Skip to content
NewCybercrime Report 2026 · Eight Chapters · A Post Is Not An Incident → Explore The ChaptersCybercrime Report 2026 → Explore
All full reports
Full reportCommodity malwareMonograph 15 / 1920 min read

HookBot Panels, Multi-Port RATs and Telegram Kits: Commodity Threat Infrastructure

How Android banking panels, multi-port Windows RAT servers and an open directory of flood-themed files run side by side on low-cost hosting

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
20 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

In a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense mapped 238 mobile and desktop RAT listeners on 160 hosts, plus one open directory holding 40 botnet-themed files. Three separate ecosystems appear: HookBot Android banking panels, multi-port Windows RAT servers and Telegram-themed flood kits. Only six hosts carry enough signals to block. Block those six, hunt default RAT certificates and ports 56001 to 56003, and limit Telegram Bot API traffic to approved hosts.

Commodity cybercrime runs separate markets for mobile banking panels, desktop remote access trojans (RATs) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) kits. All three rent cheap virtual private servers (VPS) and use public messaging APIs. This report maps where these tools listen, which fingerprints give them away, and which hosts are safe to block.

1

Twelve HookBot feed entries hold one corroborated panel and eleven older entries.

A server in Germany, 152.70.24[.]49, shows a dedicated HookBot panel certificate and JARM fingerprint in November 2026. The other 11 entries carry first-seen dates from 2025 and no fresh panel markers. They belong on watchlists. Public research documents HookBot's Accessibility abuse, overlays and VNC screen control; we saw no victim devices.

2

Desktop RAT operators pack up to 22 listener ports onto one VPS.

Across 226 desktop listeners in seven families, AsyncRAT averages 2.20 listeners per host. One Contabo server binds 22 ports. PureRAT places 9 of its 18 candidate listeners on the sequential ports 56001 to 56003.

3

An open directory on port 755 lists 40 botnet-themed files.

The files total 14.91 MB, including 7 ZIP archives and 31 JavaScript files. Their 39 stored files yield 33 unique SHA-256 hashes in five duplicate groups. File contents and server ownership are unverified, so the host stays on a watchlist.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Treat Android Accessibility grants on banking devices as a fraud signal. Require Google Play Integrity attestation, and detect active Accessibility services and screen projection during transfers. Block the corroborated panel 152.70.24[.]49 and keep the 2025 HookBot entries on watchlists.
  2. Detect RATs by certificate, JARM and port density, not single ports. Block only the six multi-signal hosts. Hunt the default AsyncRAT and Quasar certificates and TLS handshakes on ports 56001 to 56003. Keep candidate hosts on watchlists.
  3. Allow Telegram Bot API traffic only from approved automation hosts. Alert when script interpreters, abused .NET framework binaries or programs in user-writable folders connect to Telegram API domains or /bot paths.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
238Mobile and desktop RAT listener observations (236 unique family, IP and port combinations) on 160 hosts
12HookBot feed entries: 1 corroborated panel and 11 older entries for watchlists
121AsyncRAT listeners on 55 IPs (2.20 per host), up to 22 ports on one Contabo VPS
18PureRAT candidate listeners on 14 IPs; 9 of them on ports 56001 to 56003
40Files (14.91 MB) indexed on the open directory on port 755
33Unique SHA-256 hashes across the 39 stored files, in 5 duplicate groups
6Hosts with enough independent signals to block

How to use this report.

Security and fraud leaders can read Chapter 1, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. SOC and detection engineers should start with Chapters 7 to 9. CTI analysts will find the HookBot, RAT and open-directory detail in Chapters 2 to 5.

2. Three Separate Ecosystems

In short

The data shows three populations that share no IP address, certificate or verified operator link. We compare them with an analytical model of four roles, not as one coordinated group.

What was observed

In the window, Odin by Brandefense recorded 238 listener observations. They cover one Android banking framework, HookBot, and seven Windows RAT or stealer families: AsyncRAT, Quasar, Remcos, PureRAT, DCRat, RedLine Stealer and VenomRAT. Separately, one open HTTP directory on port 755 listed 40 botnet-themed files.

The 12 HookBot hosts, the 148 desktop RAT hosts and the port-755 server share no IPv4 address. Together they make 161 studied hosts. Timestamps in this report are observation times, not infection times.

Figure 1: Three unlinked commodity ecosystems: mobile panels, desktop RATs and botnet staging
Figure 1: Three unlinked commodity ecosystems: mobile panels, desktop RATs and botnet staging

Families at a glance

Density is listeners per host. A value above 1.00 means operators stack several ports on one server.

FamilyPlatform and protocolListenersDistinct IPsDensityStatus
AsyncRATWindows .NET, MessagePack over TLS121552.20x1 confirmed, 11 suspected, 109 candidate
QuasarWindows .NET, Protobuf over TLS33301.10x2 confirmed (1 to block, 1 on a dynamic ISP), 4 suspected, 27 candidate
RemcosWindows C++, RC4 or TLS32301.07x25 suspected, 7 candidate
PureRATWindows .NET, Protobuf over TLS18141.29x18 candidate (9 on ports 56001 to 56003)
DCRatWindows .NET, modular C213121.08x1 confirmed, 3 suspected, 9 candidate
HookBotAndroid, HTTP and VNC behind Traefik12121.00x12 feed-confirmed (1 corroborated, 11 older)
RedLine StealerWindows .NET, HTTP or TCP stealer551.00x3 feed-confirmed (all watchlist), 1 suspected, 1 candidate
VenomRATWindows .NET, HVNC fork441.00x2 confirmed, 2 candidate

Adding the per-family hosts gives 162 addresses. The true count is 160, because two Colombian telecom addresses host more than one family. One binds AsyncRAT on ports 5010 and 5011 plus DCRat on 5020. The other, a dynamic ISP address, binds Remcos on 3000 and 3001 plus DCRat on 30001.

The 238 observations reduce to 236 unique sockets. Two sockets were recorded twice: 102.220.163[.]109:443 (AsyncRAT) and 141.98.157[.]101:2288 (Quasar).

The four-role model

This is an analytical model. It compares how commodity malware-as-a-service (MaaS) markets specialize. It does not claim handoffs between groups.

RoleWhat it coversEvidence base
A. DeliverySideloaded Android .apk droppers that use session-based installers to get past Android 13 to 15 Restricted Settings, plus crypted Windows .msi and .zip loadersPublic reporting only
B. HookBot panelsWeb panels built to control Android implants with overlays, PIN and 2FA capture, and VNC screen control12 feed entries; no victim handsets seen
C. Multi-port desktop RATsVPS on Contabo, OVH, HostPapa and EGIHosting binding several ports per host226 desktop listeners; any split by affiliate or build is unverified
D. Botnet kit directoryOpen directory with ZIP and JavaScript files whose names suggest Telegram botnets and flood tools40 indexed files; contents not inspected

3. HookBot Android Banking Panels

In short

Of 12 HookBot feed entries, only 152.70.24[.]49 in Germany shows November 2026 panel markers. The other 11 carry first-seen dates from 2025 and go to watchlists.

HookBot descends from the leaked Ermac and Hook Android banking trojans. CSIRT KNF, the Polish financial supervisor's CSIRT, documents it as an on-device fraud (ODF) trojan. On-device fraud means the attacker starts transfers from the victim's own phone and logged-in banking session. Our view is the panel side only. We saw no victim handsets.

The corroborated panel

FieldValue
Address152.70.24[.]49, port 80 (also port 8443)
HostingOracle Corporation, Germany
TLS certificateCN=panel.pecufos[.]com
JARM1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e
Page titleHOOKBOT PANEL (reported on port 8443)
Observed13 November 2026

The certificate and JARM on port 80 are directly observed. Feed records add the HOOKBOT PANEL title on port 8443 and eight separate HookBot fingerprint matches. These cover the panel title, HTTP body hashes, certificate subject and SAN, a fork's panel title, and two host-rotation hashes. Together, these signals support blocking.

The eleven older entries

The other 11 entries carry earliest first-seen dates between July and November 2025. None shows a panel body hash or fresh November 2026 panel marker. Their addresses are withheld.

CountryHostingPortTLS and JARMEarliest first-seen
IDAmazon.com, Inc.443CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT, JARM 29d29d...5a77db11 Nov 2025
CLThe Constant Company443CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT, JARM 26d26d...9cdc1326 Nov 2025
DEContabo GmbH80CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT, JARM 3fd3fd...51d0e63 Oct 2025
DEContabo GmbH80CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT, JARM 3fd3fd...51d0e64 Oct 2025
USRouterHosting LLC80CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERT, JARM 3fd3fd...7899fb23 Sep 2025
GBEE Limited443Feed tag only11 Jul 2025
IDHostinger International443Feed tag only23 Oct 2025
LTHostinger International80JARM 0003fd...1f614518 Aug 2025
LTHostinger or unattributed80Feed tag only16 Oct 2025
NLUltahost, Inc.80Feed tag only13 Oct 2025
UnattributedVPS80Feed tag only14 Sep 2025

Five of these hosts present the default certificate of the Traefik reverse proxy. The two German Contabo servers share the exact JARM 3fd3fd00000000000043d3fd3fd43d79451d8c63b099acafdbabb24551d0e6. Their first-seen dates are 18 hours apart. That fits a standard Docker reverse-proxy template.

A first-seen date marks when a record entered the feed, not how long the panel stayed up. Addresses may have been reassigned since. One entry sits in EE Limited telecom space. Keep all 11 on watchlists until a live HOOKBOT PANEL banner is seen again.

What HookBot is built to do

Figure 2: Documented HookBot capabilities pair Accessibility overlays with VNC streaming
Figure 2: Documented HookBot capabilities pair Accessibility overlays with VNC streaming

CSIRT KNF's reverse engineering, with MITRE ATT&CK Mobile and the Android reference, documents four capabilities. None was seen on a victim device in this study.

CapabilityHow it worksATT&CK
Accessibility abuseRequests BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE to read UI trees (AccessibilityNodeInfo), auto-approve MediaProjection and SMS permissions, and block Settings or uninstallT1516
WebView overlaysWatches the foreground app and draws a C2-supplied HTML login form over banking apps; talks to the panel with AES-encrypted JSON over WebSocketT1417.002
Keylogging and 2FA captureLogs text-change events such as lock-screen PINs, seed phrases and one-time codes; intercepts SMS and bank push notificationsT1417.002
VNC controlStreams the screen to the panel behind a black overlay, so an operator can replay taps with dispatchGesture inside a logged-in sessionT1516

Because the implant encrypts its WebSocket traffic with AES, network rules match the panel's HTTP title and TLS certificate, not implant payloads.

4. Multi-Port Desktop RAT Servers

In short

Desktop RAT operators stack many listeners on one rented server. AsyncRAT reaches 22 ports on one Contabo host, and half of PureRAT's candidates sit on ports 56001 to 56003.

Figure 3: Five commodity C2 stacks span Android Accessibility VNC, .NET TLS sockets and Telegram APIs
Figure 3: Five commodity C2 stacks span Android Accessibility VNC, .NET TLS sockets and Telegram APIs

PureRAT on sequential high ports

PureRAT, also tracked as PureHVNC, is a commercial modular .NET RAT. Public analyses document Hidden VNC, a reverse SOCKS5 proxy and credential-stealing plugins. On 17 November 2026 we saw 18 PureRAT candidate listeners on 14 hosts.

Half of them (9 of 18, 50.0%) use a three-port window. Port 56001 has 2 sockets, 56002 has 3 and 56003 has 4. The other nine use 443 (3), 442, 1337, 4443, 6767, 7500 and 7777 (one each).

Four candidate hosts bind two ports each. Their addresses are withheld, as are the custom certificate names.

HostingCountryPortsWhat it shows
OVH SASSG56002, 56003Custom domain certificate on both sockets (name withheld), JARM 15d3fd...ccbc0b6b
Tier.Net Technologies LLCUS56002, 56003Sequential pair, no certificate name recorded
ReliableSite.Net LLCUS56002, 56003Sequential pair, no certificate name recorded
Antbox Networks LimitedSG442, 443Adjacent HTTPS-like pair, no certificate name recorded

Huntress and Cyderes describe three layers in PureRAT builds:

  • The .NET loader unpacks its payload with AES decryption and GZip decompression.
  • The final configuration is stored as Base64-encoded, GZip-compressed protobuf.
  • C2 traffic uses length-prefixed protobuf-net messages inside a .NET SslStream TLS session.

TLS hides the protobuf messages on the wire. So the Suricata rule for ports 56001 to 56003 is a hunt for TLS server handshakes, not a verdict. Pair it with endpoint and YARA hunting for SslStream, protobuf-net and GZipStream loader traits.

AsyncRAT: vertical stacking and horizontal sprawl

AsyncRAT shows two opposite patterns.

Vertical stacking on Contabo.

Contabo hosts 53 of the 121 AsyncRAT listeners (43.8%): 30 on Contabo Inc. and 23 on Contabo GmbH. Three Contabo candidate hosts bind 52 ports between them. Their addresses are withheld.

HostCountryPortsPattern
Contabo candidate 1FR226006 plus 21 ports between 10100 and 30900
Contabo candidate 2US16Ports 80 to 50100
Contabo candidate 3US14Ports 70 to 20700
102.220.163[.]109 (confirmed)SI, VPS Dedicated LLC11443 with CN=AsyncRAT Server, plus 10 high ports from 2502 to 8808

The confirmed host's JARM on port 443 is 22b22b07b22b22b22b22b22b22b22bfd9c9d14e4f4f67f94f0359f8b28f532.

Horizontal sprawl on EGIHosting.

Sixteen candidate hosts in one EGIHosting /24 subnet each run a single AsyncRAT listener. All 16 use TCP 8282 and the generic certificate CN=Server. The subnet is withheld.

Sister families: default certificates, spoofing and cloned templates

The other desktop families reuse default RAT certificates, spoof software brands or clone Windows RDP templates. All seven custom domain certificates seen on candidate or suspected hosts are withheld.

FamilyHost and portHostingWhat it showsAction
Quasar141.98.157[.]101:2288GB, EUGAMEHOST LTDStock CN=Quasar Server CA, JARM 2ad2ad...3585be, seen twiceBlock
QuasarWithheld, port 5000CA, Shaw CommunicationsStock CN=Quasar Server CA on a cable subscriber ISPShort watchlist
DCRat148.113.214[.]176:443 (and 80)CA, OVH SASWildcard certificate spoofing a download-manager brand (name withheld)Block
DCRatWithheld, port 3232ES, IONOS SEDefault CN=DcRatWatchlist
VenomRAT5.161.43[.]175:443US, HetznerCN=akashicsymbiosis[.]ai, JARM 27d40d...Block
VenomRAT154.12.90[.]49:443HK, cognetcloud INCCN=dgtwxj[.]com, JARM 3fd3fd...Block
RedLine StealerWithheld, port 5800FI, Hetzner Online GmbHFeed tag and port only; no certificate, JARM or bannerWatchlist
RedLine StealerTwo hosts withheld, port 3389NL, RootLayer Web ServicesFeed tag plus a shared Windows RDP hostname certificateWatchlist
Remcos9 hosts withheld; ports 3389, 2404 (4) and 9091 (5)US, Interserver, IncPort 3389 rows share one Windows RDP hostname certificateWatchlist

A shared RDP hostname certificate points to a cloned Windows VPS image, not to RAT software. That is why those RedLine and Remcos rows stay on watchlists.

5. The Port-755 Open Directory

In short

One open HTTP directory on port 755 lists 40 files with Telegram-botnet and flood-tool names. We hashed the files but did not open them, so the host stays on a watchlist.

Figure 4: Operators consolidate up to 22 RAT ports per VPS and list 40 indexed flood-themed files on port 755
Figure 4: Operators consolidate up to 22 RAT ports per VPS and list 40 indexed flood-themed files on port 755

What the directory held

The directory listed 40 files totaling 14.91 MB: 7 .zip archives, 31 .js files, 1 .c file and 1 .py file. Thirty-nine were stored and hashed. One 158,720-byte entry was listed but not stored.

We recorded names, sizes and whole-file SHA-256 hashes. We did not unpack the archives or read the scripts. Hashes alone cannot show whether the server belongs to an attacker, a third-party mirror, a lab or a honeypot. So the host address and all 40 paths are withheld.

File (described by its name)Size (bytes)Note
Telegram DDoS-named archive (.zip)616,510Not unpacked
Telegram botnet-named archive (.zip)2,198Not unpacked
Bot-counter-named archive (.zip)2,533Not unpacked
File-host stresser-named archive (.zip)1,091,073Not unpacked
Encoded layer-7 DDoS-named archive (.zip)965,898Not unpacked; two related archives also present
Two dstat-named scripts (.js)83,968 and 34,816Names suggest a flood meter
Two HTTP flood-named scripts (.js)46,080 and 34,816Names suggest HTTP flooders
Flood-named .c and .py sources6,011 and 5,256Names suggest layer-4 or game-server flooders

None of the 40 paths contained a literal api.telegram[.]org string.

Hypothesis: Telegram Bot API as C2

Four of the seven archives have bot or Telegram names. The other three have DDoS stresser names. The 31 .js files carry flood and bypass themes.

Public reporting on Telegram-controlled kits describes a two-way pattern (ATT&CK T1102.002, bidirectional communication). A bot polls GET /bot<token>/getUpdates on api.telegram[.]org and returns output with POST /bot<token>/sendMessage. This differs from a dead-drop resolver (T1102.001).

For this directory, Telegram polling, a Node.js runtime and HTTP/2 flood behavior are hypotheses drawn from file names. Defenders should still watch which processes talk to api.telegram[.]org.

Fact: five groups of identical files

Comparing hashes across the 39 stored files shows five groups of byte-identical .js files saved under different names. The groups contain 11 files in total.

GroupFilesSize (bytes) eachName pattern
121,363,148Base name and a copy with a (100$) price suffix; identical content, hash withheld
22873,472AI-themed labels
3234,816HTTP and HTTP/2 fast-flood labels
4234,816Same script in two directories
53204,800HTTP and HTTPS raw-flood labels

The identical hashes show duplication under price-tagged and AI-themed names. Whether anyone sold the script, or paid USD 100 for it, is an inference from file names only.

6. What to Block and What to Watch

In short

Internet-wide RAT data mixes real panels with proxy defaults, cloned Windows templates, old feed tags and home broadband addresses. Only six hosts carry enough independent signals to block.

Figure 5: AsyncRAT concentrates 121 listeners onto 55 IPs (2.20x) while HookBot maps 1:1 across 12 hosts
Figure 5: AsyncRAT concentrates 121 listeners onto 55 IPs (2.20x) while HookBot maps 1:1 across 12 hosts

The six hosts to block

Each of these shows a RAT or panel certificate plus a JARM fingerprint, or a panel certificate plus feed-reported panel markers.

HostFamilyMain signals
152.70.24[.]49HookBotCN=panel.pecufos[.]com, JARM 1dd40d...11926e, HOOKBOT PANEL title
102.220.163[.]109AsyncRATCN=AsyncRAT Server, JARM 22b22b...8f532, 10 more high ports
141.98.157[.]101QuasarCN=Quasar Server CA, JARM 2ad2ad...3585be, seen twice
148.113.214[.]176DCRatSpoofed download-manager wildcard certificate, ports 443 and 80
5.161.43[.]175VenomRATCN=akashicsymbiosis[.]ai, JARM 27d40d...
154.12.90[.]49VenomRATCN=dgtwxj[.]com, JARM 3fd3fd...

What not to block

GroupWhy it is not a blockAction
11 older HookBot entriesFirst-seen dates from 2025 and no fresh panel marker; addresses may have changed handsWatchlist until the panel is seen again
Port 22 on five HookBot hostsOrdinary OpenSSH administration on rented Linux VPSIgnore
Uncorroborated feed rows, such as RedLine on port 5800Feed tag onlyWatchlist
RDP-template rows (RedLine and Remcos on 3389)Shared Windows hostname certificate from a cloned VPS imageWatchlist
Several suspected AsyncRAT rows on Alibaba CloudA commercial cloud AI gateway certificate on port 443 collides with the patternWatchlist
Dynamic or cable ISP addresses (Colombia, Canada)Addresses rotate between customersShort watchlist
Contabo, EGIHosting and PureRAT candidatesPort and JARM only, with no application handshakeWatchlist
The port-755 directoryContents and ownership unverifiedWatchlist

Other explanations we could not rule out

The three populations share no address, certificate or operator link. So evidence from one cannot clear or condemn another. We weighed each one on its own.

  • Multi-port RAT candidates. For the five desktop hosts to block, RAT certificates and JARM values support a C2 listener. The 14 to 22 port Contabo hosts, the 16 EGIHosting hosts and the 18 PureRAT sockets lack an application-layer handshake. A researcher honeypot, vendor sinkhole or lab could look the same.
  • The port-755 directory. Without content or operator data, it could be a third-party repository, an academic malware mirror or a deception honeypot. Hunt by its file-name themes instead of blocking the host; its file hashes are withheld.
  • Older HookBot entries. Their first-seen dates show when they entered the feed, not that panels ran in November 2026. VPS reassignment or harmless reuse of a Traefik proxy stays possible. Five of the 11 show the Traefik default certificate.

Telegram detections need scope

Many DevOps and SOC teams send real webhook alerts to api.telegram[.]org/bot.... Staff may also run the Telegram desktop client from C:Program Files. The KQL and Sigma rules therefore exclude named approved automation hosts and the official client in C:Program Files.

They fire when a script interpreter, or a binary in %APPDATA%, %TEMP% or %PROGRAMDATA%, connects to api.telegram[.]org. The interpreters are powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, curl.exe, node.exe and python.exe. Only the KQL query also covers RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, MSBuild.exe and /bot command lines.

7. What Defenders Should Do

Within 24 hours

  • Block the six hosts in Chapter 6 on perimeter firewalls, mobile VPN gateways, DNS and proxy logs.
  • Put the 10 withheld watchlist entries and other candidate hosts on SIEM watchlists that need a certificate, JARM or endpoint signal before action.
  • Re-check certificate or banner state before keeping any VPS block past 90 days, since addresses get reassigned.

Within 72 hours

  • Enforce Google Play Integrity attestation. Block banking transfers while an untrusted AccessibilityService or MediaProjection stream is active. Disable APK sideloading on managed Android devices.
  • Restrict outbound api.telegram[.]org traffic, through proxy or EDR policy, to designated webhook servers and the official Telegram client.
  • Review any host where a script or a user-writable binary calls /bot. Isolate it if its owner and purpose cannot be confirmed, or if other malicious behavior appears.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Deploy Suricata SIDs 9515001 to 9515007, keeping 9515003 and 9515007 as hunts.
  • Enable Attack Surface Reduction rules and the Sigma rules for %APPDATA% or %TEMP% loaders that start RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, MSBuild.exe or vbc.exe, or create schtasks.exe tasks.
  • Turn on HTTP/2 Rapid Reset rate limits, TLS or JA4-based bot challenges and upstream DDoS scrubbing against commodity layer-7 flood tools.
  • Hunt for Telegram DDoS, botnet and stresser archive names in EDR file-write data and mail and web gateway archive scanners.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Each file targets a signal that survives a change of IP address.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_hookbot_purerat_asyncrat_telegram.rulesSuricata 7: seven signatures for the HookBot panel, PureRAT high-port handshakes, AsyncRAT and Quasar default certificates, and non-browser Telegram Bot API calls
sentinel_rat_beacons_and_telegram_c2_egress.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: egress to the six blocked hosts, RAT-port sockets from suspicious processes, unapproved Telegram API calls, and scheduled-task persistence
sigma_windows_dotnet_rat_and_telegram_bot_c2.ymlSigma (3 rules): .NET framework utilities started from user-writable folders, unapproved Telegram API connections, and a Linux flood-tool hunt
odin_hookbot_purerat_and_telegram_botnet_kits.yarYARA (4 rules): HookBot DEX and panel artifacts, AsyncRAT and VenomRAT stubs, PureRAT loaders, and Telegram botnet kits

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9515001<title>HOOKBOT PANEL</title> in an HTTP responseCatches the HookBot panel page (T1417.002)
9515002TLS certificate subject CN=panel.pecufos[.]com from the serverCatches the corroborated panel's certificate
9515003Any TLS server certificate from ports 56001 to 56003, once per source every 300 secondsHunt for PureRAT sequential ports; pair with endpoint process data (T1219)
9515004Certificate subject CN=AsyncRAT Server on any portCatches the AsyncRAT default certificate
9515005Certificate subject CN=Quasar Server CA on any portCatches the Quasar default certificate
9515006Outbound request to api.telegram[.]org with a /bot<token>/sendMessage, sendDocument or getUpdates path and a script user agentCatches non-browser Telegram C2 calls (T1102.002)
9515007Outbound request to api.telegram[.]org/file/bot<token>/ with a script user agentHunt for payloads pulled through the Bot API file endpoint

The script user agents are python-requests, Go-http-client, curl, node-fetch, axios, PowerShell and Mozilla/4.0.

Two limits apply. First, certificate rules 9515002 to 9515005 read the certificate in clear only in TLS 1.2 and earlier. TLS 1.3 encrypts the server certificate (RFC 8446), so TLS 1.3 needs TLS inspection, active JARM checks or endpoint data. Second, 9515006 and 9515007 read HTTPS URIs and need TLS inspection too. Exempt only named webhook gateway addresses from them, never whole workstation subnets.

How the KQL query works

The query looks back 14 days over DeviceNetworkEvents and DeviceProcessEvents and has four branches.

BranchFires when
1. Blocked-host egressA device connects to one of the six hosts in Chapter 6
2. RAT-port socketsA .NET framework binary (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, MSBuild.exe, vbc.exe, AppLaunch.exe, cvtres.exe) or a user-writable binary connects to a public IP on a commodity RAT port; ports 56001 to 56003 get their own label
3. Telegram APIAn unapproved process calls api.telegram[.]org, judged by interpreter name, .NET binary, user-writable path or a /bot command line
4. Scheduled tasksschtasks.exe /create points at AppData, ProgramData, wscript or powershell

The port list holds 17 values, including 2404, 4782, 8282, 8808, 10100 and 56001 to 56003. Watchlist hosts are withheld, so branch 2 finds them by behavior rather than by IP. Fill in your own approved Telegram hosts before use.

These events show a suspicious launch or socket. They do not show in-memory process hollowing; that needs EDR injection data. If developers run portable tools from %LOCALAPPDATA%Programs, add host-plus-path exclusions or check file signatures, rather than excluding the whole folder.

How the Sigma and YARA rules work

RuleFires when
Sigma 1A binary in %APPDATA%, %TEMP% or %PROGRAMDATA% starts a .NET framework utility, or creates schtasks.exe /create persistence
Sigma 2A script or user-writable process connects to api.telegram[.]org, outside approved hosts and the official client
Sigma 3 (hunt)A Linux node, python or curl process calls api.telegram[.]org/bot, or runs from /tmp/, /var/tmp/ or /dev/shm/ with HTTP/2 flood and proxy-list arguments
ODIN_Android_HookBot_Overlay_And_VNC_DropperStrings in an extracted Android classes.dex file or captured panel HTML; unpack the .apk first
ODIN_DotNet_AsyncRAT_VenomRAT_MessagePack_Stub.NET MessagePack RAT stub strings
ODIN_DotNet_PureRAT_Sequential_Port_Loader (hunt)SslStream with ProtoContract or ProtoMember markers, plus GZipStream config code or the 56001 to 56003 port strings
ODIN_Telegram_BotAPI_DDoS_And_Botnet_Builder_Kit (hunt)api.telegram[.]org/bot methods with Node.js http2.connect or tls.connect calls

The YARA kit rule does not cover the uninspected port-755 files.

How to sort a host

The triage logic never blocks on uncorroborated evidence.

What the host showsAction
Confirmed AsyncRAT, or HookBot with two or more independent panel signalsBlock
HookBot feed entry with only one panel markerAnalyst review
Older HookBot feed entryWatchlist
Multi-port RAT candidate clusterWatchlist
Feed-tagged desktop RAT row with only a port, or only a certificateWatchlist
Suspected RAT on a dynamic ISPShort watchlist
Uninspected open directoryWatch only
Telegram Bot API call from an unlisted %APPDATA% script, nothing elseReview before isolating
The same call plus another malicious behaviorTreat as a Telegram C2 beacon
Port-only SSH matchIgnore
Approved Telegram webhook serverAllow

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds the 6 published hosts. The 10 watchlist hosts and 12 file hashes are withheld.

TypeCount
Hosts to block (IPv4)6
Watchlist hosts (withheld)10
Withheld file hashes from the port-755 directory (12 of 33 unique)12

Supporting fingerprints: the JARM values and certificate subjects named in Chapters 3, 4 and 6.

Hosts to block

HostPortFamilyCountry, hostingKey fingerprint
152.70.24[.]4980HookBotDE, OracleCN=panel.pecufos[.]com, JARM 1dd40d...11926e
102.220.163[.]109443AsyncRATSI, VPS Dedicated LLCCN=AsyncRAT Server, 10 more high ports
141.98.157[.]1012288QuasarGB, EUGAMEHOSTCN=Quasar Server CA, seen twice
154.12.90[.]49443VenomRATHK, cognetcloud INCCN=dgtwxj[.]com, JARM 3fd3fd...
148.113.214[.]176443DCRatCA, OVHSpoofed download-manager certificate, also port 80
5.161.43[.]175443VenomRATUS, HetznerCN=akashicsymbiosis[.]ai, JARM 27d40d...

Watchlist hosts

The 10 watchlist entries are withheld. They cover five of the 11 older HookBot entries, the RedLine port-5800 feed row, the port-755 directory, a PureRAT dual-port candidate, the 22-port Contabo AsyncRAT hub and a Colombian dynamic ISP host. The two RedLine RDP-template hosts on port 3389 are also watched but are not among the 28 indicators in this chapter (6 hosts, 10 watchlist entries and 12 hashes).

File names for hunting

Twelve of the directory's 33 unique file hashes were selected as hunting indicators, and all 12 are withheld. The files were not opened and the host's owner is not established. Hunt by the file-name themes in Chapter 5 instead: Telegram DDoS and botnet archives, stresser and layer-4 or layer-7 flood scripts, and dstat meters.

Withheld: the 10 watchlist addresses, the two RDP-template hosts, all candidate and suspected addresses, custom certificate names on non-confirmed hosts, the EGIHosting subnet, the port-755 host and its paths, and all Telegram bot tokens.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueHow it appearsDetection
Credential Access (Mobile)T1417.002 Input Capture: GUI Input CaptureHookBot WebView overlays and PIN or 2FA captureSID 9515001, 9515002; HookBot YARA rule
Impact / Defense Evasion (Mobile)T1516 Input InjectionHookBot Accessibility abuse and dispatchGesture replay over VNCPlay Integrity and Accessibility monitoring
Command and ControlT1219 Remote Access ToolsAsyncRAT, Quasar, Remcos, PureRAT, DCRat and VenomRAT listenersSID 9515003 to 9515005; KQL branches 1 and 2
Command and ControlT1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolMessagePack and protobuf framing over raw TLS socketsSID 9515003; PureRAT and AsyncRAT YARA rules
Command and ControlT1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationTelegram Bot API polling and replies, as hypothesized for the kitsSID 9515006, 9515007; KQL branch 3; Sigma 2 and 3

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The findings cover a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. Some records carry earlier first-seen dates, as far back as 2023 for a few candidates and 2025 for the older HookBot entries. These are earliest first-seen dates, not a tracking start.
  • Panels, not victims. We saw servers, certificates and listings. We saw no victim device, no infection and no financial loss.
  • Feed records. The HookBot feed entries, the port 8443 title and the eight fingerprint matches on 152.70.24[.]49 come from feed records. The certificate and JARM on port 80 were observed directly.
  • Candidates are leads. Multi-port candidate hosts rest on port and JARM data alone. Do not block them without a second signal.
  • The open directory is unread. File names suggest Telegram botnets and flood tools. We did not open the files, and we do not know who runs the server.
  • The role model is a model. Nothing links the three populations to each other.
  • Rule testing. Every published rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma and Microsoft's Kusto.Language analyzer, checked on 20 November 2026). The rules were not replayed against live traffic, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use.

11. Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK Mobile. T1417.002 GUI Input Capture and T1516 Input Injection. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  2. Android Developers. AccessibilityService reference. https://developer.android.com/reference/android/accessibilityservice/AccessibilityService (verified 19 November 2026)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise. T1219 Remote Access Tools and T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise. T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  5. Telegram. Bot API documentation. https://core.telegram.org/bots/api (verified 19 November 2026)
  6. Salesforce Engineering. Easily identify malicious servers on the internet with JARM. https://engineering.salesforce.com/easily-identify-malicious-servers-on-the-internet-with-jarm-e095edac525a/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  7. CSIRT KNF. HookBot, a new Android banking trojan. https://cebrf.knf.gov.pl/images/HOOKBOT_CSIRT_KNF_ENG.pdf (verified 19 November 2026)
  8. Huntress. PureRAT threat actor evolution. https://www.huntress.com/blog/purerat-threat-actor-evolution (verified 19 November 2026)
  9. Cyderes Howler Cell. Job offer attack chains analysis. https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/job-offer-attack-chains-analysis (verified 19 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What did we find?

The data splits into three populations. They share no IP address, certificate or known operator. Of all these hosts, only six are block-ready today. Everything else belongs on a watchlist until it is corroborated.

Why should banks care about HookBot?

HookBot is an Android banking trojan descended from the leaked Ermac and Hook code. Public research by CSIRT KNF shows what it is built to do. It abuses Android Accessibility to read the screen and approve its own permissions. It draws fake login forms over banking apps. It captures PINs and one-time codes. It streams the screen to the attacker over VNC, so the attacker can tap through a transfer inside the victim's own session.

How do RAT operators set up their servers?

Desktop RAT operators rent one cheap server and open many listener ports on it. AsyncRAT averages 2.20 listeners per host across 55 addresses. One Contabo server binds 22 ports. Another hosting network shows the opposite pattern: 16 separate hosts in one subnet, each with a single AsyncRAT listener on port 8282.

What was in the open directory?

The port-755 directory listed 7 ZIP archives, 31 JavaScript files, one C file and one Python file. Their names suggest Telegram-controlled botnets and website flood tools. We recorded names, sizes and hashes, but did not open the files.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R15-IOC-01 IPv4 152.70.24[.]49 80 HookBot Block
R15-IOC-02 IPv4 102.220.163[.]109 443 AsyncRAT Block
R15-IOC-03 IPv4 141.98.157[.]101 2288 Quasar Block
R15-IOC-04 IPv4 154.12.90[.]49 443 VenomRAT Block
R15-IOC-05 IPv4 148.113.214[.]176 443 DCRat Block
R15-IOC-06 IPv4 5.161.43[.]175 443 VenomRAT Block

22 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

YARA odin_hookbot_purerat_and_telegram_botnet_kits.yar 115 lines
Download
Suricata odin_hookbot_purerat_asyncrat_telegram.rules 28 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_rat_beacons_and_telegram_c2_egress.kql 84 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_windows_dotnet_rat_and_telegram_bot_c2.yml 141 lines
Download