Introduction: The Expanding Role of Nation-State Cyber Threat Actors
In 2025, nation-state cyber threats are becoming more active, aggressive, and sophisticated. Unlike traditional cybercriminals, state-sponsored actors more often pursue long-term strategic objectives, including stealing valuable intellectual property, gathering intelligence concerning political or military objectives, and seeking to influence public opinion in foreign countries.
The digital universe continues to proliferate, and in turn, so do the opportunities for exploitation. Nation-states make massive investments into advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, providing them with tools, zero-day exploits, and advanced evasion techniques that trickle down into wide-ranging criminal activity. Nation-state actors can often move silently and quietly within networks for months or years.
The increasing geopolitical tensions in regional cyber threats including Eastern Europe, the South China Sea, and the Middle East, will further escalate activity which advances geopolitically motivated APT movements. As governments increasingly depend on digital infrastructure, state-sponsored cyber operations are moving beyond traditional espionage toward modern-day conflict.
This blog will explore how our enemies are ever-moving targets in 2025, the tools they incorporate, where they go next, and how organizations can prepare.
Top Nation-State Cyber Threat Actors in 2025
As of 2025, nation-state actors are still among the key players in the global cyber threat ecosystem. The majority of nation-state activities, or behaviors, are tied to sponsored or supported advanced persistent threat (APT) groups that are often targeting espionage, and the targets can include critical infrastructure, governments, the private sector and civil society actors.
From China, the Mustang Panda group as well as APT41, continue carrying out espionage campaigns against technology, manufacturing and diplomatic targets, and displays persistence with their operations and use of custom malware, including leveraging known vulnerabilities to exploit on enterprise systems. National Security Agency (NSA) Previously reported by Microsoft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MTIC) are targeting the Digital Connection and Emerging Tech sectors by initiating APT and exploitation campaigns.
There are still Russian threat actors such as Sandworm and APT28 (Fancy Bear) demonstrating sustained influence in the cyber realm. In particular, Russian nation-state actors are focusing on cyber sabotage, influence activities, and disruption of critical infrastructure across to Europe and North America.
Iranian groups like OilRig (APT34) and MuddyWater, represent extended surveillance collection against regional adversaries while targeting telecommunications, energy, and government collections in the middle east and beyond.
North Korea attempts to finance its regime through nation-state cyber threat actor groups such as Lazarus and Kimsuky through cryptocurrency theft and espionage operations, and demonstrate social engineering and breach of trust systems such as VPNs and remote access tools.
All of the groups have tremendous resources, and perform their operations with strategic purpose, while still carrying out foreign policy objectives for their nation as well.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Used by APT Groups
Nation-state APT groups in 2025 are improving and evolving their processes and techniques into a mixture of traditional and new, while gaining access, persistence, and exfiltration. They typically operate in multi-stage and stealthy manners, often using methods specifically designed around their targets.
Initial Access Techniques
When carrying out operations, many groups are willing to use spearphishing campaigns with bait based on recent events or geopolitics. For other groups, it is not uncommon to exploit public-facing applications or acknowledged vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access. Exploiting the VPN and remote desktop protocol (RDP) is not hard to execute and will continue to play an important technical role for groups targeting infrastructure or enterprise networks.
Living-off-the-land (LotL) tactics are also in high demand. These potentially include exfiltrating with legitimate tools found in the target environment (e.g., PowerShell, WMI) when targeting their campaign of choice, as these tactics may be resourceful or allow them to go unnoticed. Living-off-the-land tools and techniques remain widespread, as well as APT actors building their repertoire that includes signed binaries, trusted applications, and one-off WMI calls. Oftentimes they are mimicking normal activity in the enterprise.
Zero-day Exploits
Well-funded groups routinely utilize or purchase zero-day vulnerabilities, especially in deployed software involving Microsoft Exchange, VPN gateways, and cloud vendor software. APT organizations routinely get access/exploitation or privilege escalation before the vulnerability is availabe for patching.
Advanced Evasion Techniques
Threat actors use encryption, fileless malware, and domain fronting to evade detection at the network layer. Command-and-control or C2, or “C two” traffic may use a technique called “traffic blending,” where command-and-control traffic is hidden in legitimate North American traffic patterns, or routed through compromised infrastructure.
Emerging Trends
As’ of 2025, APT groups are experimenting with AI-generated phishing emails to earn the trust of their targets, deepfake voice calls (referred to as ‘vishing’) and malicious versions of popular social media platforms to manipulate their targets. Certainly these additional technology assisted tools help in their deception of targets, but the overall goal is to influence the perceptions/ beliefs of targets.
APT groups combine technical skill and psychological manipulation into their persistent campaign targeting towards strategic interests, and their variability towards how they accomplish their operations can often enable them to be unseen and undetected.
Case Studies from 2024–2025 Attacks
In order to provide context on how nation-state cyber threats will be viewed in 2025, it is helpful to look at recent incidents. These incidents, new studies highlight state-sponsored APT (“Advanced Persistent Threat”) groups and how they demonstrate strategic intent, technical capabilities, and target selection.
1. Mustang Panda (China) – Targeting Southeast Asian Diplomacy
In early 2024, Mustang Panda was targeting government officials and NGOs in Southeast Asia using spearphishing. The group used malicious attachments as political briefings. Once gained access, they deployed custom malware for the purpose of harvesting diplomatic communications. These operations align with China’s regional intelligence expectations and also indicate long-term targeting.
2. Sandworm (Russia) – Disruption of European Energy Infrastructure
In mid2024, Sandworm was conducting campaigns against multiple energy operators in Eastern Europe using wiper malware. While the attack caused some temporary service outages in the organizations, what was even more interesting was that it also exposed systematic weaknesses in supply chain security. The campaign used access brokers with VPN misconfigurations. These examples show that cyber operations can be a part of the bigger geopolitical pressure.
3. OilRig (Iran) – Monitoring in the Gulf region
OilRig maintained covert access to telecom infrastructure in the Gulf region, as they used DNS tunneling and web shell persistence to maintain access. OilRig aimed to conduct long-term surveillance of communications. Their campaign was based on public vulnerabilities found in web servers and used domain fronting as a means to avoid detection. OilRig demonstrates Iran’s regional interests and desire to build influence in same region.
4. Lazarus Group (North Korea) – Theft of cryptocurrency to evade sanctions.
Lazarus Group successfully compromised cryptocurrency platforms in various areas of Asia and the European across late 2024 and into 2025. Via phishing and manipulation of software supply chains, Lazarus exfiltrated millions of dollars in digital assets from these services as a means to backstop support North Korea and its nuclear and weapons programs. The group often reuses infrastructure and tactics, but they can quickly adapt to security improvements.
These case studies support the conclusion that APT groups are disciplined actors that are patient and develop and use evolving tool sets. They aren’t opportunistic actors but are highly focused organizations that are executing agendas advancing state-sponsored strategic goals.
Conclusion: Preparing for a Persistent and Adaptive Threat
Cyber threats from nation-states are no longer hypothetical. By the year 2025, they have established themselves as part of the global risk environment. Nation-state actors have purposeful aims or objectives, engaged with advanced techniques and methodologies, and they operate in persistent time frames, making them one of the hardest threats organizations deal with today.
While the tactics may continue to change (the continuing evolution from spearphishing to deepfake credential harvesting, zero days to supply chain compromise), the fundamental challenge remains the same: the defense of complex digital ecosystems against capable, efficient and motivated opponents.
Security leaders must transition from traditional defensive actions into a posture of positive resilience; aligning to national strategies, investing in cyber threat intelligence, establishing modern architectures using zero trust concepts, and recruiting a workforce that recognizes and responds to advanced threats.
In the end, defeating nation-state threats takes sustained commitment, planning, and collaborating through public/private engagement. During this time when cyber capabilities are a routine and standard component of geopolitical power, cyber inherently must hold its place as a national and organizational priority.
