock
26Core Oracle Database, RAC and E-Business Suite lateral scripts (23 Bash, 3 PHP)
11 / 13Rival file name patterns quarantined, and rival process patterns killed
18:00 to 09:00Local-time window in which a Windows script kills Task Manager
47Published indicators: 30 script digests and 17 network, cloud, binary and pool indicators

As of 16 November 2026, none of six primary indicators appeared in five public threat-intelligence sources. Private commercial feeds and later indexing are outside that check.

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1, Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. Detection engineers should start with Chapters 7 and 8. CTI analysts and hunters will find the tooling detail in Chapters 2 to 5.

2. One Server, Five Ports, Many Jobs

In short

The operator put lateral-movement scripts, callback endpoints, cloaking modules and mining configurations on one Linux VPS. Five HTTP ports serve files, and the scripts reference four more callback ports, a second check-in host and two cloud buckets.

What the server held

The workbench at 38.60.227[.]210 exposed 1,824 directory records across five open HTTP ports. Port 9002 mirrors port 8000, accounting for 645 paths. After removing that mirror and 8 cross-port overlaps, 1,171 unique paths remain.

From ports 8000, 8082 and 8083, 99 script and JSON configuration instances were retrieved. They map to 94 unique SHA-256 digests. By type, they break down as 47 .sh, 16 .php, 13 .json, 13 .ps1, 8 .py, 1 .bat and 1 .js.

Some files appear on more than one port. The table lists them.

FileCopiesPortsNotes
/install_user.sh38000, 8082, 8083425-line R2 variants on 8000 and 8082; 327-line variant on 8083
/config.json38000, 8082, 8083Port-specific pool and thread settings
/javas38000, 8082, 8083ELF payload, listed but not retrieved
/inst_nb.ps128000, 8082Differ only in max-threads-hint (50 vs. 60)
/miner_restart_verify.sh28000, 8083Identical copies
Figure 1: Multi-port staging layout, script-referenced callback ports and retrieved script breakdown
Figure 1: Multi-port staging layout, script-referenced callback ports and retrieved script breakdown

What each port does

Matching script download URLs against directory contents shows a clear layout. Some ports serve files. Others appear only inside scripts as callback endpoints. Whether those callback ports were listening was not verified.

PortRoleFiles listedWhat it holds
8000Main staging root645Zimbra loaders (vsdeploy.sh, ops.sh), rival eviction (excl_evict4.sh), PHP cloakers (z_prepend.php, wbi_v10.php), Ahsay SMB pivot scripts
9002Mirror of 8000645644 identical files plus one unlisted log; likely a fallback if port 8000 is blocked
8093Recon and log store312Scan outputs, target liveness lists, encoded execution logs
8082Fileless and Windows staging120deploy_ghc2.sh, R2 and /miner/ launchers, .wp_inc.php, tj.js, Windows SMB and AnyDesk tools (Taskgmr.ps1, hera_*.ps1)
8083Oracle and PHP relays10223 ebs_*.sh scripts, 10 ora_*.php files, 7 more OCI8 PHP tools, Pentaho loaders, HTTP PUT servers (put_srv*.py)
8898, 8899, 9001, 13574Callbacks named in scriptsNot verified45-second HTTP polling (8898), eviction and recon uploads (8899), pull-test callbacks (9001), VShell sessions (13574)

A second host, 38.60.252[.]110, receives /GEO_TOP_<host> check-ins on port 8900. Its reachability was also not verified.

Why this toolkit does not fit one label

Threat models often separate enterprise intrusion groups from opportunistic miners. This server holds both kinds of tooling. The scripts are written to reach high-CPU database and middleware servers through Oracle database links, Zimbra configuration changes, SMB and MSSQL execution, and lock-gated Linux persistence.

Companion modules are designed to earn money from the same hosts. They run mining at night and serve spam to search bots. The stage labels in Figure 1 reflect how files were grouped by port and campaign on the server.

Binaries listed but not retrieved

The directory listings also named 122 binary and archive files that were not retrieved. Their names show how the operator prepares privilege escalation and tunnelling.

PortStaged filesPlatformPurpose
8082/github-c2-agent-dual, /vs.agent, /agent_l64Linux ELFMain C2 and VShell agent binaries used by deploy_ghc2.sh, vsdeploy.sh and boot.sh
8082/cve3156/pwnkit.tar.gz, pwnkit2.tar.gz, pwnkit3.tar.gz, hax.tar.gz, /dirtyfragLinux local rootPrivilege-escalation archives for sudo and polkit, plus a kernel exploit binary
8082/.nd/NtApiDotNet.dll, /win/edge.exeWindows.NET token and RPC library for the PrintSpoofer loaders, and a disguised Windows payload
8000/chisel_linux, /chisel_orig.exe, /chisel_upx.exe, /plink.exe, /vagent_win.exeLinux and WindowsReverse SOCKS and port-forwarding tools to reach internal Oracle and SMB tiers

The cve3156 folder name points at CVE-2021-3156 in sudo. The pwnkit archives point at CVE-2021-4034 in polkit. Both are long-patched, so unpatched hosts are the real risk.

3. Memory-Only Linux Agents and Cloudflare R2 Delivery

In short

The root bootstrapper deploy_ghc2.sh carries the author's own notes on how its agent hides. The agent deletes its file, blanks its command line and fakes its executable path, and three hooks restart it only when a kernel file lock is free.

The bootstrapper and its author's notes

The most carefully built Linux file is deploy_ghc2.sh on port 8082. It is 156 lines and 5,796 bytes, with SHA-256 549d39ceceb57866c0ade97fa02897d29f3141034ff6a02732118324c4ca1ce7. It runs as root, downloads a binary named github-c2-agent-dual, and guards it against process sweeps and broken downloads.

The binary itself was not retrieved. Its GitHub C2 channel rests on the deployment banner (GitHub-C2 agent) and the file name. No repository URL or token was found.

Figure 2: Fileless GitHub-C2 execution, kernel flock liveness and Cloudflare R2 fallback
Figure 2: Fileless GitHub-C2 execution, kernel flock liveness and Cloudflare R2 fallback

The author left four numbered lessons in Chinese at the top of the script, headed "pitfalls already stepped in, do not alter". A fifth note sits around line 36. Translated, they say the following.

NoteWhat it saysWhy it matters to defenders
1. Self-deleting agentThe agent deletes its binary at startup (fileless/memfd). A master copy must sit outside its scope so the guard can restore it.The running process has no file on disk, but a master copy does.
2. Invisible to pgrepThe process has no comm name and an empty command line. The only reliable liveness check is flock -n on the lock file.Process-name hunts miss it. Lock files do not.
3. Checksum before installDownloads must pass a SHA-256 check with retries. A partial download once left a CentOS 7 host "permanently dark".The enforced hash identifies the agent binary.
4. System-style namesAll names pose as cache or system parts: cache-sync, cpsrv, Cache sync helper.Search for these names in units, cron and profile scripts.
Line ~36The agent sets /proc/<pid>/exe to /usr/lib/systemd/systemd with PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE, so the script skips system folders when finding its working directory.A systemd process that is not PID 1 is a red flag.

The script also records these defaults.

DefaultValue
Payload URLhttp://38.60.227[.]210:8082/github-c2-agent-dual
Enforced SHA-256 of the agentd11b12d628615d5eff982e3e312f4c406fde38373eee76bc056be780a9e2e665
Master cache folder/usr/local/lib/.cache-sync/
Kernel lock file/var/tmp/.systemd/inhibit.lock

How the agent hides

According to the script, the agent removes its own ELF file and keeps running from an anonymous memory file (memfd). It clears its comm and cmdline strings, so pgrep finds nothing. It then calls prctl with PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE to point /proc/<pid>/exe at /usr/lib/systemd/systemd.

The script's own filter skips /memfd:* and /usr/* paths when it works out the agent's folder. That confirms the author expected both tricks to be in place.

For hunters, this means /proc/<pid>/exe -> memfd: alone is not a reliable check. Correlate three signals instead:

  • executable (r-xp) anonymous memfd: regions in /proc/<pid>/maps
  • a systemd process that is not PID 1 and has no --user argument
  • a lock inode in /proc/locks that matches a file under /var/tmp

This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1620 (Reflective Code Loading). The operator-claimed GitHub channel would map to T1102.002 (Web Service: Bidirectional Communication).

Three hooks gated by one file lock

The running agent holds an exclusive advisory lock on /var/tmp/.systemd/inhibit.lock. Three persistence hooks are written to test that lock with flock -n:

HookPath
systemd unit/etc/systemd/system/cache-sync.service
cron job/etc/cron.d/cache-sync
login profile/etc/profile.d/cache-sync.sh

If a hook can take the lock, the agent is dead. The hook then checks the master copy in /usr/local/lib/.cache-sync/ against the hardcoded SHA-256 and restores it. This replaces ps and pidof checks, which the agent defeats.

Rootless launchers for service accounts

Initial access often lands in an unprivileged service account such as oracle, zimbra, pentaho or apache, with no sudo rights. For that case the toolkit ships rootless launchers that install a process named java_update.

Port and pathLines / bytesDelivery and checks
8000:/install_user.sh425 / 16,351Sends a check-in to 38.60.252[.]110:8900/GEO_TOP_<host>; pulls /javas and /config.json from the R2 bucket pub-307c565a487b43c5bee73d21edc4d83b.r2[.]dev/linux
8082:/install_user.sh and /linux/install_user.sh425 / 16,351Port 8082 revision; same check-in; stages into $HOME/.cache/java_update with WALLET=krxYMRN97D
8082:/miner/install_user.sh and 8083:/install_user.sh327 / 12,157Direct-IP variant; no :8900 check-in; pulls payloads from 38.60.227[.]210:8082/miner
8083:/inst_pentaho.sh and 8083:/watch_pentaho.sh21 / 1,177 and 5 / 262Stages :8082/miner/javas into /opt/pentaho/.cache/java_update; enforces an 8,350,992-byte size check
8083:/deploy_dyn.sh17 / 1,359Stages into /tmp/.cache/java_update; enforces the same size check plus ELF magic 7f454c46

The 425-line launchers download from Cloudflare R2 by default. That makes payload downloads look like ordinary Cloudflare TLS traffic. This maps to T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer).

The Pentaho and dynamic stagers check that the payload is exactly 8,350,992 bytes (8.35 MB). They then walk /proc/[0-9]*/exe links with readlink to avoid starting a second java_update. They do this without calling ps.

4. Pivoting Through Oracle, Zimbra and Windows

In short

Thirty middleware scripts and companion Zimbra and Windows tools are written to move between Linux and Windows tiers. They target Oracle database links, Zimbra swatchrc files, Pentaho folders and Ahsay Backup web shells.

Figure 3: Cross-tier lateral movement chains across Oracle database links, Zimbra and Windows SMB
Figure 3: Cross-tier lateral movement chains across Oracle database links, Zimbra and Windows SMB

Port 8083 holds 26 core Oracle lateral scripts and 7 supporting OCI8 PHP tools. They are written for Oracle Database 11.2.0.4, Real Application Clusters (ebs_rac.sh) and Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS).

Script groupListed / hashedKey filesWhat they are written to do
ebs_*.sh database-link wrappers23 / 23ebs_deploy.sh, ebs_rac.sh, ebs_java.sh, ebs_verify.sh, ebs_zz.shConnect with sqlplus to an internal database on port 1530, then call SYS.DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@ or APPS.P9ZZ@ across the TO_EBS link
ora_*.php OCI8 deployers10 / 3ora_fleet.php, ora_deploy.php, ora_rce.phpCreate directory TMPX9, schedule /bin/sh jobs with DBMS_SCHEDULER.CREATE_JOB, and read output with UTL_FILE
Supporting OCI8 and MySQL PHP tools7 / 7dl_probe.php, dl_fleet.php, dump2.php, dump_users.php, implant.php, jobchk.php, lateral.phpList database links and session_privs@, dump application user tables, schedule WPOLL command pollers, and pivot to internal web apps

The script ebs_deploy.sh (63 lines, 4,199 bytes) lays out a four-step remote sequence.

StepOracle call across @TO_EBSIntended effect on the remote EBS database
1. Map a folderSYS.DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@TO_EBSCreate directory TMPX9 pointing at /tmp
2. Output tableSYS.DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@TO_EBSDrop and recreate table T9Z to hold command output (schema withheld)
3. Read-back procedureSYS.DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@TO_EBSCompile procedure P9Z, which reads /tmp/.st3 with UTL_FILE.FOPEN into T9Z
4. OS jobSYS.DBMS_SCHEDULER.CREATE_JOB@TO_EBSCreate /bin/sh job JZEBS1 to fetch :8082/miner/javas into /tmp/.cache/java_update and write output to /tmp/.st3

Why database links bypass network segmentation.

Firewalls often isolate EBS servers but still allow SQL*Net (TCP 1521/1530) from neighbouring databases over pre-configured links. A call to SYS.DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@<link> runs privileged DDL on the remote instance. No direct socket to the EBS host is needed.

Two more scripts, ebs_java.sh and ebs_zz.sh, are written to compile Java classes PWNX and PWNZ on the remote side. PL/SQL wrappers P9RUN and APPS.P9ZZ@ expose them for inline command execution. This maps to T1053 (Scheduled Task/Job).

Zimbra swatchrc handling and noexec probing

Seven Zimbra scripts on port 8000, including persist.sh, vsdeploy.sh and ops.sh, mention CVE-2026-73570 in comments or backup file names. NVD lists this as a Zimbra Collaboration Suite SNMP monitoring (swatchrc / dosnmp) command-injection flaw, published 13 August 2026 and fixed in Zimbra 10.1.20.

These are post-exploitation scripts, not exploit traffic. The CVE label alone does not show which initial access path was used on any target.

The scripts treat /opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrc in two opposite ways:

  • persist.sh tells the operator to leave swatchrc alone, so the CVE-2026-73570 re-entry channel stays open.
  • ops.sh is written to back up the file as swatchrc.bak_cve73570 and rewrite the dosnmp entry with marker z_73570_ok, closing the channel to rival operators.

Testing for noexec mounts.

Hardened servers often mount /tmp with noexec. Before downloading anything, vsdeploy.sh loops through /tmp, $HOME/.cache, /dev/shm and $HOME. In each it creates a small test stub (.sysjvd/.t), marks it executable and tries to run it.

Once a folder passes, the script fetches a VShell binary of more than 7 MB (.sysjvd/.va), which calls back to 38.60.227[.]210:13574. The companion persist.sh installs a 45-second curl poller (pb.sh in .jvbd). It checks /c/, /o/ and /ping/ on 38.60.227[.]210:8898.

From backup servers to Windows: Ahsay, SMB, AnyDesk and Task Manager

To move from backup appliances into Windows subnets, the server stages 16 Windows scripts alongside Python and MSSQL wrappers. Four modules stand out.

ModulePortHow it is deliveredWhat it is written to do on Windows
ahsay_localdep.py and go_local.ps18000HTTPS requests with certificate checks off (ssl.CERT_NONE) to a JSP web shell on an Ahsay Backup server, passing ?c=powershell -nop -enc ...Stage edge.exe, go_local.ps1 and config_template.json in C:WindowsTempmsedge, mount neighbouring IPC$ shares, and copy the files to \<ip>ADMIN$Tempmsedge
inst_nb.ps18000, 8082Invoke-SMBExec sessions running as SYSTEMDownload :8082/win/edge.exe, write a plaintext Stratum config.json (tls: false) and register task MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore
actor.ps1, dec_hera*.ps1, hera_*.ps18082MSSQL xp_cmdshell into reflective .NET PrintSpoofer loaders (dec_hera2.ps1, dec_hera3.ps1)hera_adduser.ps1 creates a hidden local administrator MSSQL$; hera_setpwd.ps1 overwrites ad.anynet.pwd_hash in C:ProgramDataAnyDeskservice.conf
win/Taskgmr.ps1 and wa.bat8082, 8000Pulled from port 8082 or an Alibaba Cloud OSS bucket (imagefiles-backup.oss-ap-southeast-7.aliyuncs[.]com/javas/win/)Watch Task Manager and hide the miner from it, as described below

The hidden account works by setting WinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList to 0 for MSSQL$. That keeps it off the Windows logon screen. The AnyDesk change sets an operator-chosen password hash, which is withheld here. These map to T1136.001 (Create Local Account) and T1219 (Remote Access Software). The fake Edge update task maps to T1053.005 and T1036.005.

Task Manager watch (Taskgmr.ps1).

This 151-line script polls Taskmgr and TaskmgrApp every 3 seconds with Get-Process and CIM Win32_Process. During the day, it stops MicrosoftEdgeUpdateSvc whenever Task Manager opens. That hides the miner's CPU use from anyone who looks.

Between 18:00 and 09:00 local time, the script's "automatic Kill Window" applies. If Task Manager stays open longer than 3,600 seconds, a function named Kill-TaskManager closes it. The aim is long, quiet night-time mining runs.

5. Evicting Rivals and Cloaking for Search Bots

In short

Internet-facing servers often host several competing intruders. A watchdog script is written to kill rival processes and quarantine their files every two minutes, while three PHP implants show spam only to search bots.

Figure 4: Rival-implant quarantine watchdog and conditional PHP search-bot cloaking
Figure 4: Rival-implant quarantine watchdog and conditional PHP search-bot cloaking

A watchdog that avoids breaking the site

Opportunistic botnets such as Kinsing (kdevtmpfsi) often overwrite crontabs and web configuration. The resulting outages bring in incident responders. The script excl_evict4.sh ("Exclusive Eviction v4", 7,153 bytes, 131 lines) takes the opposite approach. It is written around five rules.

RuleWhat the script does
1. No web configuration editsThe header forbids writing to .htaccess or nginx.conf, so site routing keeps working
2. Quarantine, not deleteForeign binaries and web shells are moved with mv into /tmp/.excl_q, so a wrongly matched web file can be recovered
3. Protect its own filesThe sweep skips the operator's files by name (.sysjvd, .va, java_update, z_73570) and by content (38.60.227[.]210, :8899)
4. Match rival names and processes11 file name patterns are quarantined; a 13-branch grep -iE sweep runs kill -9 on matching processes
5. Repeat and reportEvery 120 seconds it re-scans, checks its own implants are running (selfok) and posts a log to 38.60.227[.]210:8899

The match lists are below.

Match typeCountPatterns
File quarantine (FOREIGNNAMES)11.khp, .rguard, .exectest, .java_cache, .app_args, .d, phpupdate, kinsing, kdevtmpfsi, .ksmd_, .UUID_NODEID
Process kill (kill -9)135 shared with the file list (kinsing, kdevtmpfsi, .ksmd_, .khp, .rguard) plus 8 miner and daemon names (xmrig, minerd, kryptex, nicehash, xmr-stak, sysupdates, kworkerds, crond64)

For defenders, a folder named /tmp/.excl_q full of other malware is a sign that a second intruder is on the host.

PHP prepend implants that cloak for search bots

On PHP servers, three implants hook the auto_prepend_file setting: z_prepend.php, wbi_v10.php and .wp_inc.php. A JavaScript redirector, tj.js, pairs with them. PHP runs the prepended file before the application on every dynamic request. No Nginx change is needed.

Each implant decides who sees spam. Administrators and direct visitors get the normal page.

Implant and spam feedWho triggers itWhat it is written to serve
z_prepend.php (th8.jssnjc[.]com/feed.php)Search-bot user agents (googlebot, bingbot, yandex, baiduspider), or a mobile visitor with a target Accept-Language and a search-engine referrerSpam HTML inline to bots (302 fallback); a feed.php?js=1 redirect script to mobile search visitors
wbi_v10.php (th12.jssnjc[.]com/feed.php)Bot user agents; debug switch ?xxe_debug=test123Checks an X-Mode header from the feed and renders the spam payload, skipping static files. It uses only anonymous closures and $GLOBALS['_XP']='V10', so no named functions show up in PHP-FPM function lists
.wp_inc.php (t1.sysflowus[.]com, th10.jssnjc[.]com)googlebot and bingbot only; the mobile and language branches were removed; kill switch ?xxe_off=off9xWhen the feed returns HTTP 200 and X-Mode: inject, buffers the page with ob_start and inserts spam links before </body>

Uptime monitors and homepage checks see the clean page. Only a request that looks like a search bot shows the spam. This maps to T1505.003 (Server Software Component).

6. What the Evidence Can and Cannot Show

In short

The server's own scripts show what the operator built and intended. They do not show which targets were reached, whether the agent binary works as described, or who runs the server.

Scripts versus binaries and victims

The memfd, blank command line and PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE behaviour come from the bootstrapper's comments. The agent binary was not retrieved, so these were not confirmed by disassembly. The GitHub C2 channel rests only on the banner and file name.

Lateral scripts such as ebs_deploy.sh and ahsay_localdep.py describe intended workflows. They do not show that the steps ran on any target, or what state any victim is in now. The SHA-256 values in Chapter 9 were recorded when the files were acquired.

Four explanations for the server

Because the evidence comes from a staging host and not from victims, we weighed four explanations. Without target-side logs or client authorization records, none can be fully excluded. This is an analytical model, not attribution.

HypothesisFitsDoes not fitCannot be excluded without target records
1. Unauthorized intrusion and monetization workbenchOracle, Zimbra and Ahsay pivots paired with live pool accounts (krxYMRN97D), spam feeds (*.jssnjc[.]com) and rival evictionNothing in the staging evidenceWhether specific scripts ran on targets or stayed drafts
2. Authorized red-team exerciseStandard lateral tools (DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@, Invoke-SMBExec, PrintSpoofer, chisel, plink) and target-scoped scriptsThird-party spam feeds, rival quarantine, night-time mining configs, and a note about bricking a CentOS 7 hostWhether a tester copied real monetization scripts as realistic lures
3. Research lab or honeypot1,824 records on five open directory listeners on one public VPSTarget-specific Oracle schema and link names, callback ports (8898, 8899, 13574) and custom checksum guardsWhether the server mirrors or sinkholes a captured toolkit
4. Open-source test fixtureKnown privilege-escalation archives (pwnkit, dirtyfrag, NtApiDotNet.dll) and standard SQL and PowerShell templatesCustom markers (z_73570_ok, TMPX9, P9ZZ, WALLET=krxYMRN97D) and two-server callback wiringWhether sub-modules came from unpublished training or shared toolkits

Hypothesis 1 fits all the staging evidence. The others each meet at least one conflict.

Shared mining pools are not operator infrastructure

The scripts name three bare IP addresses on port 8029, labelled # pool egress (Kryptex naked IPs) in diag.sh. They also name xmr.kryptex[.]network:8029 and gulf.moneroocean[.]stream:443. These are shared public mining-pool front ends used by many unrelated miners. Treat them as policy signals, not as C2.

The operator's own infrastructure is different. It is the workbench (38.60.227[.]210), the check-in host (38.60.252[.]110:8900) and a custom TLS pool proxy (wa.theshyc[.]xyz:5556, which resolves to 38.54.14[.]162).

Of the 24 files that reference krxYMRN97D, most use encrypted Stratum. 8083:/config_t31.json sets tls: true, and six Linux Oracle and Pentaho stagers use TLS Stratum on port 8029. Plaintext Stratum (tls: false) appears only in 8000:/config_template.json and the two inst_nb.ps1 copies. The other 14 files pass the account without a TLS flag.

Direct-IP TLS on port 8029 encrypts the login and sends no server name. Network rules alone will miss it, so pair them with a host-side search for krxYMRN97D. Likewise, blocking all *.r2[.]dev traffic would break developer tools. Tie R2 alerts to the process that made the request.

7. What Defenders Should Do

These steps cover the Linux agents, the Oracle, Zimbra and Windows pivots, and the rival-eviction scripts in Chapters 3 to 5, ordered by urgency.

Within 24 hours

  • Block traffic to 38.60.227[.]210 (all listed ports), 38.60.252[.]110:8900 and wa.theshyc[.]xyz:5556 (38.54.14[.]162).
  • Block the R2 bucket pub-307c565a487b43c5bee73d21edc4d83b.r2[.]dev, the OSS bucket imagefiles-backup.oss-ap-southeast-7.aliyuncs[.]com, *.jssnjc[.]com, t1.sysflowus[.]com and vjdghqegthea[.]cn[.]com.
  • Search Linux hosts for /var/tmp/.systemd/inhibit.lock, /usr/local/lib/.cache-sync/, cache-sync.service, /tmp/.sysjvd/, /tmp/.jvbd/, /tmp/.excl_q/ and any java_update folder.

Within 72 hours

  • On Linux, correlate executable memfd: mappings, /proc/<pid>/exe -> /memfd:* and non-PID-1 systemd processes with lock inodes in /proc/locks. Exclude kthreadd workers, systemd --user and non-executable shared memory.
  • Turn on Oracle Unified Auditing of SQL_TEXT. Alert on DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@, DBMS_SCHEDULER.CREATE_JOB@, TMPX9 and COMPILE JAVA SOURCE, and review DBA_DB_LINKS.
  • Update Zimbra to 10.1.20 or later (CVE-2026-73570) and watch /opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrc for the z_73570_ok marker.
  • Check php.ini and .user.ini for unexpected auto_prepend_file entries. Replay key pages with a Googlebot user agent and with mobile search headers.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Patch sudo (CVE-2021-3156) and polkit (CVE-2021-4034), and limit SeImpersonatePrivilege on Windows service accounts.
  • Hunt chisel and plink reverse tunnels (R: arguments), encoded PowerShell started by Java, files in C:WindowsTempmsedge, a hidden MSSQL$ account, AnyDesk service.conf edits and Taskgmr.ps1.
  • Limit egress from database and middleware servers to approved destinations. Pair port-8029 alerts with host searches for krxYMRN97D.
  • Before keeping permanent IP blocks, re-check who owns the VPS addresses. Cloud addresses get reassigned.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Together they cover five layers: the Linux kernel, the Oracle database, the network perimeter, web and mail servers, and Windows endpoints.

Figure 5: Five-layer detection architecture across Linux, Oracle, network, web and Windows
Figure 5: Five-layer detection architecture across Linux, Oracle, network, web and Windows
Rule fileWhat it catches
linux_auditd_memfd_and_flock.rulesLinux auditd: memfd_create with execveat, prctl executable spoofing, scoped flock calls, writes under /var/tmp and /dev/shm, and watches on the campaign's persistence paths
suricata_r2_staging_and_c2_beacons.rulesSuricata 7: 17 signatures for staging downloads, R2 and OSS buckets, C2 polling, cloaking feeds, web-shell PowerShell and Stratum traffic
sentinel_cross_platform_fileless_and_smb_hunt.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: Linux and Windows process, registry, file and network hunt across the campaign's artifacts
sigma_hybrid_fileless_dblink_and_taskgmr.ymlSigma (6 rules): flock liveness checks, Oracle database-link DDL, Java-spawned encoded PowerShell, fake Edge tasks, hidden MSSQL$ and tunnels, AnyDesk and Task Manager script blocks
yara_ghc2_eviction_and_prepend_implants.yarYARA (5 rules): the bootstrapper, the eviction watchdog, the PHP cloakers, Oracle pivot scripts and mining configs

Linux auditd

The auditd rules need kernel 3.17 or later, for memfd_create and execveat. They load paired 64-bit and 32-bit syscall rules before the file watches, and use -i so a missing optional folder does not stop loading.

Rule keyLooks forNotes
odin_r3_execveat, odin_r3_memfd_createExecution from an anonymous file descriptorCorrelate both on the same PID within 5 seconds; pulseaudio, pipewire and systemd-journald are excluded from memfd_create
odin_r3_prctl_exe_masqueradeprctl with PR_SET_MM and PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILECatches the /proc/<pid>/exe spoof
odin_r3_flock_syscallflock calls outside systemd, cron, logrotate and dpkgScope alerts to lock files under /var/tmp, /tmp or /dev/shm
odin_r3_vartmp_staging, odin_r3_shm_stagingFile creation and renames under /var/tmp and /dev/shmOn ARM64, drop legacy creat and rename
Path watchescache-sync.service, .cache-sync/, inhibit.lock, .sysjvd/, .jvbd/, .excl_q/, swatchrc, the Pentaho java_update path, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/profile.d/Deep paths arm only if the parent folder exists at load time

The rules deliberately do not filter out unset login IDs. That keeps service daemons such as zimbra, oracle and tomcat in scope. Container runtimes such as runc and crun may need an allowlist if they call memfd_create.

Suricata

Run these at perimeter egress and DMZ boundaries with the HTTP and TLS parsers on. SID 9302607 needs TLS termination in front of backup or middleware web servers, because ahsay_localdep.py uses HTTPS.

SIDsLooks for
9302601, 9302602Downloads of /deploy_ghc2.sh and /github-c2-agent-dual
9302603TLS server name of the R2 payload bucket
9302604, 9302612, 9302613pb.sh polling on port 8898: GET /ping/<host>, GET /c/<host>, POST /o/<host>
9302605Any outbound connection to 38.60.227[.]210 on the nine workbench ports
9302614/GEO_TOP_ check-ins to 38.60.252[.]110:8900
9302606, 9302608, 9302609TLS server names of the cloaking feeds and the tj.js redirector
9302607Inbound c=powershell with -enc in a URL query (web-shell pivot)
9302610Plain HTTP fetches of /javas/win/ from the Alibaba OSS bucket (wa.bat)
9302611TLS to wa.theshyc[.]xyz on port 5556
9302615krxYMRN97D in plaintext Stratum on port 8029
9302616Any connection to the three shared Kryptex pool IPs on port 8029 (policy signal)
9302617TLS server name ending kryptex[.]network on port 8029 (policy signal)

Scope SIDs 9302616 and 9302617 to database, middleware and DMZ subnets. They fire on any Kryptex miner, so confirm with a host-side krxYMRN97D check before linking an alert to this operator.

Microsoft Sentinel KQL

The query looks back 14 days and joins DeviceInfo to label each host's platform. It has four branches.

BranchLooks for
Process and persistenceCommand lines and paths with deploy_ghc2.sh, java_update, .cache-sync, .sysjvd, .jvbd, swatchrc.bak_cve73570, MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore, Tempmsedge, krxYMRN97D, the wallet prefix, net user MSSQL$, and chisel or plink with R:
Hidden account registryWrites under WinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList naming MSSQL$ or setting 0
AnyDesk tamperingWrites to ProgramDataAnyDeskservice.conf by any process other than AnyDesk.exe
NetworkConnections to the workbench IPs, the shared pool IPs on 8029, exact campaign host names, the jssnjc[.]com and vjdghqegthea[.]cn[.]com suffixes, kryptex[.]network, and *.r2[.]dev requests from shells, curl, Python or PowerShell

Each network hit is labelled. Exact campaign hosts are direct hits. Related domain suffixes and R2 traffic from scripting tools are hunt leads, and pool traffic is a policy check. Allowlist approved developer R2 bucket names, not whole processes. If a management tool deploys AnyDesk configuration, allowlist that signed binary by path and hash.

Sigma

The six Sigma rules need Linux process logs, Oracle Unified Auditing with SQL_TEXT, Windows process creation (Security 4688 or Sysmon 1) and PowerShell Script Block Logging (4104).

Sigma ruleFires when
Linux flock liveness and master cacheA flock command, or any command line, names /var/tmp/.systemd/inhibit, .cache-sync, github-c2-agent-dual or deploy_ghc2.sh
Oracle database-link DDL and scheduler pivotSQL_TEXT contains DBMS_UTILITY.EXEC_DDL_STATEMENT@, DBMS_SCHEDULER.CREATE_JOB@, CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY TMPX9, COMPILE JAVA SOURCE NAMED "PWN, APPS.P9ZZ@ or P9RUN@
Backup or Tomcat JVM spawning encoded PowerShelljava.exe, javaw.exe, bJW.exe, cbssvc.exe or a Tomcat service starts PowerShell with an encoded-command flag
Fake Edge update in Tempschtasks /create with MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore and WindowsTempmsedge, or edge.exe running from that folder
Hidden MSSQL$ and reverse tunnelsnet user MSSQL$ /add, a SpecialAccountsUserList change naming MSSQL$, or chisel in client mode with R:
AnyDesk hash or Task Manager loop in PowerShellA script block writing ad.anynet.pwd_hash= to AnyDesk service.conf, or containing MicrosoftEdgeUpdateSvc, TaskMgrMaxOpenDuration and KillStartTime together

Routine SELECT ... FROM dual@<link> queries are common in Oracle. Keep the database rule scoped to the DDL, scheduler, directory and Java calls listed above. On backup appliances, allowlist signed vendor scripts by full path.

YARA

The five YARA rules scan web roots, temporary folders, /usr/local/lib and service-account homes. Size limits keep them off large database files.

YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_R3_Linux_Deploy_GitHubC2_Memfd_GuardAt least three bootstrapper strings appear in a file under 50 KB
ODIN_R3_Linux_Exclusive_Turf_Eviction_WatchdogAt least three watchdog strings appear in a file under 60 KB
PHP prepend cloaker rule (ODIN_R3_PHP_AutoPrepend_*)At least two cloaker strings appear in a PHP file under 30 KB
ODIN_R3_Oracle_DBLink_DDL_Lateral_PivotA high-confidence DDL or Java string appears, or enough supporting and staging strings appear together, in a file under 40 KB, so routine DBA checks do not fire
ODIN_R3_Campaign_Monetization_Config_And_StagerA mining config under 200 KB names krxYMRN97D, the Monero wallet or the custom pool proxy

Hunting in /proc

Live checks need root or CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Link three signals per process: executable memfd mappings, PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE spoofing and lock inodes in /proc/locks.

Treat as normal the known non-executable shared-memory users (pulseaudio, pipewire, wayland, php-fpm opcache) and post-upgrade daemons. Do not allowlist /proc/<pid>/exe -> /memfd:* by process name alone. An operator can pass a fake name such as pulseaudio to memfd_create.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueHow the toolkit uses itDetection
Defense EvasionT1620 Reflective Code LoadingAgent runs from memfd after deleting its fileauditd memfd_create and execveat; Sigma flock rule
Command and ControlT1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationGitHub C2 channel, claimed by the banner and file name onlyYARA bootstrapper rule; SIDs 9302601 and 9302602
Command and ControlT1105 Ingress Tool TransferPayloads from Cloudflare R2, Alibaba OSS and the workbenchSIDs 9302603, 9302605, 9302610; KQL network branch
ExecutionT1053 Scheduled Task/JobDBMS_SCHEDULER.CREATE_JOB@ over database linksSigma Oracle rule; YARA Oracle rule
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled TaskMicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore task from TempmsedgeSigma fake Edge rule; KQL process branch
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShellEncoded PowerShell through the Ahsay web shellSID 9302607; Sigma JVM rule
PersistenceT1505.003 Server Software ComponentAhsay JSP web shell and PHP prepend implantsSigma JVM rule; YARA cloaker rule
PersistenceT1136.001 Create Account: Local AccountHidden MSSQL$ administratorSigma hidden account rule; KQL registry branch
PersistenceT1219 Remote Access SoftwareAnyDesk password hash overwriteSigma script block rule; KQL AnyDesk branch
Command and ControlT1572 Protocol Tunnelingchisel and plink reverse tunnelsSigma tunnel selection; KQL process branch
Defense EvasionT1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or LocationMicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore, cache-sync, java_update, fake systemd exeSigma rules; auditd path watches

9. Indicators

The report publishes 47 indicators. The Indicators tab holds the 34 that suit automated feeds: the three operator addresses, the agent binary digest and the 30 script digests. The shared pool addresses, domains, buckets, pool account and wallet appear only in the table below.

TypeCount
Operator IPv4 addresses (workbench, check-in host, pool proxy)3
Shared public mining-pool IPv4 addresses (policy signal, not C2)3
Domains and cloud buckets8
Agent binary SHA-2561
Mining pool account and wallet2
Script SHA-256 digests30

Network, cloud and pool indicators

IndicatorPortsRole
38.60.227[.]2108000, 8082, 8083, 8093, 8898, 8899, 9001, 9002, 13574Main staging server and callback host
38.60.252[.]1108900/GEO_TOP_<host> check-in host for the 425-line launchers
38.54.14[.]1625556TLS mining pool proxy behind wa.theshyc[.]xyz
135.125.145[.]1, 51.195.127[.]124, 40.160.29[.]148029Shared public Kryptex pool front ends; policy signal only
pub-307c565a487b43c5bee73d21edc4d83b.r2[.]dev443Cloudflare R2 bucket serving Linux java_update payloads
imagefiles-backup.oss-ap-southeast-7.aliyuncs[.]com80Alibaba OSS bucket serving Taskgmr.ps1, edge.exe and WinRing0x64.sys
th8.jssnjc[.]com, th10.jssnjc[.]com, th12.jssnjc[.]com443Spam and cloaking feeds for the PHP implants
t1.sysflowus[.]com443Link-injection feed for .wp_inc.php
ifwetrtjyudfwtuytxdfarxtyt.vjdghqegthea[.]cn[.]com443JavaScript redirector in tj.js
wa.theshyc[.]xyz5556TLS mining pool proxy host name
d11b12d628615d5eff982e3e312f4c406fde38373eee76bc056be780a9e2e665n/aSHA-256 enforced for github-c2-agent-dual
krxYMRN97Dn/aKryptex pool account in launchers, ebs_*.sh and inst_nb.ps1
89v9DbfLx49f6kuziDnExs6BHGyVV2UanFvMhcAU386sDKtT8eBqAwfhsSmxPwYSJT1r5bQyRgbpGHY741w5gMnk4McHFL3.creativejsn/aMonero wallet and worker name in config.json and cfg511.json

Key script hashes

The Indicators tab lists all 30 script digests with path, port, size and line count. The most useful for hunting on hosts are below.

FilePortBytes / linesSHA-256
/deploy_ghc2.sh80825,796 / 156549d39ceceb57866c0ade97fa02897d29f3141034ff6a02732118324c4ca1ce7
/install_user.sh808216,351 / 42573fe311d3323b6bbc9f97854e43eaf33ed45d3122b236675f68350b820640b01
/excl_evict4.sh80007,153 / 1312a271c5cbf9bcc000b914c6f1f23cabc168fb98ed1628c555a4e4c416a456cde
/vsdeploy.sh80001,756 / 46d441ac91d579ee400e188e36c678e7a543c24a69a7ce6a4aa290bb9c4098aeba
/persist.sh80001,617 / 47c9269bd3c242a96a9bbe4c61df6d8f3473a343e9bbf3a5a91159f0f6baa9bc91
/z_prepend.php80003,148 / 58dbf856873b8142dac2d29118d60532f6d7bdafd8eb8763e9e149b9ef46ec832d
/wbi_v10.php80003,655 / 74a7423702c637bd84d96d69d14b1bbefacebb3bfcbecac44b2990c5f59ab4f720
/.wp_inc.php80825,889 / 137dceb0d07a78ccecd98d7e3b3660a9aef82b580d9ffcbc44d5c0c40e45bdc0ca2
/win/Taskgmr.ps180825,443 / 151481728a7c9c4c02be07051d9c1958d902ea6397ebb8952ab83944818e3d25d21
/ops.sh80003,308 / 72525b7b194bede5a194204bdb78816b0db64b75ff9593e6d2ab3a736da79f44f6

Lateral orchestrators such as ebs_deploy.sh and ahsay_localdep.py run from the staging server or a foothold, not on the target. Hunt them through network traffic, database audit logs and the target artifacts below, rather than by file hash.

Artifacts on target hosts

ArtifactPlatformSource scriptMeaning
/var/tmp/.systemd/inhibit.lock and /usr/local/lib/.cache-sync/Linuxdeploy_ghc2.shLiveness lock and master ELF cache, guarded by cache-sync.service
/opt/zimbra/conf/swatchrc.bak_cve73570 and z_73570_okLinux (Zimbra)ops.shBackup and lockout marker written when swatchrc is changed
Directory TMPX9, Java sources PWNX and PWNZ, function APPS.P9ZZOracle DB / EBSebs_deploy.sh, ebs_zz.shRemote /tmp mapping and Java command wrappers
C:WindowsTempmsedgeedge.exe and task MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCoreWindowsahsay_localdep.py, inst_nb.ps1Disguised SYSTEM task and staging folder, watched by Taskgmr.ps1
MSSQL$ with SpecialAccountsUserList = 0Windowshera_adduser.ps1Hidden local administrator
ad.anynet.pwd_hash in C:ProgramDataAnyDeskservice.confWindowshera_setpwd.ps1Operator password hash written before AnyDesk restarts (value withheld)

Withheld: victim domains, database schema names, internal database addresses, application user names, the AnyDesk password hash and the agent's per-user install path.

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The workbench was observed from 13 to 16 November 2026. The findings describe its contents in that window.
  • Staging is not execution. The scripts show what the operator built and configured. We did not see any step run on a target system.
  • The agent binary was not retrieved. Its hiding behaviour comes from the bootstrapper's comments. Its GitHub C2 channel rests on a banner and a file name.
  • Callback ports are unverified. Ports 8898, 8899, 9001, 13574 and 8900 are named in scripts. Whether they were listening was not checked.
  • Who runs it is open. An unauthorized intrusion workbench fits the evidence best, but a red team, a research mirror or a test fixture cannot be fully excluded.
  • Shared pools are not C2. The three port-8029 pool addresses serve many unrelated miners.
  • Public sources are a snapshot. The zero-hit result covers six indicators in five public sources as of 16 November 2026, not private feeds or later reports.
  • Rule testing. Every published rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma and Microsoft's Kusto.Language analyzer, checked on 20 November 2026). The rules were not replayed against live traffic, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use. The auditd rules were checked against auditctl syntax.

11. Sources

  1. Linux man-pages. memfd_create(2). https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html (verified 18 November 2026)
  2. Linux man-pages. flock(2). https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/flock.2.html (verified 18 November 2026)
  3. Linux man-pages. prctl(2), PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE. https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html (verified 18 November 2026)
  4. Oracle. Database PL/SQL Packages and Types Reference, DBMS_UTILITY. https://docs.oracle.com/en/database/oracle/oracle-database/19/arpls/DBMS_UTILITY.html (verified 18 November 2026)
  5. NIST NVD. CVE-2026-73570 Detail. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73570 (verified 18 November 2026)
  6. Zimbra. Security Advisories (CVE-2026-73570, fixed in 10.1.20). https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories (verified 18 November 2026)
  7. PHP Manual. Core php.ini directives, auto_prepend_file. https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.core.php#ini.auto-prepend-file (verified 18 November 2026)
  8. MITRE ATT&CK. T1620 Reflective Code Loading. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  9. MITRE ATT&CK. T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  10. MITRE ATT&CK. T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ (verified 18 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What was on the server?

Each port had its own job. Port 8000 held the main toolkit, and port 9002 mirrored it, probably as a fallback if 8000 was blocked. Port 8082 held the Linux agent loader and the Windows tools. Port 8083 held the Oracle scripts, and port 8093 stored scan results and logs.

How does the Linux agent hide?

The most carefully built file is a root bootstrapper called deploy_ghc2.sh. It downloads an agent named github-c2-agent-dual, which was not retrieved. The author's own comments in the script explain how the agent hides:

How does it move inside a network?

Thirty middleware scripts target the systems that hold business data. Twenty-six are aimed at Oracle Database, RAC and E-Business Suite. The Oracle scripts use database links, the trusted connections that let one database query another. Through a link, a script can create folders, compile Java code and schedule operating-system jobs on a database the attacker cannot reach directly.

Why does it fight other malware?

Popular servers attract several intruders, and they compete for CPU. A watchdog script, excl_evict4.sh, is configured to run every two minutes. It is written to kill 13 rival process patterns, such as xmrig and kinsing, and moves files matching 11 rival names into a quarantine folder, /tmp/.excl_q.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R03-IOC-01 SHA-256 549d39ceceb57866c0ade97fa02897d29f3141034ff6a02732118324c4ca1ce7 8082 deploy_ghc2.sh · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-02 IPv4 38.60.227[.]210 8082 Main staging server and callback host (ports 8000, 8082, 8083, 8093, 8898, 8899, 9001, 9002, 13574) Block
R03-IOC-03 SHA-256 d11b12d628615d5eff982e3e312f4c406fde38373eee76bc056be780a9e2e665 8082 github-c2-agent-dual binary (digest enforced by deploy_ghc2.sh) Hunt
R03-IOC-04 SHA-256 73fe311d3323b6bbc9f97854e43eaf33ed45d3122b236675f68350b820640b01 8082 install_user.sh · Stage 5: Rival Eviction, SEO Cloaking & R2 Monetization Hunt
R03-IOC-05 IPv4 38.60.252[.]110 8900 Check-in host for the 425-line launchers Block
R03-IOC-06 SHA-256 2a271c5cbf9bcc000b914c6f1f23cabc168fb98ed1628c555a4e4c416a456cde 8000 excl_evict4.sh · Stage 5: Rival Eviction, SEO Cloaking & R2 Monetization Hunt
R03-IOC-07 IPv4 38.54.14[.]162 5556 TLS mining pool proxy behind the operator's pool host name Block
R03-IOC-08 SHA-256 d441ac91d579ee400e188e36c678e7a543c24a69a7ce6a4aa290bb9c4098aeba 8000 vsdeploy.sh · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-09 SHA-256 c9269bd3c242a96a9bbe4c61df6d8f3473a343e9bbf3a5a91159f0f6baa9bc91 8000 persist.sh · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-10 SHA-256 dbf856873b8142dac2d29118d60532f6d7bdafd8eb8763e9e149b9ef46ec832d 8000 z_prepend.php · Stage 5: Rival Eviction, SEO Cloaking & R2 Monetization Hunt
R03-IOC-11 SHA-256 af3a3f9702eda99e3fdb8a2bf63f77c52b3180f423d798d674420f18448f6dca 8000 ahsay_localdep.py · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-12 SHA-256 a44e898fa7796b8e86393398c088c78516a94fb2ee823a3c8ac3fc6ec96eaf95 8083 ora_fleet.php · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-13 SHA-256 dadd08b682d1d95b6a6c53494a179c0e34779ecdfb3aaa72bb357c87766f2501 8083 ora_deploy.php · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-14 SHA-256 36696147fc80a0657aa9259dd0bfce17fb1b0de42af4e0422b57cee9894504c3 8083 ora_rce.php · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-15 SHA-256 9bb5852cb65e3f9eb102f41f04062cc9c8a0d645e48735918208a08d5554eeb0 8083 ebs_deploy.sh · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-16 SHA-256 8d0823378cf7d6e78020dfe4fd6b9a69c1096be48368a7f91713b74e1a350028 8083 ebs_rac.sh · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-17 SHA-256 815ff1eff88646fa9a24700bdec32cf5142cce7b3419157dd9f56bee8f6041a4 8083 ebs_java.sh · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-18 SHA-256 109f2960e27fa901c1d1d28fb050fb0b0c575f8f6b740d792c1de8fb63c799e8 8083 ebs_verify.sh · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-19 SHA-256 860939d4eda603d22790507e27c085dd598a1d1f21f35dd06b54e0fe6b4cbc8f 8083 inst_pentaho.sh · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-20 SHA-256 867069a658f7f2efbeca4690918c7c830529b893221c66078e28c8c9d7311f72 8083 mq_probe.php · Stage 3: Enterprise Middleware & DB-Link Pivoting Hunt
R03-IOC-21 SHA-256 0f890a3d7102f5a950627f44924e71456f14b9bb5c44616fe20ece7d3b17357e 8083 lateral.php · Stage 6: Encoded Staging & Execution Logs Hunt
R03-IOC-22 SHA-256 0d927ad3490596db7f7a6d4883586ee26cd3726f23aa398ec59eff4b8afee6c5 8083 implant.php · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-23 SHA-256 a7423702c637bd84d96d69d14b1bbefacebb3bfcbecac44b2990c5f59ab4f720 8000 wbi_v10.php · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-24 SHA-256 dceb0d07a78ccecd98d7e3b3660a9aef82b580d9ffcbc44d5c0c40e45bdc0ca2 8082 .wp_inc.php · Stage 2: Fileless & Multi-Protocol C2 Persistence Hunt
R03-IOC-25 SHA-256 481728a7c9c4c02be07051d9c1958d902ea6397ebb8952ab83944818e3d25d21 8082 Taskgmr.ps1 · Stage 4: Windows SMB Lateral & TaskMgr Evasion Hunt
R03-IOC-26 SHA-256 f3d34077915d76b43b497d136a200a6aa705c5a6f9546d4ede7634c6551aeeab 8082 inst_nb.ps1 · Stage 4: Windows SMB Lateral & TaskMgr Evasion Hunt
R03-IOC-27 SHA-256 97036e688d4932109229cce4e4832990184fcbc0135c2c4a404af826990fdebc 8082 actor.ps1 · Stage 6: Encoded Staging & Execution Logs Hunt
R03-IOC-28 SHA-256 eb160e307d20a7586138902c5693cc69a6a03e7370e890310451a562540ab94f 8082 hera_adduser.ps1 · Stage 4: Windows SMB Lateral & TaskMgr Evasion Hunt
R03-IOC-29 SHA-256 85f7f6cbd9db334213be08a3da2b76d15b1b5a8c86f8df62b4061ef4f0387854 8082 dec_hera2.ps1 · Stage 4: Windows SMB Lateral & TaskMgr Evasion Hunt
R03-IOC-30 SHA-256 caaa8acedea1d9fbcc6802c03da6e50c93d9f8b6b9dbf56193a0a36312e5af82 8083 fam_scan.py · Stage 1: Subnet Recon & Target Fingerprinting Hunt
R03-IOC-31 SHA-256 0a76b965f59b05458a64b75130fb0384f4b4faacea11e0338bf53087f576c3f9 8083 fp_lan.py · Stage 1: Subnet Recon & Target Fingerprinting Hunt
R03-IOC-32 SHA-256 d143740b871dd26fd5cc0a8d8c4385f48d4a658eaafa1a35330638d77b12d462 8083 scan_lan.py · Stage 1: Subnet Recon & Target Fingerprinting Hunt
R03-IOC-33 SHA-256 4d86e984d2a1a9079657171fd8b797c898ccc5b2f4ca709e4ddb72b38b5fb727 8083 dbscan.py · Stage 1: Subnet Recon & Target Fingerprinting Hunt
R03-IOC-34 SHA-256 525b7b194bede5a194204bdb78816b0db64b75ff9593e6d2ab3a736da79f44f6 8000 ops.sh · Stage 6: Encoded Staging & Execution Logs Hunt

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

Suricata linux_auditd_memfd_and_flock.rules 39 lines
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Sentinel KQL sentinel_cross_platform_fileless_and_smb_hunt.kql 95 lines
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Sigma sigma_hybrid_fileless_dblink_and_taskgmr.yml 189 lines
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Suricata suricata_r2_staging_and_c2_beacons.rules 36 lines
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YARA yara_ghc2_eviction_and_prepend_implants.yar 88 lines
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