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Open Directories Beside C2 Listeners: Hybrid Servers, Stealer Relays and Agent Leaks

How 60 co-exposed listeners, 200 leaked AI agent records and 24 stealer endpoints split into what to block, what to hunt and what to rotate

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
17 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026
Open Directories Beside C2 Listeners: Hybrid Servers, Stealer Relays and Agent Leaks

1. Executive Summary

In short

In a two-week review ending 20 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense found 60 C2 and callback listeners on 44 hosts that also served open web directories. Separately, 35 hosts exposed 200 AI coding-agent and chat-connector records, including 49 commercial AI API keys. The feed held 7,648 records labelled with 11 stealer and loader families. None of the 24 endpoints examined had independent corroboration for blocking. Route feed matches to hunting, close ad-hoc HTTP servers on developer hosts, and rotate exposed agent keys.

Three kinds of infrastructure sit side by side in modern intrusions. Stealers and loaders harvest credentials. Developer and AI-agent workspaces store high-value keys.

Operators run C2 and out-of-band callback servers. This report looks at all three and asks one practical question for each: block, hunt or rotate.

1

Sixty C2 and callback listeners share a host with an open web directory.

On 44 servers, 15 offensive and callback frameworks listen next to an unauthenticated directory listing. Interactsh (14 endpoints), CyberStrikeAI (11), Sliver (7), Octopus (5) and Strix (5) make up 70.0% of them. The directories expose staging files, but many such hosts may be authorized test labs.

2

Exposed AI coding agents and chat bridges leak 200 session records.

On 35 hosts, open directories expose records from five agent tools. Hermes Agent accounts for 93; OpenClaw for 49; Claude Code for 31; Codex CLI for 20; and Cursor Server for 7.

The files hold 49 commercial AI API keys, 18 chat-bot tokens and 72 references to C2 or callback endpoints. We treat the owners as misconfigured users, not attackers.

3

None of the 24 examined stealer endpoints had independent corroboration for blocking.

The 7,648 feed records name 11 stealer, loader and RAT families. Six examined endpoints on five dedicated hosts carry feed status, hosting and TLS metadata for Rhadamanthys, Bofamet, IcedID, NebulaStealer and DarkComet, but lack independent corroboration. The other 18 sit on common service ports, share TLS fingerprints with unrelated servers or belong to residential telecom networks.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Require independent corroboration before blocking feed endpoints. Because the 24 examined stealer and loader endpoints lack independent second-signal corroboration, withhold them from automatic egress block lists. Send those feed leads, the hybrid hosts and the ISP addresses to hunting, not blocking.
  2. Ban ad-hoc HTTP directory servers on developer, AI-agent and red-team hosts. A single python3 -m http.server in a home folder publishes every hidden agent folder and key file in it.
  3. Audit chat bridges and rotate file-resident AI keys. List every DingTalk, Telegram and Discord bot connector. Move AI and chat keys out of .env files into a vault with short-lived tokens.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
60 / 44C2 and callback endpoints co-exposed with an open directory, on 44 hosts (15 frameworks)
200 / 35Exposed AI coding-agent and chat-connector records, on 35 hosts
49Commercial AI API keys in those records (DeepSeek, Stability, Anthropic, OpenAI, OpenRouter)
7,648 / 24Feed records labelled with 11 stealer and loader families, and the 24 endpoints we examined on 22 hosts
6 / 5Dedicated-host stealer, loader and RAT endpoints on five hosts without independent corroboration (addresses withheld)
18 / 17Stealer and loader endpoints with port collisions, shared JARMs or telecom ISP hosts, on 17 hosts (addresses withheld)
0Shared hosts or certificates between the stealer endpoints and the hybrid hosts

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapters 1, 6 and 7. Platform and developer-security teams should read Chapters 3 and 4. SOC and detection engineers should start with Chapters 5, 8 and 9. Teams using cyber threat intelligence will find the hosting detail in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.

2. Three Groups, One Analytical Model

In short

No shared host or certificate links the stealer endpoints to the hybrid hosts. We present the three groups together as an analytical model of how intrusion infrastructure divides work, not as one actor.

Stealers feed credentials into the ecosystem. Developer and AI-agent hosts hold the keys that make those credentials valuable. C2 and callback servers are where operators act on them. Treating every feed match across these layers as a block-list entry breaks production services and blames misconfigured developers.

We compared hosts and TLS certificates between the stealer and hybrid groups. None of the 24 stealer endpoints shares a host or certificate with the 44 hybrid hosts. So the link between them is functional, not proven. Figure 1 shows the model and what defenders can do with each part.

Figure 1: Co-exposed listeners, session leaks and stealer relays split duties (analytical model)
Figure 1: Co-exposed listeners, session leaks and stealer relays split duties (analytical model)
GroupRecordsHostsPublished addressesWhat to do
Hybrid C2 and open directory60 endpoints440Hunt; check your own hosts
AI coding-agent and chat leaks200 records350Rotate keys; close directories
Stealer, loader and RAT endpoints24 endpoints (from 7,648 feed records)220Hunt JARM fingerprints and port 5061

Where the servers are hosted

The hybrid listeners sit mostly on commercial cloud and budget VPS networks. The United States (26 endpoints, 43.3%), Germany (11, 18.3%), Finland (6, 10.0%) and China (5, 8.3%) account for 80.0% of them.

Hosting providerHybrid endpoints
Hetzner Online GmbH8
CNServer LLC6
IBM Cloud5
IXROOT LTD5
NetLab Global5
Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd.4

Six dedicated-host stealer and loader endpoints sit on cloud and European hosting: Amazon.com, Inc., IONOS SE, Yedinyye Resheniya LLC, Brainoza OU and JSC "TIMEWEB". The QakBot-labelled candidate addresses sit on residential and mobile telecom networks in Saudi Arabia and Canada. Because none of the 24 stealer endpoints has independent corroboration and ISP addresses change hands often, none is placed on a block list here.

3. Sixty Listeners Next to Open Directories

In short

On 44 hosts, C2, callback and AI-offense listeners share an IPv4 address with an unauthenticated directory listing. AI-offense platforms, classic C2 frameworks and callback utilities make up three groups of 20, 23 and 17 endpoints.

Operators on a fresh VPS often start a quick file server, such as python3 -m http.server or SimpleHTTPServer, to move payloads, stagers or logs. They skip SCP or a reverse proxy. Bound to 0.0.0.0, the file server exposes the working folder; defenders can find that risk with external attack surface management (T1583.003).

Python's own documentation warns that http.server is not meant for production and has only basic security checks. Figure 2 maps each slice of this research to the target surface and the matching detection.

Figure 2: Detection rules map hybrid open directories, agent leaks and stealer leads
Figure 2: Detection rules map hybrid open directories, agent leaks and stealer leads

AI-offense platforms and masquerade certificates

AI-assisted offense platforms account for 20 of the 60 endpoints (33.3%) on 12 hosts. They are CyberStrikeAI (11 endpoints on 7 hosts), Strix (5 on 1 host) and HexStrikeAI (4 on 4 hosts).

CyberStrikeAI shows two TLS deployment clusters:

  • Dual-port cluster. Three US hosts on CNServer LLC each listen on TCP 80 and 443 (six endpoints). All six share one certificate and one JARM fingerprint (40d40d40d00040d…, full value in Chapter 9).
  • Masquerade cluster. Three hosts in Malaysia (port 443), the United States (8443) and Japan (8443) share a second JARM. Each presents a certificate name themed as a CDN or health-check service. The three names are withheld because each points to a single server whose owner is not established.

One US host carries all five Strix endpoints on five high ports. HexStrikeAI listens on TCP 5000 on three hosts and on 8888 on one host in Hong Kong.

Classic C2 frameworks

Post-exploitation C2 frameworks contribute 23 endpoints (38.3%). Six of the seven Sliver endpoints, on ports 443 and 8443, still use Sliver's default CN=localhost certificate. Three of them share one JARM fingerprint.

Five Octopus HTTP listeners sit on five separate German IBM Cloud hosts. AdaptixC2 presents its default CN=adaptix certificate on port 4321.

Callback utilities and port collisions

Callback, interception and database-port listeners make up the last 17 endpoints (28.3%). Thirteen of the 14 Interactsh endpoints sit on mail-submission ports 465 (5) and 587 (8), across eight hosts. One more Interactsh endpoint uses 8443. Another framework label, Daybreak, sits on PostgreSQL port 5432.

ProjectDiscovery's interactsh-server opens SMTP listeners by default on port 25, on 587 for SMTPS and on 465 for SMTP with automatic TLS. A port banner rule alone therefore cannot tell a self-hosted callback server from a real mail relay. Use the X-Interactsh-Version: HTTP header as a hunt signal instead.

Two US hosts stack more than one framework over an open directory:

HostFrameworks and ports
Multi-family host 1Interactsh on 465 and 587, Sliver on 443
Multi-family host 2Sliver on 8443, Kaiten on 9080

All 15 frameworks

FrameworkEndpointsHostsPortsNotes
Interactsh149587 (8), 465 (5), 8443 (1)Mail-port collision on 13 endpoints
CyberStrikeAI117443 (5), 80 (3), 8443 (2), 8899 (1)Two TLS clusters
Sliver77443 (5), 8443 (2)Six with default CN=localhost
Octopus5580 (5)IBM Cloud, Germany
Strix518084, 8085, 8086, 8089, 8093One host
HexStrikeAI445000 (3), 8888 (1)
VShell438082 (3), 8086 (1)
AdaptixC2224321 (CN=adaptix), 4444
Cobalt Strike22443 (1), 9091 (1)
Six others (one each)66443, 5432, 8080, 8081, 9080Burp Collaborator, mitmproxy, Daybreak, Kaiten, Havoc, Hashtopolis

All 44 host addresses are withheld. Many of these frameworks are standard red-team and testing tools, and an open directory can sit on a shared lab or a hijacked VPS.

4. AI Coding Agents and Chat Bridges in Open Directories

In short

Open directories on 35 hosts expose 200 AI coding-agent and chat-connector records. The owners are misconfigured users, and the fix is to close the directory and rotate every key it held.

Autonomous coding assistants and chat-driven agents keep their state in hidden home folders: /.hermes/, /.openclaw/, /.claude/, /.codex/ and /.cursor-server/. Those folders collect API keys, bot tokens and transcripts. Starting a file server from the home folder publishes all of them at once (T1552.001).

Figure 4: Single VPS instances stack C2 listeners over unauthenticated HTTP roots
Figure 4: Single VPS instances stack C2 listeners over unauthenticated HTTP roots

Five runtimes

Autonomous task agents outnumber interactive coding tools by about two and a half to one. Hermes Agent and OpenClaw hold 142 records (71.0%). Coding assistants hold the remaining 58 (29.0%).

RuntimeFolderRecordsShareWhat leaks
Hermes Agent/.hermes/9346.5%Task state, scratch logs and API key files
OpenClaw/.openclaw/4924.5%Agent sessions, including one dingtalk-connector bridge
Claude Code/.claude/3115.5%CLI transcripts and project context
Codex CLI/.codex/2010.0%CLI configuration
Cursor Server/.cursor-server/73.5%Remote IDE configuration

What the records hold

ContentRecordsShareDetail
C2 or callback endpoint references7236.0%URLs inside agent task logs and scan output
Commercial AI API keys4924.5%17 DeepSeek, 13 Stability, 11 Anthropic, 5 OpenAI, 3 OpenRouter
Passwords, secrets and private keys3919.5%21 passwords, 15 generic secrets, 3 PEM private keys
Chat bots, paste drops and other connectors4020.0%12 Telegram, 6 Discord, 4 Pastebin, 18 other connector records including DingTalk

The 72 endpoint references sit inside agent task logs and scan output. That fits people using Hermes Agent or OpenClaw for security testing on hosts with open directories. No secret value or partial secret appears in this report.

Why a chat bridge matters

A dingtalk-connector configuration inside an OpenClaw workspace creates risk in both directions. Anyone who copies a valid bridge credential can reach internal workspace notifications and bot command webhooks without corporate single sign-on. We classify owners of these exposed Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor Server, OpenClaw and Hermes Agent servers as misconfigured users. Nothing on them shows offensive intent.

5. Stealer, Loader and RAT Endpoints

In short

Feed records name 11 stealer, loader and RAT families across 24 examined endpoints, including six endpoints on five dedicated cloud and VPS hosts. Because the available evidence does not establish independent corroboration for any of the 24 endpoints, withhold them from block lists and hunt their JARM fingerprints and SIP-TLS port 5061 usage.

Information stealers (Rhadamanthys, NebulaStealer, js-tap) and loaders or RATs (QakBot, Bumblebee, IcedID, Bofamet, DarkComet, Ursnif, StadiaRAT, SilverRAT) harvest browser cookies, SSH keys and workstation .env tokens. Those are the same secrets that fuel cloud and agent abuse later. The family names come from upstream feeds and are not actor attribution.

Figure 3: Ad-hoc HTTP servers expose listener configs and chat-bridge keys (analytical model)
Figure 3: Ad-hoc HTTP servers expose listener configs and chat-bridge keys (analytical model)

Six dedicated-host endpoints without independent corroboration

The available evidence does not establish independent corroboration for these endpoints. The study records provide upstream feed status, dedicated hosting and TLS metadata for six endpoints across five hosts, so their five IPv4 addresses are withheld.

FamilyHost and portCountry and providerTLS
RhadamanthysDedicated host 1, port 443 (address withheld)Germany, Amazon.com, Inc.Certificate, JARM 3fd21b20d3fd…
BofametDedicated host 2, port 443 (address withheld)Belarus, Yedinyye Resheniya LLCCertificate, JARM 29d29d00029d…
BofametDedicated host 2, port 80 (address withheld)Belarus, Yedinyye Resheniya LLCPlain HTTP
IcedIDDedicated host 3, port 5061 (address withheld)Netherlands, Brainoza OUCertificate, JARM 29d3fd00029d…
NebulaStealerDedicated host 4, port 80 (address withheld)Germany, IONOS SEPlain HTTP panel
DarkCometDedicated host 5, port 443 (address withheld)Russia, JSC "TIMEWEB"Certificate, JARM 27d40d40d000…

Three points matter for defenders:

  • Rhadamanthys on AWS. Cloud addresses are reassigned quickly, and an elastic IP without a corroborated beacon or response can move to a new tenant within days. Hunt the TLS JARM fingerprint instead of blocking the host.
  • Bofamet on two ports. The same Belarus host pairs plain HTTP on port 80 with TLS on 443. Use the TLS JARM fingerprint for hunting until an independent second signal is recorded.
  • IcedID on port 5061. TCP 5061 is normally reserved for encrypted SIP-TLS voice signalling. Non-voice traffic on this port can pass for VoIP traffic at a glance (T1571). Allow outbound 5061 only from known voice systems.

Eighteen endpoints with port collisions, shared JARMs or ISP churn

A feed's own "confirmed" label is not enough to block an address. Three Rhadamanthys-labelled endpoints carried that label, but two showed direct collisions. One sits on FTP port 21 at a large cloud provider. The other, on port 8443 at a cloud provider in Hong Kong, shares its TLS fingerprint with unrelated servers.

GroupEndpointsFamilies and ports
Rhadamanthys label, collision leads2FTP port 21; shared JARM on 8443
Suspected C2 leads5Bumblebee on 443 (2), QakBot on 5000, DarkComet on 50001, js-tap on 443 sharing the DarkComet endpoint's JARM
Weak leads11QakBot on 443 on telecom ISPs (4), DarkComet on 1604 and 7777, Ursnif (2), StadiaRAT (2), SilverRAT on 3467

These 18 endpoints sit on 17 hosts. Together with the five dedicated hosts above, all 22 stealer and loader host addresses are withheld. Use the metadata and JARM fingerprints as hunting context, not as block-list entries.

6. Feed Labels Against Corroborated Evidence

In short

Pushing raw feed matches into a firewall would block ISP customers, mail relays and developer machines. None of the 24 endpoints examined from the 7,648-record feed had the independent second signal required for a block list here.

A block list is defined as much by what it leaves out as by what it holds. Figure 5 compares the size of each feed label or dataset with the examined endpoints and shows why all were routed to hunting or key rotation.

Figure 5: Twenty-four endpoints examined from a 7,648-record stealer and loader feed
Figure 5: Twenty-four endpoints examined from a 7,648-record stealer and loader feed
FamilyFeed-labelled recordsEndpoints examinedHostsDedicated-host leads (unconfirmed)Collision or ISP leads (unconfirmed)
QakBot5,1645505 (4 telecom ISP, 1 port 5000)
Bumblebee1,1642202 (port 443)
DarkComet508431 (port 443, address withheld)3 (ports 1604, 7777, 50001)
Ursnif3302202 (ports 443, 58089)
Rhadamanthys321331 (port 443, address withheld)2 (FTP 21, shared JARM on 8443)
IcedID102111 (port 5061, address withheld)0
js-tap and SilverRAT392202 (23 js-tap and 16 SilverRAT records)
Bofamet12212 (ports 443 and 80, address withheld)0
StadiaRAT52202 (port 80, Germany and Netherlands)
NebulaStealer3111 (port 80, address withheld)0

Four other ways to read the evidence

  1. Authorized testing. Sliver with CN=localhost, Interactsh, Burp Collaborator, mitmproxy, AdaptixC2 and Hashtopolis are everyday tools for internal red teams and contracted testers. Even CyberStrikeAI's masquerade certificates can sit on a shared lab or a hijacked third-party VPS. That is why all 60 hybrid endpoints stay unpublished.
  2. Developers, not operators. Engineers using Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor Server, OpenClaw or Hermes Agent often start a temporary HTTP server to copy files off a cloud devbox. The 35 hosts behind the 200 records are credential-exposure victims. They need key rotation, not blocking.
  3. Residential ISP churn. QakBot has a history of relaying through infected home computers on residential broadband networks. Of 5,164 QakBot-labelled records, none produced a block-list address. Blocking a subscriber address hurts the next customer who receives it.
  4. Port and fingerprint collisions. Thirteen Interactsh endpoints on ports 465 and 587, one Daybreak label on PostgreSQL 5432, and two Rhadamanthys labels (FTP 21 and a shared JARM) make 16 collision cases. A JARM or a port on its own should never trigger a block.

7. What Defenders Should Do

Network and firewall

  • Require an independent second signal, such as a protocol response, beacon or workbench artifact, before adding upstream stealer or loader feed addresses to firewall or proxy block lists.
  • Allow outbound TCP 5061 only from registered voice gateways and session border controllers. Alert on any other process that opens it.

Cloud and developer platforms

  • Scan your own external and VPC address space for Directory listing for / pages. Close any that expose /.hermes/, /.openclaw/, /.claude/, /.codex/ or /.cursor-server/.
  • Block http.server and similar ad-hoc servers bound to 0.0.0.0 on hosts that hold agent folders.

Identity and AI platform security

  • Inventory every chat bridge (dingtalk-connector, Telegram, Discord) and every commercial AI key (DeepSeek, Anthropic, OpenAI, OpenRouter, Stability). Move plaintext .env secrets into an OS keychain or a vault with short-lived tokens.
  • Rotate any key found in a folder that was reachable over HTTP, even briefly.

Detection and threat intelligence

  • Deploy the rules in Chapter 8 on perimeter, TLS-inspection and Linux or Windows EDR tiers, with exact-name allowlists for red-team and sandbox hosts.
  • Keep FTP (21), SMTP (465, 587), PostgreSQL (5432), shared-JARM and telecom ISP matches out of automatic firewall feeds. Route them to hunting.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. The Suricata file passes a syntax lint. The rules were not loaded on live Suricata, YARA, Sigma or Kusto engines for this edition, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_hybrid_c2_opendir_rhadamanthys_and_agent_leaks.rulesSuricata 7: five signatures for the AdaptixC2 default certificate, Interactsh headers, co-exposed C2 and agent-folder directory listings, and OpenClaw config fetches
sentinel_hybrid_c2_opendir_stealer_and_agent_leak_hunt.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: non-voice use of port 5061, HTTP requests to agent folders, and ad-hoc HTTP servers next to C2 or agent folders
sigma_hybrid_c2_http_server_rhadamanthys_and_agent_env.ymlSigma (2 rules): ad-hoc HTTP servers in agent or C2 folders, and archiving or copying of agent folders
odin_rhadamanthys_bofamet_and_exposed_agent_sessions.yarYARA (3 rules): exposed OpenClaw and DingTalk sessions, agent key bundles, and hybrid open-directory listings

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9535002Server certificate subject CN=adaptixAdaptixC2's default self-signed certificate
9535003X-Interactsh-Version: response headerSelf-hosted Interactsh server (hunt only, authorized scanners use it too)
9535004A 200 directory listing that names CyberStrike, HexStrike, Sliver, Adaptix, Strix, VShell or OctopusC2 or AI-offense tooling in an open directory
9535005A 200 directory listing with links to .hermes, .openclaw, .claude, .codex or .cursor-server foldersAgent home folders exposed over HTTP
9535006GET requests under /.openclaw/ for dingtalk-connector, config, .env or session filesSomeone fetching exposed agent or bridge secrets

TLS 1.3 encrypts server certificates, so SID 9535002 fires on TLS 1.2 handshakes or behind a TLS-decrypting proxy. Keep SID 9535003 in alert-only mode where authorized scanners run.

How the other rules work

The KQL query looks back seven days. It first finds Python, PHP, Node, Caddy or nginx processes started as ad-hoc file servers, or command lines that name agent folders or C2 frameworks. It then finds network connections to port 5061 from non-voice hosts, or to URLs under agent folders. The two views are joined per device.

Each result gets one label: contain an exposed directory and rotate keys, hunt a DingTalk bridge, or hunt a listener or port 5061 anomaly. Red-team, AI-gateway and voice hosts are excluded by exact device name.

Sigma ruleLevelFires when
Ad-hoc HTTP server in a C2 or agent workspaceHighhttp.server, SimpleHTTPServer or similar starts from an agent or C2 folder on Linux
Archive or transfer of agent foldersHightar, zip, curl, scp or rsync reads an agent or dingtalk-connector path on Linux
YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_Exposed_OpenClaw_DingTalk_Connector_SessionAn OpenClaw marker appears with a DingTalk connector, or with a bot token and a key field
ODIN_Exposed_Hermes_Claude_Codex_Agent_Secret_BundleAn agent folder path appears with at least two AI API key names
ODIN_Hybrid_C2_OpenDir_Workspace_ManifestA directory listing names at least two C2, callback or AI-offense frameworks

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueHow it shows upDetection
Resource DevelopmentT1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private ServerC2 and callback listeners on rented VPS hosts with open directoriesSID 9535004; Sigma rule 1; YARA
Credential AccessT1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In FilesAI and chat keys in exposed agent foldersSIDs 9535005 and 9535006; Sigma rule 2; YARA
Command and ControlT1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsC2 and callback listeners over HTTP and HTTPSSIDs 9535002 and 9535003; KQL
Command and ControlT1571 Non-Standard PortIcedID-labelled endpoint on SIP-TLS port 5061KQL port 5061 hunt

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds 7 published indicators: 7 JARM fingerprints for TLS hunting. There are no published IPv4 addresses or file hashes in this report. Eight more indicators appear in this report only: one default certificate name, one HTTP header, five agent folder paths and one chat-bridge name.

TypeCountWhere to use it
JARM fingerprints7TLS hunting only, never block on a JARM alone
Certificate name and HTTP header2TLS and proxy hunting
Agent folder paths and chat-bridge name6External attack-surface scans, EDR and IAM reviews

JARM fingerprints to hunt

JARMFamilyContext
3fd21b20d3fd3fd21c43d21b21b43d1ec49a4b64df0a9e9f328abd60285841RhadamanthysDedicated-host endpoint; also seen on another server
29d29d00029d29d00042d42d0000002059a3b916699461c5923779b77cf06bBofametDedicated-host loader endpoint
29d3fd00029d29d00042d43d000000ad9bf51cc3f5a1e29eecb81d0c7b06ebIcedIDDedicated-host port 5061 endpoint
27d40d40d00040d00042d43d000000d2e61cae37a985f75ecafb81b33ca523DarkCometDedicated-host endpoint; shared with a suspected js-tap server
40d40d40d00040d00043d43d00043d3bef2bf79cd6719851e8198c1e8f9a14CyberStrikeAIThree dual-port hybrid hosts
40d40d40d00000000043d43d00043d6aff5ab0f4fc31897186312c9e639319CyberStrikeAIThree hosts with CDN-themed certificate names
3fd3fd20d00000021c43d43d00043d204204071741c36579e355f830d285a5SliverThree hybrid Sliver listeners

Other indicators

IndicatorTypeUse
CN=adaptixDefault certificate name (AdaptixC2, port 4321)TLS hunting
X-Interactsh-Version:HTTP response header (14 endpoints on 9 hosts)Proxy hunting, alert only
/.hermes/Agent folder (93 records)Attack-surface scans and EDR
/.openclaw/Agent folder (49 records)Attack-surface scans and EDR
/.claude/Agent folder (31 records)Developer host audit
/.codex/Agent folder (20 records)Developer host audit
/.cursor-server/Agent folder (7 records)Developer host audit
dingtalk-connectorChat-bridge configuration in OpenClawIAM and EDR review

Withheld: all 44 hybrid host addresses and all 35 agent-leak host addresses. Also withheld: all 22 hosts behind the 24 stealer endpoints (the five dedicated hosts and the 17 collision or ISP hosts). The three CDN-themed certificate names and every secret value are withheld too.

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The review ended 20 November 2026. The stealer comparison includes older feed records; their dates do not establish activity within a two-week window.
  • Feed labels are not attribution. Family names such as Rhadamanthys or QakBot come from upstream feeds. Without an independent second signal, none of the 24 stealer endpoints is treated as confirmed adversary infrastructure.
  • The model is a model. No host or certificate links the stealer endpoints to the hybrid hosts. Figures 1 and 3 show an analytical model of how the groups divide work, not one actor.
  • Owners are not operators. The 35 agent-leak hosts belong to misconfigured users. Hybrid hosts may be authorized labs. Their addresses are withheld.
  • No secrets used. We did not use any leaked key or token, and no secret value appears in this report.
  • Cloud addresses move. One Rhadamanthys-labelled endpoint sits on AWS, where elastic addresses are reassigned often. All 22 stealer host addresses are withheld rather than placed on a block list.
  • Rule testing. The rules were not loaded on live engines for this edition and were not replayed against live traffic. Test them in your own environment first.

11. Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK. T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  2. ProjectDiscovery. Interactsh: out-of-band interaction server and client. https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh (verified 20 November 2026)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK. S0633 Sliver. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK. T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  5. OWASP Cheat Sheet Series. Secrets Management Cheat Sheet. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secrets_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html (verified 20 November 2026)
  6. MITRE ATT&CK. S0650 QakBot. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  7. MITRE ATT&CK. S0483 IcedID. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  8. Salesforce. JARM: active TLS server fingerprinting. https://github.com/salesforce/jarm (verified 20 November 2026)
  9. MITRE ATT&CK. T1571 Non-Standard Port. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571/ (verified 20 November 2026)
  10. Python documentation. http.server: HTTP servers. https://docs.python.org/3/library/http.server.html (verified 20 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What does a C2 server with an open directory look like?

On 44 servers we found 60 C2, callback and AI-offense listeners running next to an unauthenticated directory listing on the same address. They cover 15 frameworks. Five of them make up 70.0% of the total: Interactsh (14 endpoints), CyberStrikeAI (11), Sliver (7), Octopus (5) and Strix (5).

How do AI coding agents leak keys?

AI coding assistants and chat-driven agents keep their state in hidden home folders: /.hermes/, /.openclaw/, /.claude/, /.codex/ and /.cursor-server/. Those folders collect API keys, bot tokens and transcripts. Start a file server in the home folder and every one of them is published.

Why did none of the 24 stealer endpoints make the block list?

Stealers and loaders harvest browser cookies, SSH keys and .env files, the same secrets that later fuel cloud and agent abuse. So it is tempting to block everything a feed labels as Rhadamanthys or QakBot. That would be a mistake.

Are these three groups the same actor?

No evidence says so. None of the 24 stealer endpoints shares a host or certificate with the 44 hybrid hosts. We present the three groups as an analytical model of how intrusion infrastructure divides work.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R35-IOC-01 JARM 3fd21b20d3fd3fd21c43d21b21b43d1ec49a4b64df0a9e9f328abd60285841 443 rhadamanthys · TLS fingerprint of the dedicated-host endpoint, also seen on another server Hunt
R35-IOC-02 JARM 29d29d00029d29d00042d42d0000002059a3b916699461c5923779b77cf06b 443 bofamet · TLS fingerprint of the dedicated-host loader endpoint Hunt
R35-IOC-03 JARM 29d3fd00029d29d00042d43d000000ad9bf51cc3f5a1e29eecb81d0c7b06eb 5061 icedid · TLS fingerprint of the dedicated-host SIP-TLS port 5061 endpoint Hunt
R35-IOC-04 JARM 27d40d40d00040d00042d43d000000d2e61cae37a985f75ecafb81b33ca523 443 darkcomet · TLS fingerprint shared by the dedicated-host DarkComet endpoint and a suspected js-tap server Hunt
R35-IOC-05 JARM 40d40d40d00040d00043d43d00043d3bef2bf79cd6719851e8198c1e8f9a14 443 cyberstrikeai · shared by three dual-port hybrid hosts Hunt
R35-IOC-06 JARM 40d40d40d00000000043d43d00043d6aff5ab0f4fc31897186312c9e639319 8443 cyberstrikeai · shared by three hosts with CDN-themed certificate names Hunt
R35-IOC-07 JARM 3fd3fd20d00000021c43d43d00043d204204071741c36579e355f830d285a5 443 sliver · shared by three hybrid Sliver listeners Hunt

28 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

Suricata odin_hybrid_c2_opendir_rhadamanthys_and_agent_leaks.rules 16 lines
Download
YARA odin_rhadamanthys_bofamet_and_exposed_agent_sessions.yar 72 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_hybrid_c2_opendir_stealer_and_agent_leak_hunt.kql 42 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_hybrid_c2_http_server_rhadamanthys_and_agent_env.yml 88 lines
Download