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What Is Moobot? The Mirai-Based Router Botnet Explained

A Mirai offshoot that turns weak routers into DDoS bots, and once into a relay network for Russian intelligence.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
6 min read
Type
IoT botnet

In short

Moobot is a Mirai-based botnet that infects routers and other internet-facing Linux devices through default passwords and known vulnerabilities, then uses them for DDoS attacks. In February 2024, the FBI and partners reported that Russia's APT28 had accessed Ubiquiti EdgeRouters already infected by Moobot and used them for spying operations.

Key takeaways

What it is
A Mirai variant, first reported in 2020, that builds a botnet from exposed routers and IoT devices.
How it works
It scans for devices, logs in with default passwords or exploits known flaws, fetches its binary over HTTP and joins the botnet.
Why it matters
The FBI reported that APT28 reused Moobot-infected EdgeRouters to steal credentials, proxy traffic and host phishing pages.
What Odin Research saw
Only two Moobot candidate nodes among 618 infected router endpoints, all treated as victims with addresses withheld.
What to do first
Factory-reset and update routers, change default passwords and close WAN-side management.

What is Moobot?

Moobot is a Mirai-based botnet that infects routers and other internet-facing Linux devices through weak passwords and known flaws. Its operators use infected devices for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In 2024 the FBI reported that Russia's APT28 had used routers already infected by Moobot for its own operations.

LevelBlue Labs wrote in 2021 that Moobot was a Mirai variant first reported by Lacework in October 2020. Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks later described it as a Mirai variant that keeps Mirai's habit of storing default login credentials and configuration in its data section, with a different encryption scheme.

Moobot is a good example of why "just an IoT botnet" undersells the risk. The same hijacked home and small-office routers can launch floods, relay traffic and hide a state-backed operator.

How Moobot works

Moobot follows the Mirai playbook, adapted for each wave of targets:

  1. Find exposed devices. The botnet scans the internet for routers, cameras and similar devices running Linux.
  2. Get in. It tries default or weak passwords, or exploits a known flaw. In 2021, LevelBlue saw it scan for CVE-2020-10987, a command injection flaw in Tenda routers. In 2022, Unit 42 saw it exploit four flaws in D-Link devices, often without authentication.
  3. Drop the bot. The exploit downloads the Moobot binary over plain HTTP, makes it executable and starts it. LevelBlue noted that Moobot samples were encrypted to evade string-based detection.
  4. Join the botnet. The device takes orders from the operators' servers and launches DDoS attacks on chosen targets. MITRE ATT&CK tracks this impact as Network Denial of Service (T1498).

The FBI also describes Moobot installing OpenSSH trojans on Ubiquiti EdgeRouters. Trojanized OpenSSH server binaries replaced the real ones, which let remote attackers bypass authentication.

Moobot and APT28: from DDoS botnet to spy relay

On 27 February 2024, the FBI, NSA, US Cyber Command and partners in ten other countries published a joint advisory on Russian use of hijacked Ubiquiti EdgeRouters. According to the advisory:

  • Criminal operators had planted Moobot on EdgeRouters that still used default credentials.
  • APT28, which the advisory ties to Russia's GRU military intelligence, then accessed those routers and added its own scripts and tools.
  • As early as 2022, APT28 used the routers to harvest credentials, collect NTLMv2 digests, proxy traffic and host spear-phishing landing pages.
  • The actors installed public tools such as Impacket's ntlmrelayx and Responder on the routers for NTLM relay attacks.
  • The US Department of Justice, the FBI and partners had disrupted the GRU botnet before the advisory was published.

The advisory explains why EdgeRouters were attractive: they run a Linux-based operating system, often ship with default credentials and limited firewall protection, and do not update firmware automatically unless configured to.

What Odin Research observed

Moobot is a small part of Odin's data, and the studies treat it with care.

  • Two candidate nodes. Monograph 19 counted 618 infected IoT router endpoints on 542 hosts: 353 Mirai, 263 Mozi and 2 Moobot. The two Moobot endpoints sat in Bulgaria and Latvia and stayed at candidate level.
  • Victims, not attackers. None of the 618 router endpoints shared an address with the C2 or password-cracking servers in that study, and Odin saw no traffic between them. These are third-party consumer routers, so every address is withheld.
  • Plain HTTP staging. Monograph 29 found two Moobot nodes serving HTTP on port 80, consistent with Moobot's habit of staging payloads over plain HTTP. One sat on a Bulgarian hosting network. Both stay on watchlists with addresses withheld.
  • Short shelf life. Monograph 19 notes that infected routers sit on consumer broadband where addresses change hands often. A permanent block mostly hurts the next customer.

How to detect Moobot

  • On your own edge devices. The FBI advisory points to replaced OpenSSH server binaries, plus unexpected Bash scripts, ELF files and Python scripts in user home folders on EdgeRouters.
  • Payload fetches. A device that downloads a binary over plain HTTP with a Wget/ user agent, then runs it, fits the Mirai family pattern.
  • Traffic spikes. Sudden outbound floods or very high connection counts from a router or camera point to DDoS participation. Unit 42 recommends network monitoring that flags unusual device behavior.
  • Inbound exploit attempts. Requests that match known D-Link or Tenda exploits show your devices are being targeted.

Monograph 29 publishes a Suricata signature for Moobot payload fetches, alongside rules for other families in that study. It is in the Defense Kit. Because infected routers are victims, use these rules to find and fix devices, not to build permanent block lists.

How to defend against Moobot

The FBI advisory gives four steps for EdgeRouter owners, which apply to most small routers:

  1. Perform a hardware factory reset to remove malicious files.
  2. Upgrade to the latest firmware.
  3. Change default usernames and passwords to strong, unique ones.
  4. Add strict firewall rules on WAN-side interfaces so remote management is not open to the internet.

Beyond that, replace end-of-life devices that no longer get patches, and include branch and home-office routers in your asset inventory. See how to respond to actively exploited vulnerabilities and patch management.

Moobot compared with other router botnets

BotnetRelationMain useOdin data
MoobotMirai variantDDoS; hijacked routers later used by APT282 candidates in Monographs 19 and 29
MiraiOriginal family that Moobot builds onSee our Mirai page353 router endpoints in Monograph 19
MoziSeparate IoT botnet familySee our Mozi page263 router endpoints in Monograph 19
KV-botnetSeparate router botnetSee our Knowledge Hub profileNot in these studies

Frequently asked questions about Moobot

What is Moobot?

Moobot is a Mirai-based botnet that infects routers and other internet-facing Linux devices through default passwords and known flaws, and uses them for DDoS attacks.

Is Moobot a variant of Mirai?

Yes. LevelBlue and Unit 42 both describe Moobot as a Mirai variant. Unit 42 notes it keeps Mirai's way of storing default credentials and configuration but encrypts that data differently.

What devices does Moobot target?

Exposed Linux-based networking devices. Researchers have seen it go after Tenda routers, D-Link devices and Ubiquiti EdgeRouters with default credentials.

What is the link between Moobot and APT28?

The FBI reported in February 2024 that criminals had installed Moobot on Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, and that APT28 then used those hijacked routers to harvest credentials, proxy traffic and host phishing pages.

Was the Moobot botnet taken down?

The US Department of Justice, the FBI and international partners disrupted the GRU botnet built on these routers before the February 2024 advisory. Owners still need to reset and patch their devices.

How do I know if my router has Moobot?

Signs include replaced SSH server files, unexpected scripts or binaries, and unusual outbound traffic. The safest fix is a factory reset and a firmware upgrade.

How do I protect my router from Moobot?

Change default passwords, upgrade firmware, close remote management on the WAN side and replace devices that no longer receive updates.

Should I block Moobot IP addresses?

Use caution. Most Moobot addresses are infected home and small-business routers on changing consumer IPs. Short-lived watchlists work better than permanent blocks.

Sources

  1. FBI, NSA, US Cyber Command and partners, joint cybersecurity advisory JCSA-20240227-001 on APT28 use of Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, 27 February 2024. www.ic3.gov/CSA/2024/240227.pdf (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks, MooBot targeting D-Link devices, 6 September 2022. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/moobot-d-link-devices/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. LevelBlue SpiderLabs, "Malware hosting domain Cyberium fanning out Mirai variants", 2021. www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/malware-hosting-domain-cyberium-fanning-out-mirai-variants (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. NVD, CVE-2020-10987. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10987 (checked 21 November 2026)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK, Network Denial of Service (T1498). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/ (checked 21 November 2026)

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