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Staged Domain and Hypervisor Intrusion: Database Pivots and Selective Rollback

What 364 files on one exposed staging server show about a web-to-domain-to-ESXi workflow, and what its rollback script would hide

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
24 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

Odin by Brandefense found an exposed staging server holding 364 attack files. The files were first seen before the window. The files stage a path from a web shell through SQL Server and Oracle databases to Active Directory replication and VMware ESXi probing. A rollback script would disable SQL command execution and delete two temporary admins, but leaves a hidden local admin. Alert on configuration changes and short-lived admin accounts, not only on current state.

The server sat open on the internet with no authentication. It held the operator's scripts, batch files and one captured database output. The files show how the operator planned to move from a perimeter web application to the domain controller and the hypervisor layer. We hold no logs from the targeted network, so every step below is staged capability unless a captured output says otherwise.

1

Python on the staging server did the heavy work.

Python made up 226 of the 364 files (62.1%). These scripts were written to run from the staging server and handle padding-oracle math, SOCKS5 relays, SSH automation, offline hash cracking and raw LDAP checks. Target-side work used built-in tools instead: 87 PowerShell files (23.9%), 25 shell scripts (6.9%) and 19 Oracle PL/SQL scripts (5.2%).

2

Staged database and Linux paths aim to bridge the DMZ and Active Directory.

The core workflow targets internal SQL Server instances and an RPC-enabled linked server. Parallel scripts probe an Oracle GIS database, Linux hosts over SSH and an internal web app. At least 96 scripts (26.4%) reference 17 internal RFC1918 addresses across three private subnets, plus one swept /24 range.

3

The rollback script cleans what posture scans check, and nothing else.

As written, a PowerShell rollback script disables xp_cmdshell and deletes two temporary administrator accounts. It leaves out a local administrator hidden from the Windows sign-in screen, and it leaves web-root staging fragments in place.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Alert on configuration changes, not only on compliance state. Send SQL Server configuration-change events and short-lived admin account lifecycles to your SIEM. A rolled-back escalation then still triggers an investigation.
  2. Separate hypervisor and out-of-band management from database networks. Put ESXi, vCenter, HP iLO and storage switches on their own management segment. Use credentials outside Active Directory and restrict port 427.
  3. Treat database linked-server logins as high-privilege identity trusts. Review SQL Server linked-login mappings with RPC-out enabled, and Oracle Java permissions, on the same schedule as Active Directory domain trusts.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
364Staged scripts and outputs on the server (311 in the root folder, 52 in a project folder, 1 in /loot)
About 2 daysSpan over which the files were first seen
62.1%Share of Python files (226 of 364)
96 / 17At least 96 scripts (26.4%) reference 17 internal RFC1918 hosts across 3 subnets
1,458Files across four comparable staging toolkits (364 here plus 1,094 in three peers)
29Representative files with SHA-256 hashes for hunting, across Stages 0 to 8

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1 and the attribution limits in Chapter 6. SOC and detection engineers should start with Chapters 3 to 5 and the rules in Chapter 8. Database and VMware administrators can use the checklist in Chapter 7.

2. The Staging Server and Its Toolkit

In short

The 364 files sit on one external staging server in three locations. Most quick experiments live in a flat root folder, while a curated project folder holds the staged domain workflow.

Where the files sit

The staging server's address is withheld, because an authorized red team cannot be ruled out. The operator named the project folder after the target organisation and the date 11 September 2026. Its numbered subfolders carry Chinese names.

LocationFilesShareWhat it holds
Root folder31185.4%Quick-iteration Telerik lab, Oracle PL/SQL, Linux SSH and web file-read scripts
/loot10.3%q12.out, a captured Oracle Java compilation and error output
Project folder5214.3%48 files in seven numbered subfolders, 3 batch orchestrators, and 1 extra dcsmb.py revision

The project subfolders are numbered 01, 02 and 04 to 08. Folder 03 is absent. The names describe each stage.

FolderPlain meaning
01Entry: web shell on the target's GIS web application
02_隧道_rtun2Tunnel: the rtun2 HTTP-to-TCP relay
04Domain identity: domain administrator escalation
05DCSync and the domain controller
06_横向扩展Lateral expansion: AD, ESXi and management networks
07_前期跳板_101_8_55Early jump host 10.101.8.55
08_未能奏效的尝试Failed attempts

How to read staged files

Three limits apply to everything that follows.

  • Files, not activity. The files show intent and tooling. They do not show when, or whether, anything ran on a target.
  • Some counts are lower bounds. Working exploit code and plaintext secrets are left out of this report. Counts such as the 96 scripts with internal addresses, or the 21 files with syntax or compilation errors, rest on file descriptions rather than full code.
  • Only one file records target contact. /loot/q12.out holds an Oracle ORA-29535 error and a pre-Java 7 ProcessBuilder.redirectOutput(File) compilation error. Everything else is staged capability.

Language split

The operator kept the logic on the staging server rather than dropping compiled implants or Python runtimes on Windows targets. External Python handled cryptography, SOCKS5 multiplexing, PuTTY plink SSH relays and MS-DRSR directory replication. Target-side PowerShell called built-in components: System.Data.SqlClient, certutil.exe, Advapi32.dll and cmd.exe.

Figure 1: Toolkit architecture and language split
Figure 1: Toolkit architecture and language split
LanguageFilesShareMean / median size (bytes)Size range (bytes)Main role
Python (.py)22662.1%2,733 / 1,090334 to 37,822Crypto oracles, SOCKS and SSH relays, raw LDAP, DCSync
PowerShell (.ps1)8723.9%1,841 / 1,394169 to 7,334MSSQL jump-host wrappers, AD user staging, rollback
Shell (.sh)256.9%2,578 / 1,51999 to 10,014Linux SSH privilege escalation, NFSv3/v4 droppers, file-read collection
Oracle PL/SQL (.sql)195.2%1,743 / 1,372124 to 4,775SQL*Plus Java procedures, DBMS_SCHEDULER, UTL_FILE probes
Other (.bat, .txt, .jsp, .out, .log)71.9%1,698 / 1,21929 to 3,977Batch orchestrators, JSP command web shells, captured Oracle output

3. Perimeter Entry and HTTP Tunneling (Stages 0 to 2)

In short

The workflow targets a Windows GIS web server on a non-standard port. Scripts stage a web shell, chunked file delivery, and an HTTP-to-TCP relay that gives the operator SOCKS5 and port-forward access inside.

The perimeter address, port and application path of the targeted web server are withheld.

A local Telerik lab

The root folder holds 38 files (#001 to #038) outside the project folders. Of these, 25 (23 Python, 2 PowerShell) are Stage 0 padding-oracle and assembly-patching scripts. The other 13 are local lab files.

The script headers cite Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX advisories CVE-2026-13181 to CVE-2026-13184 [1]. The vendor lists versions 2010.1.309 to 2026.2.519 as affected and 2026.2.708 as fixed. The scripts point at a local IIS lab (http://127.0.0.1:8090, C:TelerikLab) and build on the older CVE-2019-18935 [2]. In the suite, build_mixedmode.py builds a mixed-mode .NET assembly that can load native code.

None of these 38 scripts names the perimeter target. The project's entry folder and Tomcat helpers (axis/u.jsp, tjsp.jsp) do target a live ASP.NET and Tomcat stack. The lab may have been used to test a payload before delivery, or it may be separate research on a shared server.

Chunked delivery and web shell hygiene

Large HTTP POST bodies and inline PowerShell often trip web application firewalls. The operator staged three workarounds.

  1. Base64 chunks. Python uploaders slice a .ps1 script into small Base64 fragments prefixed _pushp. They write them into the web application folder or C:WindowsTemp.
  2. GET fallback and markers. up.py delivers fragments over HTTP GET when POST connections reset, and reassembles them with PowerShell Set-Content. JSP shells return GBK output prefixed JSPOK|. Background PowerShell launchers poll for PSBG_DONE.
  3. Competing web shell check. _find_local.ps1 scans C:app and C:inetpub for other web shell names such as u.jsp, tun, shell, behind, godzilla and .war.

The HTTP-to-TCP relay

The operator staged the rtun2 relay with axis/u.jsp and tung2.jsp, plus GBK+CRLF batch generators. This design fits a perimeter firewall that blocks direct inbound connections to internal subnets. It binds three loopback listeners on the staging server.

ListenerPurpose
127.0.0.1:1080 (also 11080 in reuse_mssql.py)SOCKS5 proxy for smbsweep.py, shares.py, depothunt.py, esxiauth.py and dcsync.py
127.0.0.1:10389Forward to domain controller 10.101.8.202 port 389 (LDAP)
127.0.0.1:10445Forward to domain controller 10.101.8.202 port 445 (SMB)

Key files, Stages 0 to 2

FileIDSize (bytes)Role
telerik_oracle_attack.py#01710,284Tests the CVE-2026-13182 RadAsyncUpload padding and JSON-parse error difference
build_mixedmode.py#02637,822Builds a mixed-mode .NET assembly that loads native code
dl.py#0391,927Serves Base64 payloads over HTTP (:8081) for certutil retrieval
psrun.py#0942,619Slices PowerShell into _pushp chunks for the ASP.NET web shell
B_all.bat#096497Top-level wrapper that calls RUN_ALL.bat
gx.py#0981,252Web shell command client with retries (later 2,015-byte revision #196)
sy.py#108613Relays commands to axis/u.jsp and converts GBK output to UTF-8
RUN_ALL.bat#1222,445GBK+CRLF pipeline chaining tunnel setup, SQL escalation and DCSync
_find_local.ps1#146460Looks for competing web shells
tjsp.jsp#169563Minimal JSP cmd.exe /c shell returning output prefixed JSPOK |
hx.py#1722,020Main HTTP client for the perimeter web shell
up.py#1982,568HTTP GET fragment uploader
psbg.py#2694,833Background PowerShell launcher polling for PSBG_DONE
_gen_runall.py#2713,934Generates an updated RUN_ALL.bat
tunkick2.py#3141,462Redeploys the Tomcat relay JSPs to restore SOCKS workers

Figure 2 shows the staged path hop by hop, from the staging server through the DMZ and application network to the management plane.

Figure 2: Reconstructed internal network path targeted by the staged scripts
Figure 2: Reconstructed internal network path targeted by the staged scripts

4. Database Pivots, Parallel Tracks and Domain Replication (Stages 3 to 5)

In short

SQL Server jump hosts carry most of the internal movement, with Oracle, Linux and web tracks running in parallel. The workflow then stages temporary admins, a hidden admin, and DCSync scripts against the domain controller.

At least 96 scripts (26.4%) reference 17 internal hosts in 10.101.8.0/24, 10.101.16.0/24 and 192.168.1.25, plus the swept range 10.103.4.0/24. Outcomes on these internal servers are not verified.

SQL Server jump hosts and the linked server

The MSSQL tooling targets SQL Server on 10.101.8.48, 10.101.8.55 and 10.101.8.101 (port 1433). There are no .sql files for MSSQL. The operator used small PowerShell System.Data.SqlClient wrappers instead: 12 jump-host scripts in folders 04 and 07, each 578 to 1,132 bytes. Python pymssql relays (mssql_try.py, reuse_mssql.py, mssql_via_socks.py) complete the set.

  • Linked-server traversal. Early scripts list linked-server logins on 10.101.8.55 with sp_helplinkedsrvlogin. They then use an RPC-enabled linked server. Later wrappers send OPENQUERY calls toward 192.168.1.25 (m55dom.ps1) and run xp_cmdshell ping and ARP sweeps across 10.103.4.0/24 (m55k.ps1).
  • Credential queries and offline cracking. Other scripts query sys.credentials, SQL Agent job steps in msdb, and sys.sql_logins password hashes (0x0100 SHA-1 format). The set also holds an offline cracker, sqlcrack.py, which has an indentation bug.
FileIDSize (bytes)Role against 10.101.8.55
m55g.ps1#095769Enables linked-server RPC options and runs remote xp_cmdshell
m55.ps1#100734Tests SQL sysadmin credential candidates and checks the sysadmin role
m55h.ps1#121638Enables xp_cmdshell on the linked server and runs host discovery
m55adm.ps1#156776Adds a temporary local admin to Administrators and RDP groups
m55e.ps1#175578Runs arp -a and queries the linked server with OPENQUERY
m55dom.ps1#248687Queries cross-segment host 192.168.1.25 via OPENQUERY
m55cred.ps1#270641Queries sys.credentials and SQL Agent jobs
m55c.ps1#289773Reads sys.sql_logins hashes and the sys.servers catalog
m55b.ps1#327802Lists server properties, sys.configurations and databases
sqlcrack.py#3601,871Offline 0x0100 SHA-1 cracker (indentation error)

Oracle, Linux and internal web tracks

Scripts in the root folder run three parallel tracks across 10.101.8.0/24.

  • Oracle Java procedures. All 19 .sql files are Oracle SQL*Plus scripts aimed at the target's GIS database on 10.101.8.49, run through sq.py and sqrun.py. They grant DBMS_JAVA permissions, compile Java procedures (HrExec, HrRun3, OSExec) and stage Windows registry hive dumps for HTTP PUT upload. The captured q12.out records an ORA-29535 error from that database.
  • Registry and SSH harvesting. hputty2.py and hssh.py parse HKEY_USERS hives for saved PuTTY, WinSCP, mRemoteNG and SSH sessions. In all, 61 files reference PuTTY plink, pscp, SSH or NFSv3/v4 workflows (rootsudo.py, nfs3.py, nfs4.py). They target six Linux hosts: 10.101.8.49, .64, .72, .103, .107 and .196.
  • Internal web app and Ghostcat. 103 files have names starting with ps_gw, gw or lfi. Eight of them test /cs/log?filename= directory traversal on 10.101.8.80:3000; the rest are delivery launchers and service probes. Separately, nine scripts target the Apache Tomcat AJP Ghostcat flaw (CVE-2020-1938 [8]) on port 8009, and seven name 10.101.8.214.
FileIDSize (bytes)Role
q14.sql#0513,483Java procedure HrExec runs commands and PUTs registry hives to :8080
q18.sql#0523,546Java procedure HrRun3 decodes and runs .bat payloads
q12.out#1613,161Captured output with ORA-29535 and a pre-Java 7 ProcessBuilder error
q17.sql#2131,643Saves SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY and SOFTWARE hives through the database
q10.sql#2381,203Reads command output from C:WindowsTemp with UTL_FILE
exfil1.ps1#2721,091PowerShell version that saves SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY for upload
mkq18.py#3064,010Rebuilds q18.sql with Base64 batch commands in Java source
q5.sql#3091,372Lists Oracle password hashes, DB links, scheduler credentials and privileges
hssh.py#3321,681Searches user folders and registry for SSH keys (syntax bug)
hputty2.py#3511,796Lists saved PuTTY, WinSCP, mRemoteNG and RDP sessions per user SID

Two kinds of admin accounts

On SQL Server 10.101.8.101:1433, xp_cmdshell wrappers and root PowerShell scripts set up privileged accounts on two tracks. Account names are withheld.

  1. Short-lived accounts. s101c.ps1 creates a temporary domain account and adds it to Domain Admins for replication. m55adm.ps1 adds a temporary local account to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users. The rollback script names both for deletion.
  2. A hidden local account. Drafted in mkuser.ps1 and mkuser.py and finished in fin.ps1, this track creates a local administrator. It hides the account from the sign-in screen with HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList [7]. It then checks RDP registry settings and tests an interactive logon with LogonUser from Advapi32.dll.

DCSync stagers and raw LDAP bind checks

DCSync abuses the directory replication protocol (MS-DRSR) to request password hashes from a domain controller [4].

  1. Share access and replication. dcsmb.py tests C$ share access on 10.101.8.202 over SOCKS5. dcsync.py calls Impacket NTDSHashes (IDL_DRSGetNCChanges) through 127.0.0.1:1080. The set also holds an updated dcsmb.py and a root dcsync.py draft with an indentation bug. No .ntds output was captured, so hash replication is not verified.
  2. Raw LDAP binds. dombind.ps1 and the dependency-free ldapv2.py test binds against 10.101.8.202:389. The Python script builds RFC 4511 [10] BER SimpleBindRequest frames by hand (0x30, 0x60, 0x80) over 127.0.0.1:10389. A root dcsmb.py compares the temporary domain admin with a deliberately wrong password over 127.0.0.1:10445.
FileIDSize (bytes)Role
sql101.ps1#064935Tests SQL sysadmin credential candidates on 10.101.8.101, with lockout notes
s101c.ps1#075694Creates the temporary domain admin via xp_cmdshell
mkuser.ps1#1011,737First ADSI draft of the hidden local admin
s101.ps1#145781Enables xp_cmdshell and lists domain users and services
sql101b.ps1#2141,132Host and domain group enumeration via xp_cmdshell
dcsmb.py#2561,432Extra revision testing C$ on the DC via SOCKS5
dcsync.py#2883,452Project DCSync stager using Impacket NTDSHashes
dcsmb.py#2951,641Updated C$ readability check on the DC
dcsync.py#2991,204Minimal root draft over 127.0.0.1:1080 (indentation bug)
dombind.ps1#326715PowerShell LDAP bind tester
ldapv2.py#3351,070Raw BER SimpleBindRequest tester
dcsmb.py#339897Differential SMB check against a wrong-password control
fin.ps1#3472,248Hides the local admin under SpecialAccountsUserList and tests LogonUser

5. Hypervisor Probing, Dead Ends and Selective Rollback (Stages 6 to 8)

In short

Alongside the AD work, scripts target the VMware and out-of-band management network. The last files are a rollback script that reverts what a posture scan would check and leaves a hidden admin behind.

Toward virtualization and out-of-band management

Scripts in folder 06_横向扩展 target 10.101.16.0/24, which holds VMware and hardware management interfaces.

  • AD and SYSVOL harvesting. adrecon.py queries LDAP over SOCKS5 for LAPS passwords (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd), Kerberoastable SPNs, AS-REP roastable accounts and adminCount=1 members. smbsweep.py scans SYSVOL policies for Group Policy Preferences cpassword strings.
  • Passive ESXi build discovery. depothunt.py and shares.py search SMB shares for VMware offline depot .zip files, .vib packages, .iso images and id_rsa keys. The slpd and libc binaries inside a depot reveal the ESXi patch level without touching the host.
  • Credential tests on management interfaces. esxiauth.py tests ESXi /sdk SOAP logins (RetrieveServiceContent, then sessionManager). creds16.ps1 and creds16b.ps1 test credentials with lockout-aware delays across ESXi, HP iLO Redfish, Cisco and Brocade SAN switches.
  • vCenter and OpenSLP. vprobe.py probes 10.101.16.11 on ports 443, 5480, 9443 and TCP 427 (slpd). slpctl.ps1 sends Service Location Protocol packets to 10.101.16.1. In 06_横向扩展/poc/, exp_leak.py and exp15160138.py adapt a public PoC for the OpenSLP heap overflow CVE-2021-21974 (VMSA-2021-0002 [3]). They point a reverse shell at 10.101.8.70:32222, served by rshandler.py. The files do not show whether 10.101.16.1 was unpatched or reached.

Documented dead ends

Folder 08_未能奏效的尝试 ("failed attempts") holds two Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228 [9]) probes.

  1. External callback. log4test.py sends JNDI strings, including one in a POST XML username field, over SOCKS5 TLS to 10.101.8.201:443. It points the callback at a commercial out-of-band testing domain.
  2. Internal callback. l4send.py (a later file) retries with a callback to an internal listener on 10.101.8.70:1389 (l4listen.ps1). Filing both under "failed attempts" suggests the operator gave up on this vector.

The selective rollback

_undo_local.ps1 is the rollback script. It connects to the SQL jump hosts, sets xp_cmdshell back to 0, and deletes the two temporary admin accounts.

FileIDSize (bytes)Role
creds16.ps1#0406,168Rate-limited credential tester for ESXi, HP iLO, Cisco and Brocade
rshandler.py#0564,600File-driven reverse-shell listener (cmd.txt, shell_out.txt)
smbsweep.py#05714,155SMB scanner and SYSVOL cpassword decryptor
l4listen.ps1#099531Temporary TCP 1389 callback listener
vprobe.py#1749,150Probes vCenter ports and the TCP 427 OpenSLP precondition
adrecon.py#19512,301ldap3 harvester for LAPS, SPNs and adminCount=1
shares.py#1976,201SMB share search for .iso, .vib, password files and id_rsa
slpctl.ps1#2216,082Positive and negative SLP control packets to 10.101.16.1 to .4
creds16b.ps1#2417,264Refined SOAP, Redfish and HTTP Basic credential tester
depothunt.py#2425,772Finds ESXi offline depots to extract slpd and libc
poc/exp15160138.py#25719,461Modified public CVE-2021-21974 PoC for ESXi build 15160138
poc/exp_leak.py#25820,265Modified public CVE-2021-21974 leak and RCE script
esxiauth.py#2967,545ESXi /sdk SOAP login tester
remote_syscheck.txt#2971,219Base64 JSP cmd.exe /c servlet with a red-team deployment and rollback comment
log4test.py#3111,696Archived JNDI probe
l4send.py#3381,010Archived JNDI retry with internal callback
_undo_local.ps1#3592,666Disables xp_cmdshell and deletes both temporary admins
sptest.py#364454SMB password-spraying and pass-the-hash wrapper

What a posture scan would miss

Figure 3 models what happens if _undo_local.ps1 and fin.ps1 run as written.

Figure 3: Point-in-time posture scans miss staged SQL and AD changes if the rollback runs as written
Figure 3: Point-in-time posture scans miss staged SQL and AD changes if the rollback runs as written
  • What looks clean. sys.configurations shows xp_cmdshell = 0 on the jump hosts. Domain Admins and local Administrators no longer list the temporary accounts.
  • What survives. No staged cleanup script removes the _pushp fragments in the web folder. The hidden local admin from fin.ps1 is not in the rollback. DCSync and raw LDAP operations against 10.101.8.202 write no files to the domain controller, so only event logs and network records keep a trace.

6. Peer Toolkits and Alternative Explanations

In short

Three other staging toolkits from the same period share the same shape: a flat working folder, curated subfolders, and an application-layer relay into internal data stores. The files cannot tell a hostile intrusion from a red-team test, a lab or a decoy.

Four staging toolkits compared

We compared this toolkit (Kit B) with three other multi-stage staging servers seen in the same period. Together they hold 1,458 files.

Figure 4: Database and message-broker pivoting recurs across four staging toolkits
Figure 4: Database and message-broker pivoting recurs across four staging toolkits
KitFilesLayoutStaged path
Kit A983889 in root, 94 in 8 subfoldersphpggc Laravel and Symfony deserialization, PHP stream TCP relay, internal Redis REPLICAOF .so RCE and RabbitMQ
Kit B (this report)364311 in root, 52 in project folder, 1 in /lootTelerik lab and GIS web shell, rtun2 JSP relay, MSSQL linked server and Oracle GIS database, DCSync and ESXi probes, rollback
Kit C8787 in rootUnauthenticated Hadoop YARN REST RCE, internal Apache Doris and Hive sampling, WinRM Java .class exfiltration
Kit D2424 in rootLocal WCF and SQL credential extraction, PowerShell SMB, WMI and MSSQL pass-the-hash

Two patterns repeat across Windows AD, Linux cloud and big-data targets.

  1. Flat root plus curated subfolders. Operators iterate in the root folder (85.4% of files in Kit B, 90.4% in Kit A). They move repeatable chains into subfolders (the project folder in Kit B; bundle and chains in Kit A).
  2. Application-layer relays into data stores. JSP and ASP.NET chunked relays in Kit B mirror PHP stream-socket relays in Kit A. Each kit pivots through high-trust data stores: MSSQL and Oracle (B), Redis and RabbitMQ (A), Hadoop YARN, Doris and Hive (C), and MSSQL (D).

Four kits are too few to estimate how common these patterns are, and nothing here links the kits to one actor.

Who is behind it: four hypotheses

Several clues point in different directions. The file remote_syscheck.txt carries a red-team deployment and rollback comment. Folder 08 archives failed attempts. Kit A holds a probable tester account and cleanup scripts. The 38 root-folder files target a local lab, and the ESXi folder adapts public exploit code.

HypothesisForAgainst
Hostile or gray-hat intrusionThe rollback leaves the hidden admin in place. Scripts target an enterprise GIS schema, a linked server and 17 internal hosts. The modified OpenSLP PoCs could crash ESXi slpd.No victim-side EDR, SIEM or flow data confirms entry, hash replication or impact on a live network.
Authorized red team or contractorThe red-team comment in remote_syscheck.txt, numbered stage folders, RUN_ALL.bat automation, commercial out-of-band testing, lockout-aware delays, negative SLP controls and tester markers in Kit A.Leaving 364 scripts and internal topology on an open server breaks assessment OPSEC. The rollback also omits the hidden admin.
Research lab or reused open-source fixtureThe 38 root-folder files (10.4%) target a local IIS lab. The ESXi PoCs are public. 21 drafts have syntax or compilation errors, typical of iterative testing.Later revisions name 17 internal hosts, GIS schemas, and an ORA-29535 output from a pre-Java 7 Oracle JVM. A stock fixture would not hold these unless run against a custom range.
Honeypot or decoy serverAll four kits sat on open HTTP workspaces in the same period, a posture some research honeypots use.Revised file versions, including broken drafts fixed later and GBK-encoded Chinese tooling, reflect active editing, not a static lure.

Verdict. The staged files cannot settle which explanation is right. We hold no data from the referenced network, so this report does not claim that a real enterprise was breached. The conclusions cover the workflow mechanics and the controls needed to detect them.

7. What Defenders Should Do

These steps follow the staged workflow from web entry to the domain and the hypervisor, ordered by urgency. The post-rollback checklist at the end of this chapter records who owns each check.

Within 24 hours

  • Search endpoints and web folders for the six target-side PowerShell hashes in the Indicators chapter.
  • Run a fleet-wide check of HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList for hidden accounts.
  • Check SQL Server error logs for xp_cmdshell changing from 0 to 1 and back to 0, using Event ID 15457 across all rotated archives.

Within 72 hours

  • Turn on the 72-hour short-lived admin lifecycle query in Sentinel and Defender XDR, including member servers.
  • Enable Directory Service Access auditing and a replication-rights SACL on domain controllers, so Event 4662 records DCSync attempts.
  • Scan web upload folders and App_Data for _pushp, PSBG_DONE and JSPOK| markers.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Upgrade internet-facing Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX to 2026.2.708 or later (CVE-2026-13182).
  • Audit linked-server logins with RPC-out or data access enabled, and Oracle DBA_JAVA_POLICY grants.
  • Isolate ESXi /sdk, TCP and UDP 427 (slpd), HP iLO Redfish and SAN interfaces from application and database subnets. Disable slpd where VMSA-2021-0002 applies.
  • Move LDAP simple binds to LDAPS or SASL, and alert on cleartext simple binds to domain controllers.

Post-rollback checklist

Use this checklist in purple-team exercises or web-to-domain intrusion reviews. Fill in the owner and status columns locally.

CheckOwnerEvidenceStatusNext review
Internet-facing Telerik UI assemblies inventoried and at 2026.2.708 or later
Web upload folders and App_Data scanned with the YARA rules
SQL Event 15457 history (show advanced options, xp_cmdshell) compared with sys.configurations, SQL Audit and EDR
Linked-server logins and Oracle DBA_JAVA_POLICY grants audited
SpecialAccountsUserList checked on every Windows host
Short-lived admin lifecycle rules active in Sentinel and Defender XDR
DC replication SACL (4662) and port 389 BER rules active
ESXi /sdk, port 427, HP iLO Redfish and SAN networks isolated

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Each file targets a step of the staged workflow that leaves a trace even after rollback.

Rule fileWhat it catches
sql_linked_server_and_event15457_audit.sqlT-SQL: lists linked servers that allow RPC-out or data access, and finds xp_cmdshell enable-then-disable sequences in error logs while the option is now off
sentinel_short_lived_admin_lifecycle.kqlSentinel and Defender XDR: accounts created, added to a privileged group and deleted within 72 hours
sigma_staged_workflow.ymlSigma (3 rules): hidden UserList accounts, replication-right access from non-allowlisted principals, and web workers spawning chunked stagers
suricata_staging_and_ldap_bind.rulesSuricata 7 (10 rules): cleartext LDAP simple binds, _pushp chunks, PSBG_DONE and JSPOK| markers, and ${jndi: probes
yara_webroot_and_persistence.yarYARA (3 rules): chunked stager scripts, minimal JSP command shells, and hidden-admin PowerShell

SQL Server audit

Part A lists linked servers with is_rpc_out_enabled or is_data_access_enabled set, with their login mappings. It shows configuration only, not traversal use. Full results need ALTER ANY LINKED SERVER and ALTER ANY LOGIN, or setupadmin or sysadmin; lower rights silently omit rows.

Part B reads error logs 0 to 6 for Event ID 15457 [5] and compares them with sys.configurations. Its strongest result flags an xp_cmdshell 0-to-1 change followed by a 1-to-0 change while the option is now off. Event 15457 records a configured-value change, not proof that RECONFIGURE made it active. Pair a hit with SQL Server Audit or sqlservr.exe spawning cmd.exe before calling it a real enable-and-rollback cycle.

Sentinel and Defender XDR query

The SecurityEvent query joins three events on the account SID within 72 hours: creation (4720), addition to a privileged group (4728, 4732 or 4756) and deletion (4726). Privileged groups are matched by SID: Domain Admins (-512), Enterprise Admins (-519), local Administrators (S-1-5-32-544) and Remote Desktop Users (S-1-5-32-555). A companion query does the same with IdentityDirectoryEvents in Defender XDR. Exclude PAM or just-in-time provisioning accounts only when tied to verified tickets.

Sigma rules

RuleLooks forNeeds
Hidden local accountA DWORD value of 0 set under WinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList (T1564.002)Sysmon Event ID 13
Replication-right accessEvent 4662 with access mask 0x100 and a replication extended-right GUID, from a principal outside an explicit list of DC and Entra Connect accounts (T1003.006)Directory Service Access auditing and a replication SACL
Web worker stagerw3wp.exe, Tomcat or java.exe spawning cmd.exe, PowerShell or certutil with arguments such as -enc, FromBase64String, Set-Content, _pushp or PSBG_DONE (T1505.003, T1059.001, T1059.003)Sysmon Event ID 1 or Event 4688 with command lines

In the replication rule, list exact DC machine accounts and Entra Connect sync accounts. Never exclude wildcards such as *$, MSOL_* or AAD_*, or an attacker account matching those prefixes could slip through. The web worker rule does not see unmarked cmd.exe /c runs through tjsp.jsp; pair it with Suricata SID 2026091109 and the JSP YARA rule.

ESXi hunting

On ESXi hosts, review active and rotated hostd, auth and syslog logs for bursts of SOAP and SSH login failures per source address, and for slpd crashes. Disable OpenSLP where it is not needed.

Suricata signatures

SIDLooks forWhy
2026091101LDAPv3 simple bind with a non-empty password, short-form BERCatches ldapv2.py-style binds to port 389 (T1078.002)
2026091102Same, definite 0x81 length for long DNsCovers longer AD distinguished names
2026091103Same, definite 0x82 lengthCovers very long DNs
2026091104Same, Windows wldap32 0x84 encodingCovers binds from Windows clients
2026091105_pushp in an HTTP request bodyChunked web shell staging over POST (T1505.003)
2026091106_pushp in an HTTP URIThe GET fallback
2026091107PSBG_DONE in an HTTP responseBackground PowerShell completion marker
2026091108${jndi: with ldap, ldaps, rmi or dns in HTTP headersInternal Log4Shell probes (T1190)
2026091109JSPOK| in an HTTP responseOutput of the minimal JSP command shell
2026091110${jndi: in an HTTP request bodyThe POST XML variant in log4test.py

The LDAP rules need visibility of domain controller port 389 traffic. Allowlist legacy printers or bind accounts until they move to LDAPS or SASL. The JNDI rules on port 443 need TLS decryption or a reverse proxy in front of Suricata. They ship with $HOME_NET as source so they load on stock configs; exclude your vulnerability scanners once defined.

YARA rules

YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_R01_Webroot_Chunked_PS1_Stager_pushp appears with PSBG_DONE, FromBase64String, WriteAllText or Set-Content, or PSBG_DONE appears with FromBase64String, in a file under 64 KB
ODIN_R01_JSP_Cmd_Webshell_MarkersJSPOK| appears, or cmd.exe /c and request.getParameter appear with Runtime.getRuntime().exec or ProcessBuilder
ODIN_R01_PS1_SpecialAccounts_Hidden_AdminWinlogonSpecialAccountsUserList appears with advapi32.dll and LogonUser, or with fDenyTSConnections

The Base64-wrapped JSP in remote_syscheck.txt must be decoded before the JSP rule can see it. For mixed-mode assemblies, look for .NET files in web upload folders that also import native kernel32.dll execution APIs. For LDAP, inspect BindRequest frames from web-tier hosts.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueStaged behaviourDetection
Initial AccessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationJNDI probes against 10.101.8.201Suricata 2026091108, 2026091110
PersistenceT1505.003 Web ShellASP.NET and JSP shells, _pushp chunksSuricata 2026091105 to 2026091107, 2026091109; Sigma rule 3; YARA
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command ShellWeb workers launching PowerShell and cmd.exe stagersSigma rule 3
Defense EvasionT1564.002 Hidden Usersfin.ps1 hides a local admin under UserListSigma rule 1; YARA hidden-admin rule
Credential AccessT1003.006 DCSyncdcsync.py with Impacket NTDSHashesSigma rule 2
Defense Evasion, PersistenceT1078.002 Domain AccountsRaw LDAP bind and SMB checks with domain credentialsSuricata 2026091101 to 2026091104

Rule testing

Every rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma, Kusto.Language); the rules were not replayed against live traffic. Test them in your own environment before production alerting.

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds the 29 file hashes, which cover Stages 0 to 8. The four staging server addresses are withheld.

TypeCount
Target-side PowerShell file hashes (SHA-256), for endpoint hunting6
Staging-side file hashes (22 Python, 1 batch), for context23
External staging servers (addresses withheld)4

Each hash is the SHA-256 of the original file on the staging server. The 23 staging-side files were built to run from the operator's server over HTTP and SOCKS relays. Their hashes will not appear on victim disks, so hunt their network and log traces with the rules in Chapter 8.

Target-side PowerShell hashes

StageFileSize (bytes)SHA-256
4sql101.ps19352ebf58a92c2e5066d7347eff9d58e2c2e1c9ca36f4c01a9fd8ecd299d65a4183
4s101c.ps16945bc431e751d0113b9c38140728627da9841da20030c6c505ad4e401fc0bf81fb
4fin.ps12,248e9568e4f3219a0c8f6300ada70d85027fda4efaaa335c9b845130ae229672662
6slpctl.ps16,0827978881fccdccf76ebc2b7753cc90825eb0775dd16ef6772d7bf95aee196ee4a
6creds16b.ps17,264ae7bc4c75b662208ccb61a53a0cb05321fcf87af68829a1280f817b7aa57ce3b
7_undo_local.ps12,66624737d6be02f88d7c0b01b34d1d316325397cd77f4c51ede26fa3dc93c2f0317

Staging servers

ServerKitFiles
Address withheldKit B (this report)364
Address withheldKit A983
Address withheldKit C87
Address withheldKit D24

All four addresses are withheld, because an authorized red team or test range cannot be ruled out for any of them. The file hashes stay published: they describe tools, not their owner.

Withheld: the four staging server addresses, the targeted perimeter address, port and application path; organisation, database, linked-server and schema names; account names; credentials; the commercial out-of-band domain; and the tester account in Kit A.

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The findings come from a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. The staging files themselves were first seen earlier; this report describes what they contain, not when they were written.
  • Staged is not done. The files show intent and tooling. They do not show that any script ran on a target.
  • One captured output. Only /loot/q12.out records contact with a target system, an Oracle error. No .ntds file, account log or hypervisor log was captured.
  • No victim data. We hold no logs from the referenced network. We cannot say whether a real enterprise, a red-team client or a test range sat behind the internal addresses.
  • Counts are lower bounds. Working code and secrets are left out, so counts such as the 96 scripts with internal addresses are minimums.
  • Small comparison. The four kits are a small sample. Shared patterns do not show how common these methods are, or that one actor runs all four.
  • Rules need local testing. See the rule testing note in Chapter 8.

11. Sources

  1. Progress Telerik. Cryptographic oracle vulnerability in RadAsyncUpload (CVE-2026-13182). https://www.telerik.com/products/aspnet-ajax/documentation/knowledge-base/kb-security-rau-padding-oracle-cve-2026-13182 (verified 18 November 2026)
  2. NIST NVD. CVE-2019-18935, Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX insecure deserialization. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935 (verified 18 November 2026)
  3. Broadcom / VMware. VMSA-2021-0002, ESXi OpenSLP heap overflow (CVE-2021-21974) and workaround. https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/23599 (verified 18 November 2026)
  4. Microsoft Open Specifications. [MS-DRSR] IDL_DRSGetNCChanges. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/b63730ac-614c-431c-9501-28d6aca91894 (verified 18 November 2026)
  5. Microsoft. Database Engine events and errors 15000 to 15999 (Event 15457). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/errors-events/database-engine-events-and-errors-15000-to-15999 and xp_cmdshell server configuration option. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/database-engine/configure-windows/xp-cmdshell-server-configuration-option (verified 18 November 2026)
  6. MITRE ATT&CK. T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  7. MITRE ATT&CK. T1564.002 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  8. NIST NVD. CVE-2020-1938, Apache Tomcat AJP (Ghostcat). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1938 (verified 18 November 2026)
  9. NIST NVD. CVE-2021-44228, Apache Log4j2 JNDI (Log4Shell). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 (verified 18 November 2026)
  10. IETF. RFC 4511, LDAP: The Protocol, Section 4.2 Bind Operation. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4511#section-4.2 (verified 18 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What was on the server?

The server held 311 files in a flat working folder, 52 in a curated project folder, and one captured output in a folder named /loot. The project folder has numbered stage subfolders with Chinese names such as "tunnel", "lateral expansion" and "failed attempts".

How does the staged path work?

The workflow runs in stages. At least 96 scripts reference 17 internal addresses across three private subnets. One folder, literally named "failed attempts", holds two Log4Shell probes the operator gave up on. We do not know whether any of these steps worked.

What would the rollback hide?

The rollback script, _undo_local.ps1, would reconnect to the SQL jump hosts, switch xp_cmdshell off and delete both temporary admin accounts. A posture scan run afterwards would see a clean SQL configuration and normal admin groups.

Who is behind it?

The evidence does not say. One file carries a red-team deployment and rollback comment, and the stage folders look like an organised engagement. But the rollback leaves a hidden admin behind, and leaving a toolkit open on the internet breaks normal assessment practice. A research lab or a decoy server are also possible. We therefore do not claim that a real company was breached.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R01-IOC-01 SHA-256 9cb603561bfddf4bcda418eb91b12dc420f942e92fe37e5592e95beb35f35c82 telerik_oracle_attack.py · Stage 0: Telerik / ViewState Cryptographic Oracle Hunt
R01-IOC-02 SHA-256 6fe1405fb45d62ab9712222a1327543fcf8acc395d51b5aaf1e3bbe5e317b48d build_mixedmode.py · Stage 0: Telerik / ViewState Cryptographic Oracle Hunt
R01-IOC-03 SHA-256 7c30b9335e1b959e9ab0f0976b5ef57a4ce0432a3c88f50fee6f9a74036b74a4 psrun.py · Stage 1: GIS Webshell & Chunked PowerShell Stager Hunt
R01-IOC-04 SHA-256 336d5524bebd3eeed980a5cb08ab9df393295602e2f896f46bee9e1aa910e7a7 hx.py · Stage 1: GIS Webshell & Chunked PowerShell Stager Hunt
R01-IOC-05 SHA-256 3ed59e26b9565b932afc301e4a56a7a54b67ab537053b5110c8d3ccd82fd9dc6 psbg.py · Stage 1: GIS Webshell & Chunked PowerShell Stager Hunt
R01-IOC-06 SHA-256 8afedc9459796f7de0758e7eaea32b827e366333eb90d5d5b19b4033119fc1e9 dl.py · Stage 2: HTTP-TCP Tunneling (rtun2) Hunt
R01-IOC-07 SHA-256 3fa8bfb85fe32a6e59e41cf369c691021aff57a5076d31d5833e8ba613a4822b sy.py · Stage 2: HTTP-TCP Tunneling (rtun2) Hunt
R01-IOC-08 SHA-256 70ce638c51e7ac1a959dc0ae990d9df1894ed018d73f68ecee9eaa1c4a1ac816 RUN_ALL.bat · Stage 2: HTTP-TCP Tunneling (rtun2) Hunt
R01-IOC-09 SHA-256 d763aeefc3133bfcbca8c0ca6ec01cdba318da059ed597f645e2f967d955c515 _gen_runall.py · Stage 2: HTTP-TCP Tunneling (rtun2) Hunt
R01-IOC-10 SHA-256 4283d8dd470fda7ea61fa846d143dc7cefd6138ad9fc5d77928e0b21dfae71b4 tunkick2.py · Stage 2: HTTP-TCP Tunneling (rtun2) Hunt
R01-IOC-11 SHA-256 bae408daf616b9d10f991e06c342187e3aa0daceebf1355fc964e916b464a7d9 sqlcrack.py · Stage 3: Database Pivoting (MSSQL & Oracle GISDB) Hunt
R01-IOC-12 SHA-256 2ebf58a92c2e5066d7347eff9d58e2c2e1c9ca36f4c01a9fd8ecd299d65a4183 sql101.ps1 · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-13 SHA-256 5bc431e751d0113b9c38140728627da9841da20030c6c505ad4e401fc0bf81fb s101c.ps1 · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-14 SHA-256 e9568e4f3219a0c8f6300ada70d85027fda4efaaa335c9b845130ae229672662 fin.ps1 · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-15 SHA-256 3f306ceec2e9972a3f2a9539f1c429eea351f5086db228ca3b4c279181cd28cb dcsync.py · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-16 SHA-256 aaa4d993332f6155a72358bb5e11528a23c40212e709b672e973cfafe7ebc7e7 dcsmb.py · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-17 SHA-256 943f2efcda3f33f7ef873c5be752fe6cad023d0ce170abc75423b55b056a6225 ldapv2.py · Stage 4-5: AD Identity Escalation & Raw BER DCSync Hunt
R01-IOC-18 SHA-256 15149e9d4494bb97f9779f01093172aa4102953777454af828b5b2c306a9aaae rshandler.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-19 SHA-256 61f9b9851d6c1e6d3fe570bf68389fa9b7c6ef85906a5899104f2bbd46f7e987 smbsweep.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-20 SHA-256 99adb79793a83ef893d2801df37550999d43adc8b766b27495f626b0772bf2ce vprobe.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-21 SHA-256 902c4114a5476f9b7accdfebc8dfa7ff3fe56ed42a5923795463800f0f8d9ce6 adrecon.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-22 SHA-256 7978881fccdccf76ebc2b7753cc90825eb0775dd16ef6772d7bf95aee196ee4a slpctl.ps1 · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-23 SHA-256 ae7bc4c75b662208ccb61a53a0cb05321fcf87af68829a1280f817b7aa57ce3b creds16b.ps1 · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-24 SHA-256 f54f8cc31b0b7cba1e0e7ff67e371e0adc9854110bd6c8e42826980092a7171a depothunt.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-25 SHA-256 5f7577cd946d64b56dbd0395ecfc82b5799da697121b5aa05bd4190dcaae89bb exp_leak.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-26 SHA-256 9a987a64174314648c17ac21fcb07166758b7018c3068ad6c3ebd50b04ed3193 esxiauth.py · Stage 6: Hypervisor (ESXi), BMC (iLO) & SAN Pivot Hunt
R01-IOC-27 SHA-256 24737d6be02f88d7c0b01b34d1d316325397cd77f4c51ede26fa3dc93c2f0317 _undo_local.ps1 · Stage 7: Anti-Forensic Rollback Hunt
R01-IOC-28 SHA-256 3c6f49b10dceab9ecb2c64c2581027da4ef6f0580c0c96a5b858512bb297b6fb log4test.py · Stage 8: Failed JNDI / Alternative Probes Hunt
R01-IOC-29 SHA-256 4db277e5258d34d88f53243e1f556c59864b3a4acc0846a172734f02486c319f l4send.py · Stage 8: Failed JNDI / Alternative Probes Hunt

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

Sentinel KQL sentinel_short_lived_admin_lifecycle.kql 50 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_staged_workflow.yml 121 lines
Download
SQL sql_linked_server_and_event15457_audit.sql 97 lines
Download
Suricata suricata_staging_and_ldap_bind.rules 11 lines
Download
YARA yara_webroot_and_persistence.yar 58 lines
Download