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Odin Research / What is / Malware and backdoors

What Is DCRat? The DarkCrystal Remote Access Trojan Explained

A cheap, modular Windows RAT that steals keystrokes, files and credentials: what the name covers, how campaigns deliver it, and how to find its servers.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
6 min read
Type
Remote access trojan (RAT)

In short

DCRat is a remote access trojan for Windows, built on .NET. It gives an attacker remote control of an infected PC, logs keystrokes, takes screenshots and steals credentials and files. The name covers the commercial DarkCrystal RAT sold on underground forums and an open-source variant of AsyncRAT. Both are delivered mainly by phishing.

Key takeaways

What it is
A .NET remote access trojan for Windows. Splunk describes DarkCrystal RAT as a low-cost commercial tool; MITRE and Zscaler describe DCRAT as an open-source variant of AsyncRAT.
How it works
Once a loader runs it, DCRat connects to its C2 server, adds persistence through scheduled tasks or Run keys, and takes commands such as keylogging, screenshots and file theft.
Who uses it
Cisco Talos tied it to a GoPhish campaign against Russian speakers. Zscaler linked it to BlindEagle (APT-C-36) attacks on a Colombian government agency.
What Odin Research saw
1,593 historical DCRat records in Monograph 08 but only one confirmed live controller. Monograph 15 confirmed one more and held 12 for review.
What to do first
Block macro and script lures, watch for .NET utilities and scheduled tasks started from user folders, and do not block old feed entries without fresh evidence.

What is DCRat?

DCRat is a remote access trojan for Windows, built on .NET. Once it runs on a PC, it gives an attacker remote control, logs keystrokes, captures screenshots and steals files, credentials and app data. It is cheap or free to obtain and arrives mostly through phishing, which makes it common in crimeware and some targeted campaigns.

The name covers two related things, and vendors use it differently:

  • DarkCrystal RAT. Splunk's threat research team describes DCRat (Dark Crystal RAT) as a .NET tool sold as an underground commercial product, available for a low price in different forums.
  • DCRAT or DcRAT, the open-source variant. MITRE ATT&CK (S9017) and Zscaler describe DCRAT as a variant of the open-source AsyncRAT, written in C#, that adds features such as patching Microsoft's Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI).

Threat feeds often merge the two under one label. For defenders the response is the same: an infected host has a full remote control channel.

How DCRat works

DCRat is rarely the first file a victim opens. A lure or loader brings it in, then the RAT sets up persistence and calls home.

  1. Delivery. Splunk described spear-phishing emails with macro-enabled Excel files that ran a PowerShell downloader. Cisco Talos described an HTML page that built a download, which ran a Go loader that added Microsoft Defender exclusions and fetched DCRat.
  2. Persistence. Splunk listed three methods: a scheduled task, a Registry Run key and a Winlogon autostart key. Talos saw several scheduled tasks and files masquerading as Windows programs such as csrss.exe and dllhost.exe.
  3. Command and control. Zscaler described socket-based C2. MITRE records certificate-based authentication of C2 servers and an AES-256-encrypted configuration file.
  4. Plugins. Talos and Zscaler both describe a modular design, with DLL plugins for injection and data theft.

Splunk listed what the RAT can do once connected:

  • Collect host details, including user name, admin status, GPU, CPU and webcam data.
  • Steal data from apps such as Steam, Telegram and Discord.
  • Take screenshots, capture the clipboard and record keystrokes (input capture).
  • Manage files and processes, run shell commands and load extra plugins.
  • Run DDoS, logoff, restart and shutdown functions.

How attackers use DCRat

DCRat shows up in both crimeware and state-linked campaigns:

  • Phishing against Russian speakers. On 22 October 2024, Cisco Talos reported that an unknown actor used the GoPhish framework to send lures to Russian-speaking users. One infection chain ended in DCRat, the other in a new PowerShell RAT Talos named PowerRAT.
  • A Colombian government agency. On 16 December 2025, Zscaler ThreatLabz reported that BlindEagle, also tracked as APT-C-36, sent a spear-phishing email with an SVG attachment to an agency under Colombia's Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. A fileless chain loaded the Caminho loader, which injected DCRAT into MSBuild.exe by process hollowing. Zscaler attributed the attack to BlindEagle with medium confidence.
  • Ukraine. Splunk's 2022 analysis cited CERT-UA reporting on DCRat campaigns against Ukrainian organizations.

The common entry point is phishing plus user action: enabling macros, opening an archive or running a downloaded file.

What Odin Research observed

Odin Research tracks DCRat controllers as part of the commodity RAT landscape. The key finding is how few listed servers are live.

  • Mostly stale records. Monograph 08 counted 1,593 historical DCRat records across 54 countries, 8.2% of six RAT families. Only one DCRat controller was confirmed live in the window. Across all six families, 6 of 920 recently active candidates were confirmed.
  • Why old records mislead. Feeds flag RAT controllers from a port, banner or self-signed certificate. Those signals stay attached to a cheap VPS address after it passes to a new tenant. Blocking such lists wholesale catches recycled addresses, not attackers.
  • A spoofed certificate. Monograph 15 recorded 13 DCRat listener observations on 12 hosts: 1 confirmed, 3 suspected and 9 candidates. The confirmed server, on OVH in Canada, used a wildcard certificate that spoofed a download-manager brand, on ports 443 and 80.
  • Default certificates. One server in Spain presented the stock CN=DcRat certificate on port 3232. It stayed on a watchlist, because a default certificate alone is weak evidence.
  • Shared hosts. Two Colombian telecom addresses ran DCRat next to AsyncRAT or Remcos on nearby ports.

How to detect DCRat

  • Default certificates. A TLS certificate with the exact subject CN=DcRat marks a stock DCRat server. Monograph 08 includes a Suricata signature for it.
  • Persistence. Alert on new scheduled tasks, Run keys or Winlogon keys that point to user-writable folders, and on files named after Windows programs outside System32.
  • .NET from odd places. .NET framework utilities such as MSBuild.exe started from user folders, or making network connections, fit DCRat loaders. Monograph 15 publishes a Sigma rule for this.
  • Defender tampering. New Microsoft Defender exclusions added by a script shortly before an unknown executable runs.
  • Splunk analytics. Splunk published detections for DCRat-style behavior, such as shutdown, reboot and logoff command lines and webcam discovery.

Monograph 15 also includes a Sentinel KQL hunt for egress to its confirmed RAT hosts and RAT-port sockets from suspicious processes. See the Defense Kit.

How to defend against and respond to DCRat

  1. Cut the lures. Block macros in files from the internet, filter HTML and SVG attachments, and train staff to report archives that ask to be run.
  2. Restrict scripts. Use application control to stop PowerShell, script hosts and .NET utilities from launching unknown code in user folders.
  3. Isolate and reset. If DCRat is found, isolate the PC and reset every password and session used on it. DCRat logs keystrokes and steals app data, so treat all of it as exposed. See How to respond to infostealer log exposure.
  4. Use fresh indicators. Block the confirmed controllers from Monographs 08 and 15, and re-check older feed entries before blocking them.

DCRat compared with other commodity RATs

Historical record counts come from Monograph 08.

RATHistorical recordsConfirmed live (13 to 16 Nov 2026)Note
DCRat1,5931Default subject CN=DcRat; open-source variant built on AsyncRAT
AsyncRAT11,4731Largest family by records
Quasar2,9382Default CN=Quasar Server CA
Remcos2,0770No confirmed controller in the window
VenomRAT1,2922Both confirmed controllers on port 443

Frequently asked questions about DCRat

What is DCRat?

DCRat is a .NET remote access trojan for Windows. It gives attackers remote control of an infected PC and can log keystrokes, take screenshots and steal files, credentials and app data.

Is DCRat a virus?

DCRat is malware, specifically a remote access trojan. The campaigns reported by Talos, Zscaler and Splunk delivered it through phishing lures and loaders that a user was tricked into opening.

What is the difference between DCRat and DarkCrystal RAT?

DarkCrystal RAT is the name Splunk and others use for a low-cost commercial .NET RAT sold on underground forums. MITRE and Zscaler describe DCRAT as an open-source variant of AsyncRAT. Feeds often merge the two.

Who uses DCRat?

Zscaler and MITRE link DCRAT to BlindEagle (APT-C-36). Cisco Talos documented an unknown actor delivering it with GoPhish, and Splunk cited CERT-UA reporting on campaigns against Ukrainian organizations.

How is DCRat delivered?

Mostly through phishing: macro-enabled Office files, HTML pages that build a download, SVG attachments and loaders that inject the RAT into legitimate processes such as MSBuild.exe.

How do I detect DCRat?

Look for CN=DcRat certificates, scheduled tasks or Run keys pointing to user folders, files named like Windows programs in odd locations and .NET utilities running from user folders. Odin Research publishes Suricata, Sigma and KQL rules in its Defense Kit.

How do I remove DCRat?

Isolate the PC, collect evidence, remove the persistence entries and payload with your EDR, and preferably reimage. Reset every password and session used on the machine, because DCRat logs keystrokes.

DCRat vs AsyncRAT: what is the difference?

MITRE describes DCRAT as a variant of the open-source AsyncRAT that adds features such as AMSI patching. AsyncRAT is far more common in feeds: Monograph 08 counted 11,473 AsyncRAT records against 1,593 for DCRat.

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK, DCRAT (S9017). attack.mitre.org/software/S9017/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. Zscaler ThreatLabz, "BlindEagle Targets Colombian Government Agency with Caminho and DCRAT", 16 December 2025. www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/blindeagle-targets-colombian-government-agency-caminho-and-dcrat (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. Splunk Threat Research Team, "Dark Crystal RAT Agent Deep Dive", 18 October 2022. www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/dark-crystal-rat-agent-deep-dive.html (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. Cisco Talos, research on a Gophish campaign delivering PowerRAT and DCRAT, 22 October 2024. blog.talosintelligence.com/gophish-powerrat-dcrat/ (checked 21 November 2026)

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