Skip to content
NewCybercrime Report 2026 · Eight Chapters · A Post Is Not An Incident → Explore The ChaptersCybercrime Report 2026 → Explore

Odin Research / What is / Targeted enterprise software

What Is VMware ESXi? Why Attackers Target the Hypervisor

The hypervisor under many corporate servers: how it works, why ransomware crews want it, and how to keep it out of reach.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
8 min read
Type
Enterprise software

In short

VMware ESXi is a bare-metal hypervisor that is installed directly onto a physical server and runs many virtual machines on it. It is the core of VMware vSphere, now sold by Broadcom. Ransomware groups target ESXi because encrypting one host can take down every virtual server it runs at once.

Key takeaways

What it is
VMware's bare-metal hypervisor, the core of vSphere, managed through vCenter, a web client, SSH and APIs.
How attackers get in
Through known flaws such as OpenSLP CVE-2021-21974, or through Active Directory, as with the ESX Admins flaw CVE-2024-37085.
Why it matters
Encrypting one host hits every VM on it. CISA and the FBI counted over 3,800 servers hit by ESXiArgs in 2023.
What Odin Research saw
A 364-file staging server that planned a path from a web shell to the domain controller and ESXi probing.
What to do first
Patch, disable OpenSLP, isolate management networks and use non-AD credentials for the hypervisor.

What is VMware ESXi?

VMware ESXi is a bare-metal hypervisor that is installed directly onto a physical server and runs many virtual machines on it. It is the core of VMware vSphere, now sold by Broadcom. Because one ESXi host can hold dozens of critical servers, ransomware groups target it to encrypt many systems in one step.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes ESXi as a bare-metal hypervisor that runs directly on hardware and controls the underlying resources. Broadcom now sells it as ESX inside its vSphere editions, but "ESXi" remains the common name for the hypervisor and for most of its security advisories.

For defenders, ESXi is a high-value, low-visibility target. It hosts domain controllers, databases and file servers, yet it often sits outside the reach of normal endpoint tools.

How VMware ESXi works

ESXi runs on the server hardware itself, with no general-purpose operating system underneath. Each virtual machine is a set of files on a datastore: configuration files plus large disk files. ESXi shares the server's CPU, memory, storage and network between those machines.

Administrators manage ESXi in several ways:

  • vCenter Server, which manages many hosts at once.
  • The host's own web client and SOAP API, reached over HTTPS.
  • SSH and the ESXi shell, when they are enabled.
  • Service Location Protocol (SLP), a discovery service on port 427 that has been the source of serious flaws.

ESXi can also be joined to Active Directory, so domain accounts can log in. That convenience creates a path from a domain intrusion to the hypervisor, as the ESX Admins flaw showed.

VMware ESXi vulnerabilities attackers exploit

  • CVE-2021-21974, an OpenSLP heap overflow in ESXi 6.5, 6.7 and 7.0. An attacker on the same network segment with access to port 427 could achieve remote code execution (CVSS 3.1 score 8.8). VMware fixed it in advisory VMSA-2021-0002 and recommends disabling OpenSLP if it is not used.
  • CVE-2024-37085, an authentication bypass in ESXi hosts joined to Active Directory (CVSS 3.1 score 7.2 from NVD). CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 30 July 2024.
  • CVE-2025-22224, CVE-2025-22225 and CVE-2025-22226, published on 4 March 2025. They cover a race condition that leads to an out-of-bounds write, an arbitrary kernel write that can lead to a sandbox escape, and a memory leak from the VMX process. An attacker needs administrator rights inside a virtual machine. CISA added all three to the KEV catalog the same day.

Prioritize these with the KEV catalog and see how to respond to actively exploited vulnerabilities.

How attackers target VMware ESXi

Mass encryption. Microsoft notes that encrypting an ESXi hypervisor file system allows one-click mass encryption, because every hosted VM is affected. It also notes that many security products have limited visibility into ESXi. Microsoft said its incident response engagements involving ESXi more than doubled in the three years before July 2024. MITRE ATT&CK lists ESXi as a platform for Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486).

ESXiArgs. In February 2023, CISA and the FBI reported that the ESXiArgs ransomware campaign had hit over 3,800 servers worldwide. It encrypted VM configuration files, likely on end-of-life or unpatched servers, and may have used the SLP service. CISA advised updating ESXi, disabling SLP and keeping hypervisors off the internet.

ESX Admins. In July 2024, Microsoft reported that ransomware operators exploited CVE-2024-37085 by creating a domain group named "ESX Admins" and adding a user. Domain-joined ESXi hosts gave that group full admin rights by default. Microsoft named Storm-0506, Storm-1175, Octo Tempest and Manatee Tempest, with Akira and Black Basta ransomware deployed in several cases.

Running commands in guests. MITRE ATT&CK tracks abuse of ESXi administration services, such as VMware Tools and vSphere guest operations APIs, as ESXi Administration Command (T1675).

What Odin Research observed

  • A staged path to the hypervisor. Monograph 01 analyzed 364 attack files on one exposed staging server. They lay out a path from a web shell, through SQL Server and Oracle databases, to Active Directory replication and ESXi probing. Odin holds no logs from the targeted network, so these steps are staged capability.
  • Quiet build discovery. Scripts searched file shares for VMware offline depots, VIB packages and ISO images. Binaries inside a depot reveal the ESXi patch level without touching the host.
  • Login testing. Other scripts tested ESXi SOAP logins, and credentials across ESXi, HP iLO, Cisco and Brocade storage switches, with lockout-aware delays.
  • OpenSLP exploits. Two scripts adapted a public proof of concept for CVE-2021-21974, one built for a specific ESXi build. The files do not show whether the target was unpatched or reached.
  • Cloud Director tooling. Monograph 05 found a 65-file workbench aimed at VMware Cloud Director Availability and VMware Cloud Director lab appliances. It also held an ESXi console helper for enabling SSH. Service providers use these products to run multi-tenant recovery across vCenter and ESXi.

The same Monograph 01 server also held DCSync and Ghostcat scripts, which shows how hypervisor attacks follow a domain intrusion.

How to detect attacks on VMware ESXi

  • Forward ESXi logs. Send hostd, auth and syslog logs to your SIEM. Microsoft recommends this too.
  • Login bursts. Review active and rotated logs for bursts of SOAP and SSH login failures per source address.
  • SLP crashes. Crashes of the slpd service can signal OpenSLP exploit attempts.
  • The ESX Admins group. Alert when a domain group named "ESX Admins" is created or renamed, or gains members.
  • Short-lived admins. Accounts created, added to a privileged group and deleted within days often mark a cleanup.

Monograph 01 publishes a Microsoft Sentinel KQL query for accounts created, added to a privileged group and deleted within 72 hours, plus Sigma, Suricata and YARA rules for the staged workflow. Monograph 05 adds a YARA rule set for VMware Cloud Director tooling. All are in the Defense Kit.

How to protect VMware ESXi

  1. Patch quickly. Apply VMware security updates on every host, starting with KEV-listed flaws.
  2. Disable OpenSLP where it is not needed, and close port 427.
  3. Keep ESXi off the internet. Put ESXi, vCenter, HP iLO and storage management on their own segment. See network segmentation.
  4. Separate identity. Use credentials outside Active Directory for the hypervisor layer, or harden the ESX Admins group as Microsoft advises.
  5. Protect backups. Keep immutable backups of VMs off the hypervisor, and test recovery. See the ransomware response playbook.

VMware ESXi compared with related VMware targets

ProductRoleExample flaw or abuseOdin coverage
VMware ESXiBare-metal hypervisorCVE-2021-21974 (OpenSLP), CVE-2024-37085 (ESX Admins)Monographs 01 and 05
vCenter ServerCentral management for ESXi hostsvSphere Client plugin flaws fixed in VMSA-2021-0002Probed in Monograph 01
VMware Cloud DirectorMulti-tenant cloud layer for service providersPath traversal and request smuggling testsMonograph 05

Frequently asked questions about VMware ESXi

What is VMware ESXi?

VMware ESXi is a bare-metal hypervisor installed directly onto a physical server. It runs many virtual machines on one host and is the core of VMware vSphere, now sold by Broadcom.

Why do ransomware groups target ESXi?

One ESXi host can hold many critical servers, so encrypting its file system hits every hosted VM at once. Microsoft also notes that many security products have limited visibility into ESXi.

What was ESXiArgs?

ESXiArgs was a 2023 ransomware campaign that, according to CISA and the FBI, hit over 3,800 ESXi servers worldwide by encrypting VM configuration files, likely on unpatched or end-of-life systems.

What is CVE-2024-37085?

An authentication bypass in ESXi hosts joined to Active Directory. Attackers who can create a group named ESX Admins get full admin rights. Microsoft saw ransomware operators exploit it, and CISA lists it as known exploited.

What is CVE-2021-21974?

A heap overflow in the OpenSLP service of ESXi 6.5, 6.7 and 7.0 that allows remote code execution from the same network segment via port 427. VMware fixed it in VMSA-2021-0002.

Should I disable SLP on ESXi?

Yes, if you do not use it. VMware recommends disabling OpenSLP when it is not used, and CISA gave the same advice during the ESXiArgs campaign.

How do I detect attacks on ESXi?

Forward hostd, auth and syslog logs to a SIEM, watch for login bursts and slpd crashes, and alert on changes to the ESX Admins group. Odin Research publishes KQL, Sigma, Suricata and YARA rules in its Defense Kit.

Sources

  1. Microsoft Threat Intelligence, "Ransomware operators exploit ESXi hypervisor vulnerability for mass encryption", 29 July 2024. www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/07/29/ransomware-operators-exploit-esxi-hypervisor-vulnerability-for-mass-encryption/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. CISA and FBI, AA23-039A: ESXiArgs Ransomware Virtual Machine Recovery Guidance, 8 February 2023. www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-039a (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. Broadcom VMware, VMSA-2021-0002. support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/23599 (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. NVD, CVE-2021-21974. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21974 (checked 21 November 2026)
  5. NVD, CVE-2024-37085. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37085 (checked 21 November 2026)
  6. NVD, CVE-2025-22224. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22224 (checked 21 November 2026)
  7. NVD, CVE-2025-22225. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22225 (checked 21 November 2026)
  8. NVD, CVE-2025-22226. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22226 (checked 21 November 2026)
  9. MITRE ATT&CK, ESXi Administration Command (T1675). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1675/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  10. MITRE ATT&CK, Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  11. VMware by Broadcom, vSphere product page. www.vmware.com/products/cloud-infrastructure/esxi-and-esx (checked 21 November 2026)

Related tools and terms

All Odin Research explanations · Brandefense glossary

Odin Research

Get the rules, not just the definition

Every Odin Research report ships with verified indicators and detection rules you can load today.

Open the Defense Kit