1. Executive Summary
In short
In a two-week observation window ending 21 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense examined 3,500 endpoints across 3,311 hosts from 11,819 sightings labelled as Emotet, RedLine Stealer, Raccoon Stealer, LokiBot, and Ramnit. Only seven cloud and VPS endpoints across six IPv4 addresses survived initial collision checks, and none carried independent C2 beacon corroboration. Meanwhile, all 700 examined Ramnit rows carried an upstream victim label and 208 rows sat on broadband ISPs or shared CDNs. Keep unverified feed IPs off static block lists and hunt HTTP, SOAP, and process signals.
Security teams frequently import bulk malware feeds into perimeter firewalls without cyber threat intelligence platform review, expecting every listed IPv4 address to belong to an attacker server. Across these feeds, upstream exports mix cloud and VPS listings with broadband, shared proxy, and victim-labelled addresses.
Blocking raw Emotet or Ramnit IP lists cuts off broadband subscribers, breaks websites behind Cloudflare, and leaves proxy-fronted panels that defenders can review with external attack surface management online. Because none of the 3,311 hosts in our study spans two families, we present the five families as an analytical model.
Only seven cloud and VPS relay candidates remain among 3,500 examined rows.
Across 11,819 global sightings and 34 upstream "confirmed" records, collision filtering left five Emotet endpoints on four cloud and VPS addresses plus two RedLine Stealer endpoints. Because independent C2 beacon corroboration is not documented for those six addresses, all 3,500 examined endpoints across 3,311 hosts stay withheld.
All 700 examined Ramnit rows carry an upstream victim label and were withheld.
Ramnit accounts for 6,804 global sightings (57.6% of the five-family total) and carries an explicit victim classification in upstream feeds. That pool includes four entries marked verified on FTP port 21 and port 8443. Blocking raw Ramnit exports blackholes 599 victim-labelled enterprise and broadband hosts in China, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia rather than verified attacker command servers.
Telecom carriers and shared CDNs account for 208 collateral collision rows.
Seventy-three LokiBot candidates sit behind shared Cloudflare proxies; 66 Emotet rows sit on broadband carriers or Akamai edge nodes; 65 RedLine and four Raccoon rows belong to subscriber ISPs. Network signatures for SOAP contracts, PHP gates, and multipart POSTs can flag matching traffic without static IP blocks; each match needs triage.
Three Decisions for Leaders
- Require an independent protocol or endpoint signal before blocking feed IPv4 addresses. Even the seven dedicated cloud and VPS relay candidates across Amazon Web Services, DigitalOcean, and Hetzner lacked documented C2 beacon proof. Keep all 3,500 uncorroborated, ISP, CDN, and victim-labelled endpoints out of static firewall deny lists.
- Quarantine victim-tagged botnet feeds and shared CDN ranges before firewall import. Route Ramnit victim records, broadband telecom networks, and Cloudflare or Akamai proxy addresses to threat-hunting workflows instead of outbound deny lists.
- Shift loader and stealer defense to wire-level HTTP, SOAP, and endpoint process rules. Alert on RedLine WCF SOAP headers, LokiBot PHP submission paths, Raccoon
/configposts, andregsvr32.exeorrundll32.exeoutbound network sessions.
The Study in Numbers
| Number | What it is |
|---|---|
| 11,819 | Global feed sightings across Emotet, RedLine Stealer, Raccoon Stealer, LokiBot, and Ramnit |
| 3,500 / 3,311 | Examined endpoints (700 per family) across 3,311 distinct hosts and 2,368 /24 subnets |
| 7 / 6 IPs | Dedicated cloud and VPS relay candidates (5 Emotet, 2 RedLine) across 6 withheld IPv4s; C2 uncorroborated |
| 700 / 599 | Examined victim-labelled Ramnit endpoints withheld across 599 hosts |
| 208 / 42 | Broadband telecom ISP, Emotet-labelled carrier, and Cloudflare or Akamai rows across 42 networks |
| 2,585 | Other unconfirmed port, TLS fingerprint, and historical panel candidates held for hunting |
| 8 | Published TLS JARM indicators in the Indicators tab (plus 5 text-only wire signatures in Chapter 9) |
How to use this report.
Security leaders can start with Chapters 1, 6, and 7. Network and firewall teams should read Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7. SOC analysts and detection engineers should go directly to Chapters 8 and 9. Threat intelligence analysts will find the hosting breakdown and scope limits in Chapters 2, 5, 6, and 10; the Odin Research blog collects related cases.
2. Five Malware Labels, One Analytical Model
In short
Zero hosts among the 3,311 distinct hosts in our sample carry labels from more than one family. We present Emotet, RedLine Stealer, Raccoon Stealer, LokiBot, and Ramnit together as an analytical model of feed-list collisions, not as one threat actor. Keep uncorroborated feed lists off firewalls and hunt protocol signals.
Modular Windows loaders (Emotet), Malware-as-a-Service information stealers (RedLine Stealer and Raccoon Stealer), PHP credential panels (LokiBot), and legacy banking worms (Ramnit) serve distinct criminal roles. Even so, threat feeds often ship all five inside one indicator stream without separating attacker servers from victim or proxy addresses. None of the five families in this report overlaps with Monographs 24 or 35.
Comparing host records across all 3,500 examined endpoints shows zero shared hosts across families. Our 3,311 distinct hosts equal 678 Emotet, 683 RedLine, 700 Raccoon, 651 LokiBot, and 599 Ramnit hosts, with zero shared custom certificates across the seven cloud and VPS relay candidates. At the /24 prefix level (2,368 distinct /24 blocks), 21 commercial hosting blocks hold candidates from two families.
Those 21 blocks include 10 Raccoon and RedLine, 8 LokiBot and RedLine, 2 LokiBot and Raccoon, and 1 Emotet and Raccoon prefixes. The shared prefixes may reflect co-tenant VPS hosting at M247 Europe SRL, Hetzner Online GmbH, OVH SAS, and Delis LLC; they do not establish operator identity. Figure 1 maps the four functional groups in our analytical model and their defensive split.

From 11,819 global sightings to 3,500 examined endpoints
Global sightings total 11,819 entries across the five families. Ramnit leads with 6,804 sightings across 47 countries (57.6%), followed by RedLine Stealer with 2,247 across 48 countries (19.0%) and Emotet with 1,053 across 59 countries (8.9%).
LokiBot accounts for 885 sightings across 8 countries (7.5%), and Raccoon Stealer accounts for 830 across 34 countries (7.0%). Upstream feeds assign Emotet, RedLine, and Raccoon to command-and-control, LokiBot to panel management, and Ramnit explicitly to a victim category.
Within our 3,500-endpoint sample (700 per family), 247 rows carry last-seen dates inside the two-week window ending 21 November 2026 (59 Emotet, 9 RedLine, and 179 Ramnit rows). The other 3,253 rows carry earlier upstream feed listing dates from 2020 through October 2026 rather than continuous observation by Odin by Brandefense.
Only seven cloud and VPS endpoints (0.20% of examined rows; 0.059% of global sightings) across six IPv4 addresses survived initial collision filtering, and none had independent C2 corroboration. All six addresses and the remaining 3,493 endpoints (99.80%) across 3,305 hosts stay withheld.
| Family | Category | Sightings | Feed "verified" | Examined / hosts | Cloud/VPS relay candidates | ISP & CDN held | Victim held | Other candidates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emotet | C2 | 1,053 | 26 | 700 / 678 | 5 (4 IPs held) | 66 | 0 | 629 |
| RedLine Stealer | C2 | 2,247 | 4 | 700 / 683 | 2 (2 IPs held) | 65 | 0 | 633 |
| Raccoon Stealer | C2 | 830 | 0 | 700 / 700 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 696 |
| LokiBot | Management | 885 | 0 | 700 / 651 | 0 | 73 (Cloudflare) | 0 | 627 |
| Ramnit | Victim | 6,804 | 4 | 700 / 599 | 0 | 0 | 700 (100%) | 0 |
Geographic and hosting split
Across the 3,500 examined endpoints, 2,881 map to 65 countries, while 619 historical panel records carry an unattributed country code. Those 619 rows include 587 LokiBot, 14 Raccoon, 11 RedLine, 4 Ramnit, and 3 Emotet entries, with 583 lacking current ASN routing.
China leads attributed volume with 498 endpoints (438 victim-labelled Ramnit rows and 60 Emotet rows), followed by the United States (451), the Netherlands (407), Germany (304), and Russia (191). South Korea (176, including 161 victim-labelled Ramnit rows), the United Kingdom (97), Singapore (79), Finland (71), France (70), and Uruguay (57) complete the top locations.
| Commercial cloud or VPS provider | Rows | Primary families seen | Study note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon.com, Inc. | 190 | Emotet (124), RedLine (45), Raccoon (21) | 2 upstream-confirmed relay candidates (US, UK) + 188 other candidates |
| DigitalOcean, LLC | 117 | Emotet (102), Raccoon (9), RedLine (6) | 4 upstream-confirmed Emotet endpoints (3 droplets) + 113 other candidates |
| Hetzner Online GmbH | 97 | Raccoon (47), Emotet (39), RedLine (11) | 1 upstream-confirmed RedLine endpoint (FI) + 96 other candidates |
| RootLayer Web Services Ltd. | 80 | RedLine Stealer (80) | Includes 2 withheld port 3389 RDP collisions |
| OVH SAS | 70 | Emotet (35), RedLine (20), Raccoon (14), LokiBot (1) | Shared VPS candidates (0 upstream-confirmed) |
| Partner LLC | 70 | Raccoon Stealer (70) | Historical HTTP port 80 candidates |
| STARK INDUSTRIES SOLUTIONS LTD | 54 | Raccoon (51), RedLine (3) | Offshore VPS candidates |
| M247 Europe SRL | 53 | Raccoon Stealer (53) | European HTTP port 80 candidates |
| AEZA GROUP Ltd | 44 | Raccoon Stealer (44) | Commercial HTTP port 80 candidates |
| SERV.HOST GROUP LTD | 41 | RedLine Stealer (41) | High-port WCF VPS candidates |
3. Cloud and VPS Relay Candidates: Emotet and RedLine Stealer
In short
Emotet and RedLine Stealer account for all seven dedicated cloud and VPS relay candidates (six IPv4 addresses) in this study. Twenty-three other upstream "confirmed" rows in those two families failed review due to telecom listings, lure certificates, or port 3389 RDP collisions. Because independent C2 beacon corroboration is not documented for the six cloud and VPS addresses, withhold them from static block lists and deploy wire rules for Emotet POSTs and RedLine SOAP contracts.
Emotet (MITRE ATT&CK S0367) places infected Windows computers (T1583.005) in front of backend cloud servers as Epoch reverse proxies on ports 443, 8443, 8080, 2083, 80, and 8010. On infected hosts, Emotet commonly launches DLLs via regsvr32.exe (T1218.010) and rundll32.exe (T1218.011).
RedLine Stealer (S1240), built in C# .NET, exposes Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) BasicHttpBinding SOAP services (hxxp://tempuri[.]org/IRemoteEndpoint/) over high TCP ports such as 1912, 55615, 25920, 27667, 49157, and 5800. Figure 2 maps all five families to their wire behaviors and detections.

Emotet: five cloud and VPS relay candidates vs broadband proxy listings
Emotet accounts for 1,053 sightings across 59 countries, with 700 endpoints examined across 678 hosts (21 multi-port hosts across 43 rows) and 622 /24 subnets. Port 443 leads with 563 endpoints (80.4%), followed by 8443 (48), 2083 (29), 8080 (27), 80 (19), 8010 (2), and 444 (2). Leading countries include the United States (171), Germany (117), China (60), Russia (45), France (41), Singapore (37), the United Kingdom (22), and the Netherlands (20).
Twenty-six examined Emotet rows carried an upstream "confirmed" label. Independent C2 corroboration for the five cloud and VPS endpoints is not documented.
- US AWS port 443 relay candidate (address withheld) on Amazon.com, Inc. in the United States, presenting a custom domain TLS certificate (withheld) and JARM prefix
29d29d07d29d. - German DigitalOcean ports 80 and 8010 relay candidate (address withheld) on DigitalOcean, LLC in Germany, a dual-port droplet listening on HTTP ports 80 and 8010.
- Two US DigitalOcean port 80 relay candidates (addresses withheld) on DigitalOcean, LLC in the United States, paired droplets sharing one custom certificate profile on port 80.
Twenty-one other upstream-confirmed Emotet rows failed collision review. Two port 443 hosts sat on a regional broadband carrier in southern China, where infection and proxy behavior were not verified for each host. Six dual-port 443 and 8443 rows across three Huawei Cloud hosts presented spoofed financial-brand certificates without corroborated Emotet C2 traffic.
Six Alibaba Cloud port 443 rows came from a single uncorroborated batch. Seven HTTP port 80 and 8010 rows at JSC Selectel and Data Storage Center JSC also lacked handshake proof. Overall, 66 Emotet-labelled rows (9.4%) sit on telecom carriers (45 rows across 16 countries) or Akamai Connected Cloud edge nodes (21 rows). Those telecom rows include four port 8443 nodes in South Korea sharing JARM prefix 2ad2ad0002ad.
RedLine Stealer: two dedicated relay candidates vs port 3389 RDP and telecom collisions
RedLine Stealer accounts for 2,247 sightings across 48 countries, with 700 endpoints examined across 683 hosts and 427 /24 subnets. High WCF ports dominate: TCP 1912 (124, 17.7%), 80 (112, 16.0%), 55615 (107, 15.3%), 25920 (57, 8.1%), 443 (35, 5.0%), 27667 (21), 55123 (8), and 16383 (8). Sixty-five RedLine rows expose default Windows machine certificates.
Four RedLine endpoints carried an upstream "confirmed" label. Independent C2 corroboration for the two dedicated cloud and VPS endpoints is not documented:
- One UK AWS port 49157 endpoint and one Finnish Hetzner port 5800 endpoint (addresses withheld) on Amazon.com, Inc. and Hetzner Online GmbH lacked independent WCF SOAP beacon corroboration.
- Two Dutch port 3389 endpoints (addresses withheld) on RootLayer Web Services Ltd. (alongside one suspected port 3389 host) were withheld because Windows Remote Desktop TLS handshakes triggered false C2 labels without WCF SOAP evidence.
Sixty-five RedLine rows (9.3%) belong to subscriber telecom networks, led by 57 port 25920 leases on a national telecom carrier in Uruguay plus eight broadband leases across seven other countries.
4. Proxy-Fronted Panels and Victim Feeds: Raccoon, LokiBot, and Ramnit
In short
Raccoon Stealer (700 examined), LokiBot (700 examined), and Ramnit (700 examined from 6,804 sightings) produced zero corroborated block-list addresses. Seventy-three LokiBot rows point to shared Cloudflare proxy IPs, Raccoon rows carry stale 2025 listing dates, and all 700 Ramnit rows carry an upstream victim label. Catch LokiBot and Raccoon via HTTP URI signatures and keep Ramnit victim lists off firewalls.
Raccoon Stealer and LokiBot: stale port 80 VPS pools and 73 Cloudflare proxies
Raccoon Stealer (MITRE ATT&CK S1148) has 830 sightings across 34 countries. We examined 700 endpoints on 700 hosts and 419 /24 subnets. Its HTTP POST check-in uses /config with bot_id and config_id.
In our sample, 685 of 700 Raccoon rows (97.9%) listen on TCP port 80. Leading locations include the Netherlands (211), Germany (119), the United States (77), Russia (76), Finland (54), and the United Kingdom (43). Zero Raccoon rows carried upstream verification, and all 700 carry feed listing dates on or before 15 December 2025 (696 candidates plus 4 telecom ISP rows). Blocking recycled VPS addresses nearly a year later risks breaking reassigned tenant workloads.
| Raccoon Stealer VPS provider | Examined rows |
|---|---|
| Partner LLC | 70 |
| M247 Europe SRL | 53 |
| STARK INDUSTRIES SOLUTIONS LTD | 51 |
| Hetzner Online GmbH | 47 |
| AEZA GROUP Ltd | 44 |
| Galaxy LLC | 40 |
LokiBot (MITRE ATT&CK S0447; 885 sightings across 8 countries) accounts for 700 examined endpoints across 651 hosts and 489 /24 subnets, including 46 multi-port hosts across 95 rows. Its servers run PHP administration panels (PvqDq929BSx_A_D_M_I_N_a.php) and binary credential gates (fre.php) with Charon; Inferno User-Agent strings on port 80 (570, 81.4%) and port 443 (121, 17.3%).
Zero LokiBot rows carried upstream verification, and all 700 carry listing dates on or before 7 May 2026. Critically, 73 LokiBot endpoints (10.4%) resolve to Cloudflare, Inc. shared anycast IPv4 addresses. Blocking those 73 Cloudflare proxy IPs breaks enterprise access to thousands of unrelated websites while leaving the origin PHP panel online.
Ramnit: why all 700 victim-labelled rows (from 6,804 sightings) are withheld
Ramnit accounts for 6,804 global sightings across 47 countries (57.6% of all 11,819 sightings) and carries an explicit victim classification in upstream feeds. Following the 2015 Europol takedown across roughly 3.2 million infected PCs, upstream feeds continue to log Ramnit victim or sinkhole-peer sightings, though infection or sinkhole status was not independently verified on every host.
Our 700 examined Ramnit endpoints span 599 distinct hosts and 432 /24 subnets, including 55 multi-port hosts exposing up to nine ports on a single host.
Exposed ports on those 700 victim-labelled Ramnit rows reflect ordinary customer services. Leading ports include HTTP port 80 (257), 82 (43), 8088 (39), 8081 (28), 88 (26), 443 (26), 81 (26), 9201 (21), and FTP port 21. Four Ramnit rows carried a "confirmed" tag in the upstream feed. Those four rows comprised three FTP port 21 servers in China and one port 8443 telecom host in Thailand with an OAuth single-sign-on lure certificate.
Overall, 655 of 700 Ramnit rows (93.6%) sit in China (438), South Korea (161, with 158 on one national carrier), Thailand (34), and Indonesia (22). Under our victim-protection rules, all 700 Ramnit rows (100%) are withheld.
5. Why Blind IP Blocking Breaks Broadband ISPs, CDNs, and Victim Networks
In short
Combining 700 victim-labelled Ramnit endpoints with 208 telecom and CDN collision endpoints means 908 of our 3,500 examined rows (25.9%) sit on victim-labelled customer hosts, residential ISPs, or shared Cloudflare and Akamai proxies. Windows TLS fingerprints also collide directly between RedLine candidates and victim-labelled Ramnit rows. Replace blind IP feed blocks with URI, SOAP, and process detections.
Figure 3 shows how victim-labelled rows, broadband listings, and Cloudflare-fronted PHP gates enter raw threat feeds. It contrasts them with seven cloud and VPS candidates across six withheld IPv4 addresses.

Three ways raw loader and botnet feeds cause self-inflicted outages
- Victim-tagged worm and sinkhole logs (700 Ramnit endpoints on 599 hosts). Upstream
victimtags on customer FTP (port 21) and web devices (ports 80, 81, 82, 88, 8081, 8088) flag suspected victim or sinkhole-peer hosts without verifying every host, not attacker C2 infrastructure. - Broadband proxy candidates and DHCP rotation (114 telecom ISP rows across 40 carriers). Subtracting 73 Cloudflare and 21 Akamai rows from the 208-row collision pool (42 networks) leaves 114 telecom ISP rows. Those rows include 57 RedLine port 25920 leases in Uruguay, 45 Emotet-labelled telecom leases across 16 countries, 8 other RedLine ISP leases, and 4 Raccoon ISP leases. Infection and proxy behavior were not verified for each host, and dynamic DHCP rotation can reassign residential addresses within days.
- Shared CDN reverse proxies and edge nodes (94 Cloudflare and Akamai endpoints). Blocking 73 Cloudflare proxy addresses or 21 Akamai Connected Cloud addresses causes immediate business web outages while attackers rotate domains. Figure 4 contrasts the six dedicated cloud and VPS relay candidate hosts (seven endpoints, addresses withheld) with the 3,305 other withheld hosts.

TLS JARM overlap and certificate collisions across 1,163 endpoints
TLS JARM fingerprints appear on 1,163 examined endpoints across 369 unique hashes (2,337 non-JARM rows), and X.509 certificates appear on 1,066 endpoints across 697 subjects (2,434 non-TLS rows). Emotet's top JARM (2ad2ad0002ad prefix, 96 rows) spans both cloud candidates and broadband telecom rows in South Korea and China.
Worse still, the next three top JARMs reflect standard Windows SChannel TLS stacks that collide directly between RedLine candidates and victim-labelled Ramnit hosts. Prefix 14d14d16d14d spans 55 rows (34 RedLine, 13 Ramnit, 8 others) and 26d26d16d26d spans 47 rows (31 Ramnit, 14 RedLine, 2 others). Prefix 2ad2ad16d2ad spans another 43 rows (31 RedLine, 11 Ramnit, 1 Raccoon).
| Certificate or JARM group | Rows | Family breakdown | Relay candidates | Defender guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Custom domain certificates | 837 | 259 Emotet, 215 Ramnit, 197 RedLine, 155 Raccoon, 11 LokiBot | 4 | Withhold unverified IPs and domains; pair with HTTP/TLS wire rules |
| Default Windows host certs | 86 | 65 RedLine, 16 Raccoon, 5 Ramnit | 1 | Never block port 3389 RDP certs; pair with WCF SOAP rules |
| Generic portal mimic certs | 44 | 18 Emotet, 18 Raccoon, 8 RedLine | 0 | Hunt only; reused across VPS parking templates |
| Financial-brand lure certs | 23 | 22 Emotet (Huawei Cloud), 1 Raccoon | 0 | Withhold IPs; 6 feed-confirmed Emotet rows lacked C2 proof |
| OAuth and SSO lure certs | 19 | 18 Ramnit, 1 Emotet | 0 | Withhold victim hosts; monitor outbound credential phishing |
IP-literal (26) & localhost (19) | 45 | Seen across all 5 families | 0 | Generic server defaults; never block on certificate alone |
| Top 3 Windows SChannel JARMs | 145 | 79 RedLine, 55 Ramnit-labelled, 8 Raccoon, 2 Emotet, 1 LokiBot | 0 | Heavy victim and Windows Server overlap; pair with EDR logs |
Emotet 2ad2ad0002ad JARM | 96 | 96 Emotet (cloud and broadband telecom rows) | 0 | Hunt paired with regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe egress |
6. Feed Labels Against Cloud and VPS Relay Candidates
In short
Importing raw lists for these five families straight into a firewall would block 599 victim-labelled Ramnit hosts, 114 broadband ISP addresses, and 94 Cloudflare or Akamai edge addresses. Only seven dedicated cloud and VPS endpoints (0.20% of examined rows; 0.059% of global sightings) survived collision checks, and all six IPv4 addresses remain withheld pending independent C2 corroboration. Keep raw feed lists off firewalls and hunt wire and endpoint signals.
Figure 5 compares global sighting volumes and the 208-row ISP and CDN pool against the seven cloud and VPS relay candidates.

| Group in our analysis | Feed "confirmed" | Feed "suspected" | Feed "candidate" | Total rows | Hosts | Share | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud and VPS relay candidates | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 0.20% | Withhold IP; hunt with wire and endpoint rules |
| Other unverified candidates | 21 | 30 | 2,534 | 2,585 | 2,498 | 73.86% | Withhold; hunt with wire and endpoint rules |
| Subscriber ISPs and shared CDNs | 2 | 5 | 201 | 208 | 208 | 5.94% | Withhold; protect broadband users and Cloudflare |
| Victim-labelled Ramnit rows | 4 | 15 | 681 | 700 | 599 | 20.00% | Withhold; never block victim-classified feeds |
Why 27 of 34 feed-confirmed rows failed collision checks
Twenty-seven of the 34 upstream "confirmed" records (79.4%) failed initial collision review. Four were victim-labelled Ramnit hosts on port 21 (three in China) and port 8443 (one in Thailand), and two were Emotet-labelled broadband telecom rows in southern China.
Two more were Dutch port 3389 Remote Desktop collisions at RootLayer Web Services Ltd., while six Huawei Cloud port 443 and 8443 financial-lure rows lacked Emotet C2 traffic. The final 13 rows included six Alibaba Cloud port 443 rows from one uncorroborated batch. Seven HTTP port 80 and 8010 rows at JSC Selectel and Data Storage Center JSC also lacked handshake verification.
Four other ways to read the 3,493 non-relay endpoints
- Pre-existing services on victim-labelled hosts (700 Ramnit rows on 599 hosts). Some victim-labelled hosts expose up to nine ports, including 21, 80, 81, 82, 88, 8081, 8088, and 9201. The ports may serve FTP, cameras, or web traffic. Individual infection or sinkhole status was not verified.
- Dynamic broadband NAT and telecom ISP listings (114 telecom ISP rows). Subscriber-network rows (57 RedLine port 25920 leases in Uruguay and 45 Emotet-labelled telecom leases) sit on residential carrier ranges where individual infection or proxy status was not verified.
- Shared CDN anycast proxies and edge caches (94 Cloudflare and Akamai rows). Operators place 73 LokiBot PHP panels behind Cloudflare because blocking shared anycast IPs breaks legitimate websites.
- Reassigned VPS addresses, Windows SChannel overlaps, and RDP servers (2,585 candidates). Older Raccoon (2025) and LokiBot (May 2026) VPS listings, shared Windows SChannel JARMs, and port 3389 servers require endpoint or payload corroboration.
7. What Defenders Should Do
Perimeter firewall and network security
- Do not import raw Emotet, RedLine, Raccoon, LokiBot, or Ramnit feed IPv4 addresses into static firewall block lists without an independent protocol, beacon, or endpoint signal.
- Keep Cloudflare, Akamai Connected Cloud, residential telecom ISP ranges, and victim-classified Ramnit feeds out of automated firewall deny lists.
SOC and endpoint detection
- Deploy the six Suricata 7 signatures in Chapter 8 on perimeter and SSL-inspection links. Those rules alert on RedLine
IRemoteEndpointSOAP envelopes, LokiBot/PvqDq929BSx_A_D_M_I_N_a.phpand/fre.phpposts, Emotet bare-IPv4 multipart POSTs, and Raccoon/configcheck-ins behind Cloudflare or ISP NAT. - Run the Sentinel KQL hunt and two Sigma rules across Windows endpoint logs. Isolate hosts when
regsvr32.exeorrundll32.execonnects to public Emotet ports (80, 443, 2083, 8010, 8080, 8443) or.NETand script utilities open RedLine high ports (1912, 5800, 16383, 25920, 27667, 49157, 55123, 55615). - Scan unpacked binaries, sandbox drops, and memory dumps with the three YARA rules for RedLine WCF contracts, LokiBot
Charon; Infernogates, and Raccoon/configparameters.
Threat intelligence management
- Strip
victim-categorized botnet feeds (Ramnit), standalone Windows SChannel JARMs, and port 3389 Remote Desktop collisions out of firewall External Dynamic Lists.
8. Detection Rules
The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. The Suricata file passes a static syntax check with zero problems. The rules were not loaded on live Suricata, Sentinel Kusto, Sigma, or YARA engines for this edition, so test and tune them before enabling automated isolation.
| Rule file | What it catches |
|---|---|
odin_emotet_redline_raccoon_and_lokibot_c2.rules | Suricata 7 (6 rules): RedLine WCF SOAP headers and bodies, LokiBot PHP panel and fre.php posts, Emotet bare-IPv4 multipart POSTs, and Raccoon /config check-ins |
sentinel_loader_stealer_c2_and_victim_noise_hunt.kql | Microsoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: regsvr32.exe/rundll32.exe Emotet port egress and .NET or script binaries hitting RedLine high ports |
sigma_loader_stealer_relays_and_wcf_beacons.yml | Sigma (2 Windows network rules): regsvr32.exe/rundll32.exe reaching Emotet ports, and .NET or script binaries reaching RedLine WCF ports |
odin_emotet_redline_raccoon_and_lokibot_artifacts.yar | YARA (3 rules): RedLine IRemoteEndpoint WCF configs, LokiBot Charon; Inferno and fre.php stagers, and Raccoon /config check-ins |
How the Suricata, KQL, Sigma, and YARA rules work
| SID or Rule | Looks for | Action |
|---|---|---|
| SID 9551001 | HTTP POST with SOAPAction IRemoteEndpoint header | RedLine WCF SOAP header |
| SID 9551002 | XML SOAP envelope calling CheckConnect, ScanResult, or GetArguments | RedLine WCF SOAP body |
| SID 9551003 | HTTP URI /PvqDq929BSx_A_D_M_I_N_a.php | LokiBot PHP admin panel |
| SID 9551004 | HTTP POST to /fre.php with Charon; Inferno User-Agent | LokiBot credential gate |
| SID 9551005 | Multipart POST to bare IPv4 Host without Referer or Origin | Emotet HTTP beacon (hunt) |
| SID 9551006 | HTTP POST to /config containing bot_id and config_id | Raccoon config check-in |
| Sigma Rule 1 | Exact regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe reaching public Emotet ports | High (contain loader) |
| Sigma Rule 2 | Exact .NET or script host reaching RedLine WCF high ports | High (contain stealer) |
| YARA Rules 1 to 3 | Bounded (<2 MB) RedLine WCF, LokiBot Charon, and Raccoon /config payloads | Hunt / Contain |
The Sentinel KQL query looks back seven days across DeviceNetworkEvents and DeviceProcessEvents. It correlates outbound regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe connections on Emotet ports. It also checks .NET or script connections on RedLine WCF ports, excluding exact lab hostnames in ApprovedRedTeamHosts.
| Tactic | Technique | Study observation | Detection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resource Development | T1583.003 Virtual Private Server | Cloud and VPS relay candidates across DigitalOcean, Hetzner, and AWS | 8 JARM indicators; Sigma 1, 2; Sentinel KQL |
| Resource Development | T1583.005 Botnet | 66 Emotet-labelled ISP/edge rows and 700 Ramnit victim-labelled nodes | Feed quarantine; Sigma 1 |
| Defense Evasion | T1218.010 / T1218.011 Regsvr32 and Rundll32 | Emotet DLL loader network activity | Sigma 1; Sentinel KQL |
| Command and Control | T1071.001 Web Protocols | RedLine SOAP, LokiBot /fre.php, Raccoon /config, Emotet POST | SIDs 9551001 to 9551006; YARA 1 to 3 |
| Command and Control | T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography | Emotet port 443 and RedLine port 49157 TLS relay candidates | 8 JARM indicators; Sentinel KQL |
| Credential Access | T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers | RedLine, Raccoon, and LokiBot browser password theft | SIDs 9551001 to 9551004, 9551006; Sigma 2; YARA 1 to 3 |
9. Indicators
The Indicators tab holds 8 published indicators: 8 TLS JARM fingerprints used for hunting. All six cloud and VPS IPv4 addresses remain withheld because no independent C2 beacon is documented. They cover seven address-and-port entries; one German DigitalOcean droplet had ports 80 and 8010.
The other 3,493 examined endpoints are also withheld. There are no file hashes in this report. Five text-only HTTP and SOAP wire signatures also appear below.
| Type | Count | Where to use it |
|---|---|---|
| TLS JARM fingerprints (Indicators tab) | 8 | TLS hunting paired with endpoint process logs; never block on a JARM alone |
| HTTP and SOAP wire signatures (text-only) | 5 | Suricata and HTTP proxy rules (sid:9551001 to 9551006) |
| Withheld cloud and VPS relay candidates (6 unique IPv4s) | 7 | Withheld pending independent protocol or beacon signal; do not block |
JARM fingerprints and wire signatures to hunt
| Indicator | Family | Context |
|---|---|---|
29d29d07d29d29d21c29d29d29d29dce2e4c8c53174ecbf5529ce7584d5518 | Emotet | Upstream-confirmed US AWS port 443 endpoint (address withheld) |
2ad2ad0002ad2ad0002ad2ad2ad2ade1a3c0d7ca6ad8388057924be83dfc6a | Emotet | Seen across 96 cloud and broadband telecom rows |
29d29d00029d29d21c29d29d29d29d8da29ade5a975f32a8d3f61299c69dc4 | Emotet | Shared across four Alibaba Cloud port 443 candidate endpoints |
2ad2ad16d2ad2ad00042d42d0000008fe5654c9239cdb4052d3ab65a579afa | Emotet | Huawei Cloud port 443 financial-lure certificate cluster |
14d14d16d14d14d08c14d14d14d14dfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532 | RedLine Stealer | Windows SChannel JARM on 55 rows including 13 victim-labelled Ramnit rows |
26d26d16d26d26d22c26d26d26d26dfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532 | Ramnit | Windows JARM on 47 rows including 31 victim-labelled Ramnit rows and 14 RedLine rows |
2ad2ad16d2ad2ad22c2ad2ad2ad2adfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532 | RedLine Stealer | Windows SChannel JARM on 43 rows including 11 victim-labelled Ramnit rows |
29d3fd00029d29d21c42d43d00041df61f6b5fa6973e9fa14c8155669c6633 | Raccoon Stealer | Linux Nginx JARM across 21 RedLine, 16 Raccoon, and 1 LokiBot candidates |
hxxp://tempuri[.]org/IRemoteEndpoint/ | RedLine Stealer | Text-only WCF SOAPAction header contract; SIDs 9551001, 9551002 |
/PvqDq929BSx_A_D_M_I_N_a.php | LokiBot | Text-only PHP C2 administration panel URI; SID 9551003 |
/fre.php | LokiBot | Text-only Charon binary credential submission gate; SID 9551004 |
/config | Raccoon Stealer | Text-only HTTP POST check-in path (bot_id, config_id); SID 9551006 |
Content-Type: multipart/form-data | Emotet | Text-only bare-IPv4 HTTP POST without Referer; SID 9551005 |
We withhold all 3,500 examined endpoints across 3,311 hosts. These include 7 uncorroborated relay rows on 6 hosts, 700 Ramnit rows on 599 hosts, and 208 ISP/CDN rows on 208 hosts. The other 2,585 candidates span 2,498 hosts; unverified certificate domains and Windows machine hostnames are also withheld.
10. Scope and Limits
- Observation window. Findings cover a two-week observation window ending 21 November 2026. Earlier dates on 3,253 examined records (including Raccoon Stealer through December 2025 and LokiBot through May 2026) are upstream feed listing dates, not continuous monitoring by Odin by Brandefense.
- Feed labels are not attribution. Malware family names and verification tags come from upstream feeds. Because independent protocol or beacon corroboration is not documented for the seven cloud and VPS relay candidates (six IPv4 addresses), all 3,500 examined endpoints remain withheld from public block lists.
- Analytical model. Zero hosts span two families across all 3,311 hosts. Figures 1 and 3 present an analytical model of loader, stealer, and victim-feed collisions rather than a unified threat group.
- No victim or subscriber hosts contacted. Odin by Brandefense did not interact with Ramnit victim-labelled machines or consumer broadband routers, and all 3,311 examined hosts remain withheld.
- Rule validation. Detection rules were verified statically and were not loaded on live production engines for this edition.
11. Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK. S0367 Emotet. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367/ (verified 21 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK. S1240 RedLine Stealer. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1240/ (verified 21 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK. S1148 Raccoon Stealer. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148/ (verified 21 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK. S0447 Lokibot. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447/ (verified 21 November 2026)
- CISA. Alert AA20-280A: Emotet Malware. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-280a (verified 21 November 2026)
- CISA. Alert AA20-266A: LokiBot Malware. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-266a (verified 21 November 2026)
- Europol EC3. World's most dangerous malware EMOTET disrupted through global action. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/world%E2%80%99s-most-dangerous-malware-emotet-disrupted-through-global-action (verified 21 November 2026)
- Europol EC3. Botnet [Ramnit] taken down through international law enforcement cooperation. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/botnet-taken-down-through-international-law-enforcement-cooperation (verified 21 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK. T1583.005 Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005/ (verified 21 November 2026)
- Salesforce Engineering. JARM: active TLS server fingerprinting. https://github.com/salesforce/jarm (verified 21 November 2026)
What is…?
Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.
What is RedLine?
RedLine is an infostealer sold as malware-as-a-service. It steals browser credentials, cookies and crypto wallets. Law enforcement disrupted its infrastructure in 2024.
More about RedLineMalware loaderWhat is Emotet?
Emotet is a long-running modular malware loader and botnet spread by malicious email attachments. It was disrupted by law enforcement in 2021 and later resurfaced.
More about EmotetBanking trojanWhat is Ramnit?
Ramnit is a long-running banking trojan and worm. Many of its infrastructure records are old feed entries.
More about RamnitTechniqueWhat is JARM?
JARM is an open TLS server fingerprinting method from Salesforce. It hashes how a server answers a set of crafted TLS handshakes.
More about JARMFrequently asked questions
Why do Ramnit and Emotet feeds blackhole innocent networks?
More than half of all sightings in our study (6,804 of 11,819, or 57.6%) carry a Ramnit label under an explicit victim category. Across 700 examined Ramnit endpoints on 599 hosts, exposed ports belong to ordinary FTP, web, and router services. These include ports 21, 80, 81, 82, 88, 8081, and 8088.
Why do even the six remaining cloud and VPS relays require corroboration?
Reviewing all 34 upstream "confirmed" records eliminated 27 rows (79.4%) on collision grounds. Those 27 rows included four victim-labelled Ramnit rows, two broadband Emotet listings, two Dutch port 3389 Remote Desktop collisions, six Huawei Cloud financial-lure rows, and 13 single-batch cloud rows.
How do you catch proxy-hidden stealers without blocking Cloudflare or ISPs?
Raccoon Stealer (700 examined rows, 97.9% on HTTP port 80, listed on or before December 2025) produced zero corroborated block-list servers. LokiBot (700 rows on ports 80 and 443, listed through May 2026) also produced zero corroborated block-list servers. Three Windows TLS JARM hashes also occur across 79 RedLine rows and 55 Ramnit victim-labelled rows. Instead of blocking recycled VPS or CDN addresses, inspect protocol payloads and process behavior:
Are these five families operated by one group?
No evidence links them to one operator. Zero hosts among all 3,311 distinct hosts carry labels from two families, and the 21 shared /24 blocks may reflect co-tenant VPS hosting. We present the five families as an analytical model to help teams separate durable C2 signals from victim and ISP noise.