Introduction: Why 2025 is Still the Year of Ransomware
In 2025, ransomware is still the number one cyber threat. Despite increased investment in cybersecurity tools and incident response, every sector is still at risk from ransomware attacks. The type of techniques and level of sophistication is maturing. The ransomware ecosystem is becoming more organized in who the attackers are and how they operate.
Ransomware is no longer done as an individual effort. As mentioned before, cyber criminals have begun to work together or for another party known as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS). This is a large distributed network of threat actors with distinct roles as this allows threat actors to have specialized expertise. For example, some threat actors specialize in initial access, while others specialize in delivering the payload. The biggest challenge is now the attacker negotiating a successful ransom and then the actor turning to extortion.
The latest changes in these threats is called triple extortion. Attackers were no longer restricting their methods to just encryption or extortion. They started combining these two elements by also threatening victims with leaking their sensitive data, along with using third parties like clients, vendors, or regulators to apply pressure to ransom paid.
In this blog, we will take a look at how triple extortion is realized and who the major threat actors are in 2025, and why so many organizations still fail to mount an adequate response to this threats despite clear recognition of the threat.
What is Triple Extortion? How It Works Today
Triple extortion is the most recent development in the progression of ransomware tactics. Originally, attackers encrypted a victim’s data and demanded payment for it to be decrypted. This evolved to what we now know as double extortion when attackers stated they would leak the data they had stolen if the ransom was not paid, in addition to encrypting whatever financial, technological or operational data they had originally compromised.
State-sponsored ransomware attacks and “states of emergency” due to cyber events are now also in public view with the introduction of triple extortion in 2025. With this plan of action, attackers are now bringing in additional pressure from outstide parties, such as the breached organization’s clients, partners, suppliers and in some cases regulators to increase psychological pressure on the targeted organization.
Typically a triple extortion campaign goes like this:
1. Infiltration: Attackers create access through phishing emails, compromised credentials and vulnerable systems.
2. Data exfiltration: Sensitive information is stolen often prior to the encryption.
3. Encryption: Critical systems and files are locked, causing operations to halt.
4. Multi-Channel Extortion: Threats are made via a dark web post, emails to customers or partners, and/or leaking information to the media.
5. Escalation: Attackers may also threaten DDoS attacks or contacting board members directly.
This model will increase the chances of the attack victim paying a ransom demand. In the age of regulators and losing customer trust the cost-benefit analysis may force organizations to pursue a ransom. In addition, this type of plan of action poses challenges to the traditional Ransomware playbook when all affected teams (Legal, communications, leadership, IT) must work together effectively while also being under the influence of pressure from outside parties.
Major Ransomware-as-a-Service Groups Operating in 2025
The Ransomware-as-a-Service model has morphed into the preeminent modus operandi for most ransomware campaigns. As of 2025, there remain many high profile RaaS groups that pose a threat, enabling less skilled affiliates to execute complex attacks through the use of rented ransomware kits and supportive infrastructure.
Important groups acting in 2025 include:
LockBit 3.0: Number one in persistence, always looking for adaptive patterns to modify their products faster than other RaaS groups. LockBit continues to offer modular payloads, and affiliate programs, and has automated negotiation portals. Global targets include both the public and private sector.
ALPHV (BlackCat): provides advanced power of encryption routines and clichéd multi-platform support. BlackCat affiliates frequently use double or triple extortion strategies and maintain a public leak site. The site includes searchable content on past and current victim data.
Black Basta: Active since 2022 and potential descendants or updated version of Conti, Black Bastas’ targets include large enterprises and initial access brokers before ransomware affiliate. In 2025, Black Basta has determined stealthier methods of delivery while recognizing that their focus should exclusively be on healthcare, finance, and manufacturing.
New or Emerging Actors: Groups include RA Group, Akira, and 8Base who can generate new revenue, with affiliates committed to aggressive pricing. Some actors enter marginal investing to reserve territory or target patients in underserved regions, or experimenting with extra-customized extortion campaigns to bypass using remote access tools like contacting regulatory agencies directly.
Common Entry Points and Failures in Defense
Although there is a greater awareness of cybersecurity and organizations are making more investments in security, the basic security hygiene employed by organizations, and vulnerabilities known in the security community are enabling ransomware actors to continue their reign of terror. Entering 2025, an attacker engaging in a successful ransomware campaign will start with one or all of the following entry points:
1. Phishing and Social Engineering
Credential harvesting via spearphishing is still the primary vector of choice for attackers. The attackers send emails engineers to appear to come from a trusted source with the theme of the email as a common online form for invoices, receipts, legal threats, and internal HR functions, among others.
2. Vulnerabilities Exploited in Publicly Facing Applications
Unpatched systems are popular behavior for ransomware groups. Systems to which attack can gain access with great ease to freeway system access include but are not limited to VPNs, remote access software like Team Viewer, and CMS Wordpress. Additionally, they will exploit zero-day vulnerabilities and APIs that have not been protected.
3. Use of RDP and VPNs
Misconfigured RDP’s that are exposed to the internet, configured for bare minimal security access including the use of MFA to bypass RDP access; stolen VPN credentials acquired through phishing that attackers don’t have to give their own attempted defense inclusion. There are still many occurrences of brute-force hacks on VPN’s.
4. Accessbroker
Ransomware groups use Initial Access Brokers (IAB) on dark web markets, which are generally verified access to corporate networks. Ransomware as a service (RaaS) sells betrayed verified corporate network access, and would-be attackers have more cause to expend energy on breaches.
Reasons why defenses fail:
Limited visibility: Unsophisticated behavioral analytics or SIEM correlation can allow lateral movement to go unnoticed.
Networks left unsegmented: Flat networks can easily allow ransomware to spread.
Backups not usable: Only a few backups are isolated, encrypted, or regularly tested; some are deleted or encrypted during an attack.
Weaknesses persist despite being documented just like defenses are exploited, organizations that don’t act on recognized risks are always targets.
Why Resilience is the Weak Link: Beyond the Backups
Many organizations now have a backup solution and, at least in 2025, resilience against ransomware will require more than restoring data. Attackers have adapted, and so must the defenders. Resilience means rebuilding data and infrastructure, maintaining business continuity and reputational trust, and minimizing financial and regulatory impacts.
1. Attackers Are Now Targeting Backups
Modern ransomware viruses search for backups and actively delete them – especially those that are connected to the primary systems and improperly secured cloud storage. If organizations are not using backups that are isolated (offline or immutable) their backups are effectively useless for recovery purposes during the attack.
2. Recovering Takes Time and Coordination
Not only will most of us need backups which we will run into storage limitations, but even the organizations that will restore their critical systems with well-structured backups will take several days to weeks before being able to restore their critical systems. Most organizations under-estimate the rebuilding time needed to restore applications, re-configure the systems involved, and validate the integrity of the information. While systems are down so are revenues, operational activities, and reputational trust with customers.
3. Resilience Requires a More Holistic Approach
- Immutable (write-friendly) backups that are incapable of alteration once written
- Air-gapped data storage, which is incomplete removed from the production systems
- Disaster Recovery Plans that include at least people, process, and communications
- Business impact assessments to rank which areas should recover to speed up processes to cut down long-term impact
- Incident response playbooks as it relates to a ransomware attack
4. Mean time to restore (MTTR) is a driving metric
Organizations are starting to measure resilience in the form of MTTR. A low MTTR means that nothing was ever missed; however, it also means that this recovery has been practiced, rehearsed, and is automatic.
By 2025, resilience means being able to absorb a ransomware attack and resume operations without much long-term damage.
Conclusion: Preparing Organizations for Triple Extortion Models
The operationalization of triple extortion ransomware is no longer an abstract threat; it is the reality of 2025. Attackers can now leverage encryption, leakage of data, and pressure from third parties to maximize leverage against organizations, leaving ultra-vulnerable organizations exposed on all fronts.
Organizational readiness will require organizations to employ intention beyond perimeter defenses and improve their backup strategy. This includes business-wide proactive monitoring and detection, zero trust architectures, threat intelligence, and rehearsed recovery plans.
Ransomware actors are adapting; defenders must evolve faster.
