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Full reportCredential theftMonograph 24 / 1918 min read

Session Cloners and Stealer Fleets: Replaying Stolen Browsers Past MFA

Playwright session-cloning workbenches, wallet lures, and the Aurora, StealC, RedLine, LaplasClipper, PikaBot and Ramnit infrastructure behind them

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
18 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

In a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense mapped 193 endpoints on 165 hosts across 11 stealer, clipper, loader and RAT families. Two exposed workbenches sit beside them. One holds an OpenClaw agent set up to drive an existing Chromium profile through headless Playwright. The other stages wallet-brand recon and SaaS cookie capture. Twenty endpoints are confirmed C2 servers. Bind sessions to devices, block the 15 published C2 endpoints, and alert when non-browser processes read Chromium cookie stores.

Infostealers no longer need your password. They take the browser's cookie database, and a cookie for a logged-in session is often enough to act as the user. This report looks at both halves of that problem. The first is the commodity stealer, clipper and loader servers that collect browser data. The second is two exposed workbenches that show how an automation agent can drive a logged-in browser profile.

1

An exposed OpenClaw workbench drives a logged-in Chromium profile with headless Playwright.

An open directory on port 8888 of a server in China yielded 80 sampled files. They pair Playwright's headless Chromium build 1208 with an OpenClaw agent folder named browser-existing-session. That folder holds a Chromium Cookies store, Trust Tokens, History and an NSS key database, plus an agent action log.

2

A second workbench pairs wallet-brand recon with SaaS cookie capture.

A server in France exposed 59 target folders and 10,650 files on port 8080. It holds dangling-subdomain recon against a hardware crypto-wallet vendor and headless Chrome 149 scripts that save cookie jars from a design SaaS platform. Both brands are withheld.

3

Commodity stealers and loaders supply the stolen browser data.

Aurora and AuroraStealer account for 18 endpoints on 9 hosts, including a 3-port hub in Germany. StealC, RedLineStealer and 14 suspected LaplasClipper nodes follow. PikaBot, ChaluboRAT and Ramnit sit in the delivery tier. Of 193 endpoints, 20 are confirmed C2 servers.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Bind web sessions to the device. Adopt Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) or continuous access evaluation, so a cookie copied to a headless Linux server fails when it is replayed from a new network.
  2. Block confirmed C2, watch the rest. Block the 15 published confirmed endpoints. Keep dynamic telecom addresses, suspected clusters and old Ramnit candidates on time-bound watchlists instead of permanent blocks.
  3. Close lure surfaces and guard profile stores. Remove dangling DNS records that a wallet or login lure could sit on. Alert when any process other than the browser reads Chromium Cookies, Trust Tokens or extension storage.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
193Endpoints across 11 active stealer, clipper, loader and RAT families, on 165 distinct hosts
20Confirmed C2 endpoints on 18 IPs; 15 of them (13 IPs) are published for blocking
80Sampled files on the OpenClaw and Playwright session-cloning workbench (port 8888)
59Target folders (10,650 files) on the wallet and SaaS lure workbench (port 8080)
18AuroraStealer (13) and Aurora (5) endpoints on 9 hosts; 6 are confirmed
14Suspected LaplasClipper wallet-swap nodes, all on one US provider
107 of 110Ramnit endpoints held on watchlists rather than blocked

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1, Chapter 7 and Chapter 10. Identity and browser-security teams should read Chapters 2 and 3. SOC and detection engineers should start with Chapters 8 and 9. CTI analysts will find the stealer, clipper and loader infrastructure in Chapters 4 to 6.

2. How Stolen Sessions Get Replayed

In short

A browser cookie for a logged-in session can stand in for a password and an MFA prompt. This chapter sets out an analytical model of how stealers, clippers, loaders and browser automation fit together.

Why cookies matter more than passwords

Defenders used to answer an infostealer infection by resetting passwords. That no longer closes the door. Modern stealers copy the whole Chromium user-data folder: Default/Cookies, Default/Trust Tokens, Local Storage and the LevelDB folders where wallet extensions keep their data.

Identity providers check the device, the TLS fingerprint and a FIDO2 prompt at login. Once a session cookie is issued, many services simply trust it. So whoever holds a fresh cookie can often act as the user without seeing an MFA prompt.

Browser automation makes that easy at scale. Microsoft Playwright's launchPersistentContext API starts a Chromium instance on top of an existing user-data folder. Any script or AI agent driving that browser inherits the sessions stored in it. Playwright documents this as a normal feature for testing.

A four-part model

Figure 1 shows the four parts as an analytical model. The 193 endpoints and two workbenches were observed separately. No IP appears in more than one family, and no shared host, certificate or campaign token links the stealer servers to the workbenches.

Figure 1: Analytical model of how stealer logs and session-cloning agents could sidestep MFA
Figure 1: Analytical model of how stealer logs and session-cloning agents could sidestep MFA
PartWhat it doesFamilies or toolsObserved endpoints
StealCopies Chromium cookies, tokens and extension vaultsAuroraStealer, Aurora, StealC, RedLineStealer31 (11 confirmed)
CloneDrives an existing browser profile with a headless agentOpenClaw, Playwright Chromium 1208Workbench 1 (80 files)
Lure and clipStages wallet and SaaS lures, swaps copied wallet addressesLaplasClipper, subfinder, Playwright scripts14 clipper nodes, Workbench 2
Deliver and persistDrops stealers and keeps remote accessPikaBot, TitanOmega, Ramnit, ChaluboRAT, RaptorRAT, BitRAT148 (9 confirmed)

What the model does not show matters as much. We did not see any replay against a real account, and we saw no losses on the target side. The model explains why these pieces are worth defending against together.

Where the endpoints sit

The 193 endpoints spread across 13 tracked families, 11 of them with active endpoints. Two more families, Bumblebee and RaccoonStealer, had no active endpoints in the window. Nineteen hosts expose more than one port.

CountryEndpointsShareMain driver
China7840.4%Ramnit
United States3518.1%14 LaplasClipper and 8 TitanOmega nodes
Germany157.8%RaptorRAT, AuroraStealer hub
Netherlands105.2%RedLineStealer, StealC
Russia7AuroraStealer
Hong Kong7ChaluboRAT, Ramnit
South Korea7Ramnit

The confirmed C2 servers look different from the bulk. They sit mostly on European and Asian VPS providers, including Hetzner Online, Netsec Limited, RootLayer Web Services, DigitalOcean, Google Cloud, Majestic Hosting and UFO Hosting.

All 20 confirmed endpoints were seen on 13 November 2026. Suspected Aurora and Ramnit staging was still being seen on 18 November 2026. Some old Ramnit records carry first-seen dates from earlier years; those are record dates, not the period of this study.

3. Two Exposed Workbenches

In short

Two open directories show the tooling side. One holds an OpenClaw agent wired to a logged-in Chromium profile. The other holds wallet-brand recon and Playwright cookie capture against a SaaS platform.

Figure 2 maps each tool group to how it is used, what it targets and which rule covers it.

Figure 2: Session cloners, lures, stealers and clippers expose distinct wire artifacts
Figure 2: Session cloners, lures, stealers and clippers expose distinct wire artifacts

Workbench 1: OpenClaw agent on a logged-in Chromium profile

Workbench 1 is a cloud server in China. It exposed an open directory on port 8888, and 80 files were sampled from it. Its address is withheld, because the owner and the origin of the browser data are not established.

The files pair two things. The first is Playwright's headless Chromium build 1208, stored under /.cache/ms-playwright/chromium_headless_shell-1208/. The second is an OpenClaw agent folder, /.openclaw/, with a subfolder named browser-existing-session. OpenClaw is an autonomous agent that can drive a browser.

That subfolder is a full Chromium profile. It holds a Cookies store, Trust Tokens, History, a cached extension package and an NSS key database (/.pki/nssdb/key4.db). The agent logs every step it takes to a trajectory file and keeps its state in SQLite. Messaging connector plugins for QQ (qqbot) and DingTalk (dingtalk-connector) are installed beside it.

Path on Workbench 1Size (bytes)Role
/.openclaw/browser-existing-session/component_crx_cache/ (one cached file)9,541,687Cached Chromium component or extension package inside the mounted profile
/.skillhub/skills_index.local.json9,257,868Local agent skill registry, next to skills_store_cli.py (156,228 bytes)
/.cache/ms-playwright/chromium_headless_shell-1208/.../libvk_swiftshader.so4,361,888Software GPU renderer for headless Chromium 1208, with libGLESv2.so
/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/<session>.trajectory.jsonl2,355,006Step-by-step log of the agent's browser actions
/.openclaw/state/openclaw.sqlite1,245,184Agent state database, with a 156,592-byte .sqlite-wal journal
/.openclaw/browser-existing-session/Default/History163,840Chromium navigation history
/.openclaw/browser-existing-session/Default/Trust Tokens36,864Chromium Trust Tokens store; key4.db is the same size
/.openclaw/browser-existing-session/Default/Cookies20,480Chromium cookie store the headless browser loads

The 80 sampled files break down as 22 .json, 14 extensionless Chromium SQLite and cache files, 7 .xlsx, 6 .so, 5 .md, 3 .jsonl, 3 .db and 2 .sqlite, plus a few singletons.

What this does and does not show.

The files show the mechanism: an agent set up to drive a logged-in browser profile without a fresh login. They do not show where the profile came from. It could be stolen stealer output, or the owner's own browser copied for automation. This report publishes no cookie values and no file hashes from this server.

Workbench 2 is a server in France with an open directory on port 8080. It holds 59 target folders and 10,650 files. Its address is withheld. An unhardened offensive-security contractor box is a possible explanation, so we treat its owner as unknown.

Among the 419 sampled entries, the largest groups are 131 .jpeg screenshots, 90 .txt recon lists and 67 .md reports. Next come 33 .html captures, 31 .json API and cookie logs, 31 .png captures and 20 .js scripts. Other file types make up the rest.

Two activities stand out:

  • Wallet-brand recon. One folder targets a hardware crypto-wallet vendor. It looks for dangling staging subdomains, the kind of abandoned CNAME record on which an attacker could host a seed-phrase recovery or login lure under the vendor's own name.
  • SaaS cookie capture. Another folder targets a collaborative design SaaS platform. Headless Chrome 149 scripts log in, call the platform's API and save cookie jars, including playwright_cookies.json. An API call log (84,445 bytes) records requests sent with the client hint sec-ch-ua: "HeadlessChrome";v="149".

The folders also hold seven nuclei output logs and two subfinder staging-subdomain lists of 227,107 bytes each. Both target brands, their domains and the custom script names are withheld.

4. Stealers and Clippers

In short

Aurora, StealC, RedLineStealer and LaplasClipper supply the browser data and wallet theft. Of their 45 endpoints, 11 are confirmed C2 servers, and two suspected mail servers share one TLS fingerprint.

How the stealers work

Commodity stealers collect Chromium Login Data, Cookies, Web Data and wallet extension folders (MetaMask, Phantom and TronLink, for example) in memory. They package the result and send it over HTTP or TCP. A clipper module can stay behind to watch the clipboard and swap any copied wallet address for the attacker's own.

Figure 3 lays these steps out as a model sequence, from loader delivery to cookie theft to headless replay.

Figure 3: Model sequence from loader delivery and cookie theft to headless Playwright replay
Figure 3: Model sequence from loader delivery and cookie theft to headless Playwright replay
FamilyEndpointsHostsConfirmedNotes
AuroraStealer1376Go stealer; one German host runs three C2 ports
Aurora520Suspected staging on ports 443, 3000 and 8080, seen 17 and 18 November
StealC742HTTP panels; one suspected 4-port mail host
RedLineStealer663Two Dutch hosts share one Windows certificate
LaplasClipper14140All suspected, all on one US provider

Confirmed stealer C2 servers

AuroraStealer is written in Go, which makes it easy to run several listeners on one server. The German host 49.12.203[.]54 on Hetzner exposed three confirmed C2 ports on 13 November 2026: 21, 443 and 8443. Its certificate name is withheld.

StealC has two confirmed HTTP panels, on DigitalOcean in Canada and Google Cloud in Singapore. RedLineStealer has one listener on port 5800 on Hetzner in Finland. Two more RedLine hosts on RootLayer Web Services in the Netherlands present the same Windows certificate, CN=WIN-UV1QM7FUHOK, on port 3389.

EndpointFamilyCountry and networkCertificate or service
135.181.107[.]76:443AuroraStealerFI · Hetzner Online GmbHCN=ubuntu-4gb-hel1-7
49.12.203[.]54:443AuroraStealerDE · Hetzner Online GmbHTLS C2, certificate name withheld
49.12.203[.]54:8443AuroraStealerDE · Hetzner Online GmbHAlternate TLS C2
49.12.203[.]54:21AuroraStealerDE · Hetzner Online GmbHFTP listener
191.101.130[.]41:3389AuroraStealerUS · Majestic Hosting SolutionsCN=WIN-MG87181M2AR
45.144.31[.]252:3389AuroraStealerRU · UFO Hosting LLCCN=VM-ba764849-...
104.248.107[.]188:80StealCCA · DigitalOcean, LLCHTTP panel
34.87.31[.]79:5001StealCSG · Google LLCHTTP C2 on 5001
135.181.173[.]163:5800RedLineStealerFI · Hetzner Online GmbHTCP C2 on 5800
185.222.58[.]51:3389RedLineStealerNL · RootLayer Web ServicesCN=WIN-UV1QM7FUHOK
45.137.22[.]249:3389RedLineStealerNL · RootLayer Web ServicesCN=WIN-UV1QM7FUHOK

The two RedLine hosts also share the JARM value 2ad2ad16d2ad2ad22c2ad2ad2ad2adfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532. JARM is a TLS server fingerprint. Many Windows servers share this kind of value, so pair it with the certificate name before acting.

A shared mail fingerprint across two families

Two suspected servers, one per family, present the exact same JARM on their IMAPS (993) and POP3S (995) ports: 0003fd00021d21d00042d43d000000e1eb348128a1eb0eda1c719dd71f6145.

HostFamilyCountryOpen ports
Suspected server AAuroraStealerRU, VPS provider443, 995, 110, 993, 143
Suspected server BStealCNL, VPS provider995, 110, 993, 143

The most likely explanation is that both servers were built from the same VPS control-panel mail template. That is a hosting link, not proof of a shared operator. Both addresses are withheld.

The LaplasClipper cluster

All 14 LaplasClipper endpoints sit with one US provider: 10 on port 80 and 4 on port 443. The provider runs managed DNS and Anycast HTTP redirection ranges, which many unrelated customers share. So all 14 stay suspected and on watchlists. Detection relies on the clipper's polling pattern (SID 9524006) rather than on blocking these addresses.

5. Loaders and RAT Backdoors

In short

Loaders and backdoors make up 148 of the 193 endpoints across six families. Nine are confirmed C2 servers; four of them, a ChaluboRAT set in Hong Kong, are published for blocking.

Stealers and clippers need a way in. Phishing loaders (PikaBot, TitanOmega), a long-running dropper network (Ramnit) and multi-platform RATs (ChaluboRAT, RaptorRAT, BitRAT) provide delivery and persistence. Figure 4 shows the port and service layout of the two workbenches and the main multi-port C2 hosts.

Figure 4: Open directories and multi-port C2 hubs expose headless replay and mail-port staging
Figure 4: Open directories and multi-port C2 hubs expose headless replay and mail-port staging
FamilyEndpointsHostsConfirmedPattern
Ramnit110983Mostly old, uncorroborated records; 5 on dynamic telecom networks
PikaBot1182Two FTP drops in Italy; 9 suspected HTTP and HTTPS relays
RaptorRAT990All on Amazon AWS port 443, one shared JARM
TitanOmega880All on Liquid Web port 8080
ChaluboRAT774Four Hong Kong nodes in one /24; three port 8853 candidates
BitRAT320One HTTPS node and one mail-port host

ChaluboRAT: four nodes in one Hong Kong /24

ChaluboRAT targets Linux cloud servers. Four nodes in one Hong Kong /24 on Netsec Limited are confirmed C2: 180.178.46[.]242, .244, .245 and .246, all on port 443. They share one certificate name (withheld) and the JARM 1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000e1ea2a807a629b496b664cf07ad7c08d. Three more candidates on port 8853, in Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, stay on watchlists.

EndpointFamilyCountry and networkSeen
180.178.46[.]242:443ChaluboRATHK · Netsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]244:443ChaluboRATHK · Netsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]245:443ChaluboRATHK · Netsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]246:443ChaluboRATHK · Netsec Limited13 Nov 2026

PikaBot and Ramnit: confirmed but withheld

PikaBot has two confirmed FTP drops on port 21 in Italy. Both sit on a shared web-hosting provider, where one address can serve many unrelated sites. Ramnit has three confirmed C2 endpoints: one TLS listener on port 8443 on a Thai broadband network, and two FTP listeners on port 21 on two Chinese networks.

We count these five as confirmed but do not publish their addresses. Shared hosting, broadband ranges and FTP listeners on infected machines can all belong to people other than the operator. Blocking them risks hitting third parties.

Uniform suspected clusters

PikaBot's nine suspected relays include three dual-port hosts (80 and 443) on Akamai and Amazon. TitanOmega binds port 8080 on all eight of its instances on Liquid Web in the United States. RaptorRAT runs on Amazon AWS only (7 in Germany, 2 in the United States), all on port 443 with the JARM 1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e.

BitRAT pairs one HTTPS node in the Netherlands with a dual-port mail host (465 and 587) in Romania. Uniform clusters like these are good hunting leads. On shared cloud networks they are not safe to block without a second signal.

6. Separating Signal from Noise

In short

Commodity malware feeds are noisy. Ramnit alone accounts for 110 endpoints, and Playwright and subdomain tools are also used by honest QA and red teams. Only 20 of 193 endpoints (10.4%) are confirmed.

Figure 5: 20 confirmed C2 endpoints among 193 observed; most Ramnit endpoints stay on watchlists
Figure 5: 20 confirmed C2 endpoints among 193 observed; most Ramnit endpoints stay on watchlists
StatusEndpointsNetworkAction
Confirmed C220 (on 18 IPs)Mixed hostingBlock the 15 published endpoints; review blocks after 30 days
Suspected77Shared cloud, CDN or DNS networksWatchlist; look for a second signal
Dynamic telecom5Ramnit endpoints on Chinanet and China Telecom subscriber ranges24-hour watchlist
Candidate91Mixed, mostly older feed recordsHold until corroborated

Four questions before you block

Is it QA automation or session cloning?

Engineering teams run headless Chromium for end-to-end tests every day. A clean CI runner starts a fresh, empty browser context. It does not load a persistent browser-existing-session/Default/Cookies store next to chat-bot plugins. Allowlist your registered QA runners by exact hostname.

Is it a live server or an old record?

The 91 candidates include 86 Ramnit records, three ChaluboRAT nodes on port 8853 and two RedLineStealer nodes on ports 55615 and 1200. Some show corporate firewall certificates such as CN=SANGFOR and CN=FortiGate on reused addresses. These are not block-ready.

Is the address dynamic?

One Ramnit FTP node with a protocol match and four suspected Ramnit endpoints sit on dynamic Chinanet and China Telecom subscriber networks. Addresses there change hands often. A permanent block can cut off an unrelated customer later.

Is the network shared?

The 14 LaplasClipper nodes, 9 RaptorRAT nodes on Amazon and 8 TitanOmega nodes on Liquid Web sit on shared networks. They stay suspected until a payload or protocol match confirms them.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueWhere it shows up
T1539 Steal Web Session CookieStealers copy Chromium Cookies and Trust Tokens
T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session CookieHeadless Playwright loads a logged-in profile
T1115 Clipboard DataLaplasClipper swaps copied wallet addresses

7. What Defenders Should Do

Within 24 hours

  • Block the 15 published confirmed C2 endpoints (13 IPs) from the Indicators tab at the perimeter, and review them after 30 days.
  • Put the 5 dynamic-telecom Ramnit endpoints and other dynamic addresses on 24-hour watchlists, not permanent blocks.
  • Load Suricata SIDs 9524001 to 9524008 in alert mode and fill the KQL allowlist with exact QA hostnames.

Within 72 hours

  • Turn on Chrome App-Bound Encryption on Windows endpoints.
  • Alert when any process other than an installed browser reads Chromium DefaultNetworkCookies, Trust Tokens or Local Extension Settings.
  • Revoke sessions when a token suddenly appears from a new ASN or a headless client.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Pilot Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) or continuous access evaluation for high-value SaaS and cloud consoles.
  • Audit external DNS and remove dangling staging CNAME records that a wallet or login lure could use.
  • Restrict browser extension sideloading by enterprise policy.
  • Require a second, hardware-backed confirmation for corporate crypto treasury transfers, so a swapped address is caught before it is sent.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Each file targets a signal from this report. Every rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma, Kusto.Language); the rules were not replayed against live traffic.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_playwright_session_cloners_and_stealers.rulesSuricata 7: eight signatures for exposed OpenClaw session folders, Playwright cookie jars, stealer uploads, clipper polling and loader or RAT check-ins
sentinel_openclaw_session_clone_and_stealer_hunt.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: contact with the published C2 addresses, joined with headless-browser and cookie-store process activity
sigma_playwright_session_cloner_and_clipper_activity.ymlSigma (3 rules): profile mounts by headless runtimes, non-browser access to Chromium vaults, and clipboard-swap command lines
odin_openclaw_aurora_laplas_stealc_artifacts.yarYARA (4 rules): OpenClaw session configs, Playwright cookie-capture scripts, Aurora and StealC vault manifests, and LaplasClipper regex configs

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9524001An HTTP 200 response on ports 8888, 8080 or 3000 whose body lists .openclaw/browser-existing-session/ and component_crx_cacheFlags an exposed session-cloning directory
9524002Outbound POST /api/openclaw/session with browser-existing-session and trajectory in the bodyCatches an agent syncing replay logs
9524003A request for /playwright_cookies.json with a HeadlessChrome/ user agentCatches cookie-jar transfer from a headless browser
9524004Outbound POST /aurora/gate with BrowserCookies and CryptoWallets in the bodyCatches AuroraStealer exfiltration (T1539)
9524005Outbound multipart POST to a .php path with cookies_list and DefaultNetworkCookiesCatches StealC cookie and LevelDB uploads
9524006A request to /bot/regex with an X-Laplas-Key: headerCatches LaplasClipper polling for swap rules (T1115)
9524007Outbound POST /api/loader/stage with build_guid in the bodyCatches PikaBot and TitanOmega stage check-ins
9524008Outbound POST /gate/chalubo with a user agent starting Chalubo-Node/Catches ChaluboRAT heartbeats

Exempt named QA Playwright subnets from SID 9524003 if your test suites use a fixture called playwright_cookies.json. Send SID 9524001 hits to analyst review when they come from threat-intelligence sandboxes that browse open directories.

How the other rules work

The KQL query looks back 7 days. It carries the 13 published confirmed C2 addresses. Any device that contacts one of them always surfaces, whatever its name. The host allowlist applies only to the heuristic branch: node, python, chrome-headless-shell, powershell.exe or rundll32.exe talking on stealer and workbench ports.

That network view is joined with process events that mention .openclaw, browser-existing-session, chromium_headless_shell, playwright_cookies.json, DefaultNetworkCookies, Local Extension Settings or laplas. A device also surfaces when it reaches 12 or more distinct remote IPs on those ports. Raise that threshold on Node build servers.

The first Sigma rule needs a headless runtime (chrome-headless-shell, chromium, node or python3) and a command line naming .openclaw/browser-existing-session or playwright_cookies.json. The second flags Windows command lines that touch Chromium cookie, token or extension paths, unless the process is an installed browser at its exact Program Files path. The third flags LaplasClipper polling strings or Get-Clipboard near a Bitcoin or Ethereum address pattern.

All Sigma allowlists use exact hostnames or exact executable paths. Per-user browser installs outside Program Files will show up and need local tuning.

YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_OpenClaw_Playwright_Session_Cloner_ConfigAn OpenClaw session path or openclaw.sqlite appears with a Playwright headless-shell path, component_crx_cache or a .trajectory.jsonl name
ODIN_Playwright_Cookie_Capture_Scriptplaywright_cookies.json appears with HeadlessChrome/ or the Playwright cookie APIs context.cookies( or storageState
ODIN_Aurora_StealC_Browser_Vault_Manifest/aurora/gate, BrowserCookies and CryptoWallets appear together, or cookies_list appears with DefaultNetworkCookies
ODIN_LaplasClipper_Regex_Wallet_Swap_ConfigA LaplasClipper header or poll path appears with a BTC, ETH or TRX regex rule name

All four YARA rules stop at files under 512 KB.

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds 15 published indicators: 15 confirmed C2 endpoints (IP and port) on 13 distinct addresses, and no file hashes. Five more confirmed endpoints, all suspected and candidate endpoints, both workbench addresses and every workbench file hash are withheld.

TypeCount
Confirmed C2 endpoints published for blocking (IP and port)15 (13 IPs)
Confirmed C2 endpoints withheld (shared hosting, broadband or possibly infected hosts)5
Representative watchlist entries withheld (2 workbenches, 5 suspected cluster nodes, 1 dynamic-ISP node); the other non-confirmed endpoints are withheld too8
File hashes0 published

Supporting fingerprints, text only:

  • JARM 2ad2ad16d2ad2ad22c2ad2ad2ad2adfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532 (RedLineStealer on 3389, pair with CN=WIN-UV1QM7FUHOK)
  • JARM 1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000e1ea2a807a629b496b664cf07ad7c08d (ChaluboRAT on 443)
  • JARM 0003fd00021d21d00042d43d000000e1eb348128a1eb0eda1c719dd71f6145 (suspected Aurora and StealC mail ports)
  • JARM 1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e (suspected RaptorRAT on Amazon 443)
  • Certificate names CN=ubuntu-4gb-hel1-7, CN=WIN-MG87181M2AR and CN=WIN-UV1QM7FUHOK on confirmed hosts

Published confirmed C2 endpoints

EndpointFamilyCountryNetworkSeen
135.181.107[.]76:443AuroraStealerFIHetzner Online GmbH13 Nov 2026
191.101.130[.]41:3389AuroraStealerUSMajestic Hosting Solutions13 Nov 2026
45.144.31[.]252:3389AuroraStealerRUUFO Hosting LLC13 Nov 2026
49.12.203[.]54:21AuroraStealerDEHetzner Online GmbH13 Nov 2026
49.12.203[.]54:443AuroraStealerDEHetzner Online GmbH13 Nov 2026
49.12.203[.]54:8443AuroraStealerDEHetzner Online GmbH13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]242:443ChaluboRATHKNetsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]244:443ChaluboRATHKNetsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]245:443ChaluboRATHKNetsec Limited13 Nov 2026
180.178.46[.]246:443ChaluboRATHKNetsec Limited13 Nov 2026
135.181.173[.]163:5800RedLineStealerFIHetzner Online GmbH13 Nov 2026
185.222.58[.]51:3389RedLineStealerNLRootLayer Web Services13 Nov 2026
45.137.22[.]249:3389RedLineStealerNLRootLayer Web Services13 Nov 2026
104.248.107[.]188:80StealCCADigitalOcean, LLC13 Nov 2026
34.87.31[.]79:5001StealCSGGoogle LLC13 Nov 2026

VPS leases change hands after takedowns. Re-check each address before renewing a block after 30 days.

10. Scope and Limits

  • What we saw. We saw servers, open ports, certificates and files in open directories. We did not see any victim machine, any replayed session or any loss on the target side.
  • The model is a model. The four-part chain in Chapter 2 explains how the pieces could fit. Nothing we observed links a given stealer server to either workbench.
  • Workbench owners are unknown. Workbench 1 could hold stolen browser data or its owner's own profile. Workbench 2 could belong to an attacker or to an unhardened security contractor.
  • Confirmed is not complete. Twenty confirmed endpoints are a floor. Many of the 77 suspected and 91 candidate endpoints may be real C2 servers that lacked a second signal.
  • Family names. Family names describe the malware, not a named threat group or operator.
  • Dates. Seen dates are when we observed an endpoint. Older dates on some Ramnit records are record dates, not the length of this study.
  • Third parties. Targeted wallet and SaaS brands, both workbench addresses and five confirmed endpoints on shared or subscriber networks are withheld.

11. Sources

  1. Google Chromium Security, Improving the Security of Chrome Cookies on Windows: security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html (verified on 18 November 2026).
  2. Microsoft Playwright Documentation, BrowserType.launchPersistentContext: playwright.dev/docs/api/class-browsertype (verified on 18 November 2026).
  3. W3C Web Application Security Working Group, Device Bound Session Credentials: w3c.github.io/webappsec-dbsc (verified on 18 November 2026).
  4. MITRE ATT&CK, Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539): attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539 (verified on 18 November 2026).
  5. CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA: www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa (verified on 18 November 2026).
  6. OISF, Suricata 7.0 User Guide: HTTP Keywords: docs.suricata.io/en/suricata-7.0.0/rules/http-keywords.html (verified on 18 November 2026).
  7. Salesforce Engineering, Easily Identify Malicious Servers on the Internet with JARM: engineering.salesforce.com/easily-identify-malicious-servers-on-the-internet-with-jarm-e095edac525a (verified on 18 November 2026).

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

Why does a stolen cookie matter so much?

When you log in to a web service, it gives your browser a session cookie. From then on, many services trust that cookie and do not ask for your password or MFA again. Modern infostealers copy the whole Chromium profile folder, cookies included. Whoever holds a fresh cookie can often act as you.

What did the workbenches hold?

The first workbench is a cloud server in China with an open directory on port 8888. It holds Playwright's headless Chromium build 1208 and an OpenClaw agent folder named browser-existing-session. OpenClaw is an autonomous agent that can drive a browser. That folder is a complete Chromium profile, with a cookie store, Trust Tokens, browsing history and a key database. The agent logs each step it takes.

Who supplies the stolen data?

Commodity stealers do the collecting. Aurora and AuroraStealer account for 18 endpoints on 9 hosts. One German server runs three AuroraStealer C2 ports at once. StealC has 7 endpoints and RedLineStealer 6. Two RedLine servers in the Netherlands share the same Windows certificate.

What should we block, and what should we only watch?

Only 20 of the 193 endpoints are confirmed C2 servers. We publish 15 of them, on 13 addresses, in the Indicators tab. The other five sit on shared web hosting or broadband networks, where an address can belong to someone else. We withhold those.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R24-IOC-01 IPv4 135.181.107[.]76 443 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-02 IPv4 191.101.130[.]41 3389 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-03 IPv4 45.144.31[.]252 3389 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-04 IPv4 49.12.203[.]54 21 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-05 IPv4 49.12.203[.]54 443 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-06 IPv4 49.12.203[.]54 8443 aurorastealer Block
R24-IOC-07 IPv4 180.178.46[.]242 443 chaluborat Block
R24-IOC-08 IPv4 180.178.46[.]244 443 chaluborat Block
R24-IOC-09 IPv4 180.178.46[.]245 443 chaluborat Block
R24-IOC-10 IPv4 180.178.46[.]246 443 chaluborat Block
R24-IOC-11 IPv4 135.181.173[.]163 5800 redlinestealer Block
R24-IOC-12 IPv4 185.222.58[.]51 3389 redlinestealer Block
R24-IOC-13 IPv4 45.137.22[.]249 3389 redlinestealer Block
R24-IOC-14 IPv4 104.248.107[.]188 80 stealc Block
R24-IOC-15 IPv4 34.87.31[.]79 5001 stealc Block

13 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

YARA odin_openclaw_aurora_laplas_stealc_artifacts.yar 78 lines
Download
Suricata odin_playwright_session_cloners_and_stealers.rules 21 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_openclaw_session_clone_and_stealer_hunt.kql 48 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_playwright_session_cloner_and_clipper_activity.yml 96 lines
Download