Skip to content
NewCybercrime Report 2026 · Eight Chapters · A Post Is Not An Incident → Explore The ChaptersCybercrime Report 2026 → Explore

Odin Research / What is / Malware and backdoors

What Is XenoRAT? The Open-Source C# Remote Access Trojan

A free remote access trojan with hidden desktop and proxy features, now forked by state-linked actors. What it does and how to find it.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
5 min read
Type
Remote access trojan

In short

XenoRAT is an open-source remote access trojan (RAT) written in C# whose source code is published on GitHub. It gives an operator hidden desktop (HVNC) access, a SOCKS5 proxy, file, process and registry control, and a payload builder. Cisco Talos reported that a North Korea-nexus cluster built its MoonPeak RAT from XenoRAT code.

Key takeaways

What it is
A free, open-source C# RAT with a client builder, hidden desktop access, reverse proxy and system management features.
How it works
A small .NET client runs on the victim, connects to the operator's server and takes commands, often after a shortcut-file lure and DLL side-loading.
Why it matters
Its code is free to fork. Cisco Talos tied a XenoRAT-based RAT called MoonPeak to a North Korea-nexus cluster in 2024.
What Odin Research saw
11 XenoRAT endpoints, 2 confirmed TLS controllers in Hong Kong and Malaysia, and XenoRAT kits staged on a tax-lure workbench.
What to do first
Block confirmed controllers, hunt the CN=ChromeServer certificate and side-loaded version.dll files, and treat .lnk attachments as hostile.

What is XenoRAT?

XenoRAT is an open-source remote access trojan written in C#, with its full source code published on GitHub. It lets an operator control a Windows machine remotely, including through a hidden desktop the user cannot see. Brandefense's earlier analysis describes it as aiming to compete with commercial RATs at no cost. Criminals and state-linked actors have adopted it.

The project lives at moom825/xeno-rat on GitHub, as Brandefense's earlier analysis noted. Cisco Talos says the source code was posted around October 2023. CYFIRMA described it in February 2024 as freely available malware with advanced capabilities that is under active development.

A remote access trojan gives an attacker hands-on control of a victim's system. XenoRAT matters because it is free, easy to build and easy to change. Anyone can fork it, rename it and alter its protocol.

How XenoRAT works

XenoRAT has two .NET parts: a server that the operator runs and a client that runs on the victim. A builder in the server creates new client files.

Vendor reports describe these capabilities:

  • Hidden desktop (HVNC). The operator works in an invisible second desktop on the victim's machine (CYFIRMA).
  • SOCKS5 and reverse proxy. Traffic can be routed through the victim (CYFIRMA, Brandefense).
  • System control. Process, file and registry management and a remote shell (Brandefense).
  • Data theft. An InfoGrab module extracts browser cookies, saved passwords and card data (Brandefense).
  • Persistence and evasion. Startup entries or scheduled tasks, plus anti-debugging and sandbox checks (CYFIRMA).

CYFIRMA documented one delivery chain in detail. A Windows shortcut (.lnk) disguised as a WhatsApp screenshot downloaded a ZIP archive and ran it. The payload used DLL search-order hijacking through a legitimate Sysinternals tool, then injected code into other processes. This maps to DLL hijacking and startup persistence.

Who uses XenoRAT?

Because XenoRAT is public, its users range from hobbyists to state-linked groups.

  • MoonPeak and UAT-5394. In August 2024, Cisco Talos reported MoonPeak, a RAT based on XenoRAT's public source code. Talos attributed it to UAT-5394, a North Korean state-sponsored nexus cluster. The actors renamed the client namespace so MoonPeak implants cannot talk to standard XenoRAT servers, forced compression before encryption and added obfuscation.
  • A possible Kimsuky link. Talos noted that UAT-5394 shares some techniques and infrastructure patterns with Kimsuky. It said it lacked substantial technical evidence to link them, and tracks UAT-5394 separately.
  • Criminal operators. Commodity actors stage XenoRAT next to other off-the-shelf RATs, as Odin Research's data below shows.

Is XenoRAT legal? Publishing source code is legal in many places. Installing a RAT on someone else's computer without consent is a crime almost everywhere.

What Odin Research observed

  • 11 endpoints, 2 confirmed. Monograph 26 found 11 XenoRAT endpoints on 11 hosts. Two dedicated VPS nodes were confirmed TLS controllers on port 443, one on CORENET CLOUD in Hong Kong and one on Shinjiru Technology in Malaysia. Their addresses are in the report's indicator list.
  • Candidates on many ports. The other nine were candidates on ports 443, 4444, 5333, 8080, 8123 and 50607. Two on port 4444, in France and the United States, were first seen on 19 November 2026.
  • A browser-name certificate. One candidate on a Belgian broadband network presented CN=ChromeServer, a name that imitates the browser. It shared a TLS fingerprint with an OrcusRAT candidate. The shared fingerprint is a lead, not proof of one operator.
  • Kits on a tax-lure workbench. An open directory that staged IRS Form 1120 tax lures, HVNC builds and Chrome cookie-theft scripts also held XenoRAT plugin archives and an implant archive. Five /xeno_*/ folders each paired a shellcode file with a side-loading version.dll.
  • Several families ready. The same server held full XWorm and Remcos kits, and the study's confirmed set was led by Emotet controllers.

These were staged files. Odin Research saw nothing showing they were used against a target.

How to detect XenoRAT

  • TLS certificate subjects. Alert on server certificates with the subject CN=ChromeServer from ports 443, 4444, 5333 or 8080.
  • Plugin downloads. Outbound GET requests for paths starting /xeno_plugins and ending in .zip point to XenoRAT staging.
  • Side-loaded DLLs. Hunt for version.dll next to copies of signed programs outside System32, such as a copied mstsc.exe.
  • Shortcut lures. Flag .lnk files that pose as images or PDFs and start PowerShell or download archives.
  • Persistence. Review new scheduled tasks and startup entries. Brandefense's earlier analysis also flagged files under an Adobe-named folder in %APPDATA%.

Monograph 26 carries Suricata signatures for XenoRAT plugin archive downloads and the ChromeServer certificate, a Sigma rule for side-loaded DLLs and a YARA rule for XenoRAT and PureRAT plugin and config markers. All are in the Defense Kit.

How to respond to a XenoRAT infection

  1. Isolate the host. XenoRAT can proxy traffic and open a hidden desktop, so cut its network access first.
  2. Reset sessions and passwords. Assume browser cookies and saved passwords were stolen. Revoke session cookies and reset credentials from a clean device.
  3. Remove persistence. Delete scheduled tasks, startup entries and side-loaded DLLs, then rebuild if you cannot verify a clean state.
  4. Block confirmed controllers. Block the confirmed addresses in Monograph 26 and keep candidates on a watchlist.

XenoRAT compared with other commodity RATs

RATNotesEndpoints in Monograph 26
XenoRATOpen-source C# RAT with HVNC and SOCKS511 (2 confirmed)
PureRATMulti-port .NET RAT and HVNC client on regional VPS hosts61 (all candidates)
OrcusRATModular remote admin trojan; can present CN=Orcus Server3 (2 confirmed)
ShadowHVNCHidden-desktop C2 on port 4438 (all candidates)

Frequently asked questions about XenoRAT

What is XenoRAT?

XenoRAT is an open-source remote access trojan written in C#. It offers hidden desktop access, a SOCKS5 proxy, file, process and registry control, and a builder for new client files.

Is XenoRAT malware?

Yes, in practice. Its source code is public, but installing it on a computer without the owner's consent makes it malware. Security vendors such as CYFIRMA and Cisco Talos have analyzed it in real campaigns.

Who created XenoRAT?

The source code is published on GitHub under the account moom825. Cisco Talos says it was posted around October 2023.

What is MoonPeak?

MoonPeak is a RAT based on XenoRAT's public code. Cisco Talos reported in August 2024 that the North Korea-nexus cluster UAT-5394 develops it.

Is XenoRAT linked to Kimsuky?

Not firmly. Cisco Talos said UAT-5394, which built MoonPeak from XenoRAT, shares some techniques with Kimsuky, but it lacked substantial technical evidence to link the two.

How is XenoRAT delivered?

CYFIRMA documented a Windows shortcut disguised as a WhatsApp screenshot that downloaded a ZIP archive. The payload then used DLL search-order hijacking through a legitimate tool.

How do I detect XenoRAT?

Hunt for CN=ChromeServer certificates, downloads of /xeno_plugins archives, side-loaded version.dll files and shortcut-file lures. Odin Research publishes Suricata, Sigma and YARA rules in its Defense Kit.

Sources

  1. Cisco Talos, "MoonPeak malware from North Korean actors unveils new details on attacker infrastructure", 21 August 2024. blog.talosintelligence.com/moonpeak-malware-infrastructure-north-korea/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. CYFIRMA, "Xeno RAT: A New Remote Access Trojan with Advance Capabilities", 23 February 2024. www.cyfirma.com/research/xeno-rat-a-new-remote-access-trojan-with-advance-capabilities/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. Brandefense, "Xeno RAT Analysis". brandefense.io/blog/xeno-rat-analysis/ (checked 21 November 2026)

Related tools and terms

All Odin Research explanations · Brandefense glossary

Odin Research

Get the rules, not just the definition

Every Odin Research report ships with verified indicators and detection rules you can load today.

Open the Defense Kit