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Odin Research / What is / Malware and backdoors

What Is HookBot? How the Android Banking Trojan Works

An overlay and screen-control trojan sold as a service: how it steals from phones, how its code spread, and what defenders can do.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
7 min read
Type
Android malware

In short

HookBot is an Android banking trojan sold as a service and descended from the ERMAC and Hook code base. It abuses Android Accessibility to control the screen and draws fake login overlays over banking apps. It captures PINs and one-time codes, and streams the screen so an operator can make transfers from the victim's own phone.

Key takeaways

What it is
An Android banking trojan sold as a service, one branch of the ERMAC and Hook code base.
How it works
Accessibility abuse, panel-supplied overlays and screen streaming let an operator steal credentials and commit on-device fraud.
Why it matters
The fraud runs inside a real session on the customer's phone, so server-side checks and SMS codes do not stop it.
What Odin Research saw
12 to 13 HookBot endpoints per study; only one controller, on Oracle Cloud in Germany, was corroborated and published.
What to do first
Treat Accessibility grants as a fraud signal, harden the banking app and take down fake app lures.

What is HookBot?

HookBot is an Android banking trojan sold as a service and descended from the ERMAC and Hook code base. It abuses Android Accessibility to read and control the screen and draws fake login overlays over banking apps. It captures PINs and one-time codes, and streams the screen so an operator can move money from the victim's own phone.

Censys describes ERMAC and HookBot as two branches of one Android banking trojan sold as a service, forked from a shared code base. A single constant in the panel code sets the displayed name, "ERMAC" in one tree and "Hook" in the other. Zimperium notes that Hook itself was first described by ThreatFabric as an ERMAC fork with remote access features.

HookBot is a form of malware-as-a-service. Buyers rent or build their own copy and run their own web panel. That is why defenders see many unrelated HookBot panels rather than one central operator.

How HookBot works

Modern Android banking trojans such as HookBot combine three techniques:

  1. Accessibility abuse. Once the victim grants Android Accessibility permission, the app can read the screen and tap buttons, including approving its own permissions. MITRE ATT&CK tracks simulated taps and text entry as Input Injection (T1516).
  2. Overlays. The trojan watches which app is in front and draws a fake login screen over it, a form of credential harvesting. MITRE calls this GUI Input Capture (T1417.002). Odin's Monograph 15 notes that the overlay HTML comes from the panel, so operators can add new targets without updating the app.
  3. Screen streaming. A VNC-style stream lets the operator watch and replay taps inside a logged-in banking session. This is on-device fraud: the transfer starts from the victim's own phone, inside a session that has already passed multi-factor authentication.

The Hook line keeps growing. Zimperium reported in August 2025 that Hook version 3 supports 107 remote commands, 38 of them new. Its additions include ransomware-style full-screen overlays, fake NFC overlays, fake PIN and pattern prompts to capture the lock screen, and transparent overlays that record gestures.

HookBot origin, leak and versions

Censys lays out the family tree. ERMAC was built on the earlier Cerberus banking trojan and first appeared in July 2021. Hook appeared as an ERMAC fork in January 2023. In August 2025 the ERMAC 3.0 source code was published, including the backend, the React panel, the WebSocket relay and the APK builder.

After the leak, anyone could stand up a panel. Censys counted 266 distinct HookBot panel IPs over the past year, peaking at 58 active hosts in September 2025, the month after publication, and falling to 6 in June 2026. HookBot adds two parts that the ERMAC 3.0 dump lacks: an IP allowlist gate and a Telegram bot.

Distribution is mostly outside official app stores. Zimperium reported Hook APKs hosted on phishing websites and GitHub repositories. Lures often pose as known brands, which is why fake mobile apps and smishing are the usual entry points.

Why HookBot matters to banks and defenders

HookBot attacks the phone, not the bank's servers. The fraud happens inside a genuine, logged-in session on the customer's own device. Device-binding and SMS one-time codes do little when the attacker is tapping the screen.

That shifts the defense to the app and the fraud engine. Banks need to spot an active Accessibility service, screen projection or an overlay during a transfer. Customers need to know that a banking app never needs Accessibility permission. Strong, phishing-resistant sign-in such as passkeys helps against credential theft, but on-device fraud needs runtime checks too.

What Odin Research observed

Odin looks at the server side only. Neither study saw victim handsets.

  • One corroborated panel. Monograph 15 reviewed 12 HookBot feed entries. Only one, on Oracle Cloud in Germany, showed a dedicated panel certificate and TLS fingerprint in November 2026. Feed records also showed the HOOKBOT PANEL page title on port 8443 and eight separate fingerprint matches.
  • Eleven older entries. The other 11 entries carried first-seen dates from 2025 and no fresh panel markers. Five sat behind a default Traefik proxy certificate. Cloud addresses get reassigned, so they stay on watchlists.
  • The same picture in a second study. Monograph 29 counted 13 HookBot endpoints. The German controller on port 80 was still the only one corroborated in the window, and it is the only address that study publishes for blocking. A thirteenth endpoint on port 2223 stayed a candidate.
  • Part of a wider mobile scene. Monograph 29 found HookBot next to other Android overlay families, L3MON, Daam and Octopus, for 23 mobile C2 endpoints in all.

How to detect HookBot

  • On the device. Flag banking sessions where an Accessibility service is active, the screen is being projected, or an overlay sits on top of your app.
  • App integrity. Use Google Play Integrity attestation and runtime integrity checks to spot sideloaded or tampered environments.
  • Panel titles. Pages titled HOOKBOT PANEL are a strong hunting lead. Censys warns that titles and favicons are easy to change, so pair them with certificates or other signals.
  • Gated panels. Censys reports that HookBot's allowlist gate can hide panels from passive scans while they still run. A missing host is not proof it went offline.
  • Network contact. Corporate phones or mobile VPN users that reach a confirmed HookBot controller need a check.

Monograph 15 publishes a Suricata signature for the HookBot panel page and a YARA rule for HookBot DEX and panel artifacts. Monograph 29 adds a Suricata signature for HookBot check-ins, a YARA rule for HookBot and Daam panel configs, and a KQL query for contact with the confirmed controller. All are in the Defense Kit.

How to defend against HookBot

  1. Treat Accessibility grants as a fraud signal in mobile banking risk scoring, and step up checks during transfers.
  2. Harden the app. Enforce Android restricted settings and OWASP MASVS runtime integrity checks to limit sideloaded overlays and screen capture.
  3. Take down lures fast. Monitor for fake versions of your app and phishing pages that host APKs. See brand impersonation.
  4. Educate customers. Install apps only from official stores, and never grant Accessibility to an app that asks for it right after install.
  5. Block confirmed panels. Block the corroborated controller on perimeter firewalls and mobile VPN gateways, and review the lease after 30 days.

HookBot compared with other Android banking trojans

FamilyRelationNotable traitsOdin data
HookBotHook branch of the ERMAC code baseAccessibility abuse, overlays, VNC streaming, IP allowlist gate12 to 13 endpoints; 1 corroborated controller
ERMACSister branch; built on CerberusSource code published in August 2025Not tracked separately
Hook v3Latest Hook release reported by Zimperium107 remote commands, NFC and lock-screen overlaysNot tracked separately
L3MONSeparate Android mobile C2 familyRelies on Accessibility abuse too (Monograph 29)Watchlist only in Monograph 29

Frequently asked questions about HookBot

What is HookBot?

HookBot is an Android banking trojan sold as a service and descended from the ERMAC and Hook code base. It uses Accessibility abuse, fake overlays and screen streaming to steal credentials and carry out fraud on the victim's phone.

Is HookBot the same as Hook?

Closely related. Censys describes ERMAC and HookBot as two branches of one code base, with the panel name set to Hook in one branch. Zimperium tracks the Hook line, which reached version 3 in 2025.

How does HookBot infect phones?

Victims install a fake app from outside the official store, often from a phishing page or a hosted APK. The app then asks for Accessibility permission, which gives it control of the screen.

What does HookBot steal?

Banking logins through fake overlays, PINs and lock-screen patterns, and one-time codes. With screen streaming, the operator can also start transfers inside the victim's banking session.

Was the HookBot source code leaked?

The ERMAC 3.0 source, which closely matches HookBot, was published in August 2025. Censys saw HookBot panel numbers peak the following month.

How do I know if my phone has HookBot?

Warning signs include an unknown app with Accessibility permission, overlays on banking apps and unexpected screen-sharing prompts. Remove the app, contact your bank and reset banking passwords from a clean device.

How do banks detect HookBot?

By checking for active Accessibility services, screen projection and overlays during sessions, and by using Play Integrity attestation. Odin Research publishes Suricata, YARA and KQL rules for HookBot panels.

HookBot vs ERMAC: what is the difference?

They share a code base. Censys notes HookBot adds an IP allowlist gate and a Telegram bot that the ERMAC 3.0 dump lacks, and Hook's command set grew to include remote screen control.

Sources

  1. Censys, research on the ERMAC source leak and HookBot panels. censys.com/blog/ermac-source-leak-hookbot/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. Zimperium, "Hook Version 3: The Banking Trojan with the Most Advanced Capabilities", 25 August 2025. zimperium.com/blog/hook-version-3-the-banking-trojan-with-the-most-advanced-capabilities (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK, GUI Input Capture (T1417.002). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK, Input Injection (T1516). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516/ (checked 21 November 2026)

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