Skip to content
NewCybercrime Report 2026 · Eight Chapters · A Post Is Not An Incident → Explore The ChaptersCybercrime Report 2026 → Explore

Odin Research / What is / C2 and post-exploitation

What Is AdaptixC2? How the Open-Source C2 Framework Works

A free, plugin-based red-team framework that criminal and state-linked operators have picked up: how it works, who uses it and how to find it.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
8 min read
Type
C2 framework

In short

AdaptixC2 is an open-source command-and-control (C2) and post-exploitation framework built for authorized penetration testing. It pairs a Go teamserver with a C++ and Qt operator client and loads listeners and agents as plugins. Security vendors have reported ransomware affiliates and a state-linked group using it in real intrusions.

Key takeaways

What it is
An open-source post-exploitation and adversary emulation framework with a Go teamserver, a C++ and Qt multi-operator client, and plugin-based listeners and agents.
How it works
Operators build beacons for HTTP, SMB, TCP and other channels, then task them from the client. Agents run commands, move files, load Beacon Object Files and tunnel traffic through SOCKS.
Why it matters
Unit 42, Silent Push and Zscaler have reported real attacks with it, including Fog and Akira ransomware activity and the Tropic Trooper group.
What Odin Research saw
101 AdaptixC2 endpoints on 89 hosts in Monograph 22, none confirmed as hostile, plus 26 Adaptix gopher agent builds staged next to a FortiGate kit in Monograph 25.
What to do first
Hunt for default teamserver certificates and ports, alert on help-desk chats followed by remote assistance tools, and keep unconfirmed listeners on a watchlist rather than a block list.

What is AdaptixC2?

AdaptixC2 is an open-source command-and-control (C2) and post-exploitation framework made for authorized penetration testing. Red teams use it to control implants on test systems. Its Go teamserver, C++ client and plugin design make it a free alternative to commercial tools, and attackers have adopted it too.

The project lives on GitHub under the Adaptix-Framework organization. Its README describes it as an extensible post-exploitation and adversarial emulation framework. The server is written in Go, and the operator client is written in C++ with the Qt framework, so several operators can share one server.

Like Cobalt Strike or Sliver, AdaptixC2 is a C2 framework. A C2 framework is the server and implant pair that lets an operator send commands to systems they have already reached. The software is legal to download. Its use against systems you do not own or have permission to test is not.

How AdaptixC2 works

AdaptixC2 has three main parts:

  1. The teamserver. A Go service that receives agent check-ins, stores tasks and results, and serves the operators. In Odin Research data, many teamservers listen on port 4321.
  2. The client. A C++ and Qt desktop program. Operators connect to the teamserver with it, browse agents, run commands and share sessions.
  3. Extenders. Plugins that add listeners and agents. Monograph 22 lists them as ExtenderListener and ExtenderAgent modules, scripted in AxScript.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 describes three main beacon types. BEACON_HTTP uses web requests with configurable URIs, headers and user agents. BEACON_SMB uses Windows named pipes when HTTP is blocked or watched. BEACON_TCP uses direct sockets. Unit 42 says beacons ship as EXE, DLL, service or raw shellcode builds for x86 and x64, with an RC4-encrypted configuration.

Once a beacon runs, the operator can run commands, manage files and processes, and exfiltrate data in chunks. The framework supports Beacon Object Files (BOFs), small compiled modules that run inside the agent process. It also supports SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 proxying and port forwarding, which let an operator reach internal systems through the agent. Unit 42 notes operator controls such as a kill date and working hours, which limit when a beacon talks to its server.

Kaspersky reported in April 2026 that the agent can also talk over DNS and DNS over HTTPS. AdaptixC2 also includes Go agents, which Odin Research saw staged as "gopher" builds for Linux, Windows and macOS.

How attackers use AdaptixC2

Several vendors have documented AdaptixC2 in real intrusions:

  • Help desk lures and Fog ransomware. In September 2025, Unit 42 reported seeing AdaptixC2 infections from early May 2025. In one chain, attackers posed as IT support in Microsoft Teams and talked victims into a Quick Assist session. PowerShell loaders then ran the beacon in memory. Unit 42 also described a case where Fog ransomware was deployed alongside AdaptixC2 against a financial institution in Asia.
  • Akira and CountLoader. In October 2025, Silent Push said it first saw malicious AdaptixC2 payloads delivered by the CountLoader loader. It also cited an Akira ransomware affiliate using the framework. Silent Push linked a main developer alias to Russian-language Telegram promotion, at moderate confidence, and said the evidence does not prove that person took part in malicious activity.
  • Tropic Trooper. In April 2026, Zscaler ThreatLabz attributed a campaign against targets in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan to Tropic Trooper, with high confidence. A loader delivered an AdaptixC2 beacon in memory. The group built a custom listener that used GitHub Issues as its C2 channel.

The persistence and follow-on steps are ordinary. Unit 42 saw Startup folder shortcuts, a Run key and DLL search-order hijacking, followed by discovery commands such as whoami and nltest. See Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder and Application Layer Protocol for the matching ATT&CK techniques.

What Odin Research observed

AdaptixC2 appears in four Odin Research monographs. None of the teamservers counted below is confirmed as hostile, so their addresses stay withheld.

  • 101 endpoints, none confirmed. Monograph 22 mapped 101 AdaptixC2 endpoints on 89 hosts: 32 suspected, 68 candidates and 1 node on a dynamic consumer line. Hosts sat in the United States (19), Hong Kong (15), China (13), Singapore (10), Russia (7) and Germany (5).
  • Defaults give servers away. In the same study, 35 endpoints (34.7%) used the default port 4321. Others used 443, 4444, 8443, 4443 and 43211. Seven certificates used CN=adaptix, CN=adaptix.local or CN=adaptix-server, 11 used CN=localhost, and 21 listeners shared one Go TLS fingerprint. One certificate imitated a remote desktop product name.
  • Feed labels are not verdicts. Monograph 02 found 203 AdaptixC2 management-port candidates in upstream feeds, with 82 on 4321 and 11 on 43211. Those counts are feed labels, not confirmed C2.
  • Shared servers. One server in China ran an AdaptixC2 listener beside a ToShellC2 console. Monograph 19 saw AdaptixC2 on the same hosts as Mythic.
  • Staged agent builds. Monograph 25 found an open staging server with 26 Adaptix gopher builds across six OS and CPU targets, next to a FortiGate 100E kit and 22 Windows beacon builds. Every build had a unique SHA-256 hash, which suggests per-listener keys. Several Linux builds were named for server roles such as DRBD storage and Apache Tomcat. These were staged files; nothing showed them running on a target.

How to detect AdaptixC2

Combine network, host and identity signals. No single one is enough.

  • Default teamserver traits. Watch outbound connections to port 4321 and certificates named CN=adaptix, CN=adaptix.local or CN=adaptix-server. Operators who replace defaults will slip past these checks.
  • Default beacon traits. Kaspersky lists a default X-Beacon-Id heartbeat header, an old Firefox 20 user agent, a default peer-to-peer TCP port of 9000 and a server banner reading "AdaptixC2 server". All can be changed, so treat them as hunting leads.
  • Help desk then remote assistance. Unit 42 published a hunt for external Teams chats with help-desk titles followed within ten minutes by Quick Assist, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect or LogMeIn.
  • In-memory loading. Alert when PowerShell or a renamed binary allocates executable memory soon after outbound traffic to a rare host.
  • Hosting traits. Do not block on port alone. Many AdaptixC2 endpoints share ports and default certificates with labs and test servers.

Odin Research publishes rules for these patterns. Monograph 22 carries a Suricata signature for default AdaptixC2 certificate names, a Sentinel KQL hunt for egress followed by in-memory activity, and a YARA rule for AdaptixC2 extender and beacon configuration files. Monograph 25 adds a YARA rule for multi-architecture gopher build sets and a Sigma rule for Linux gopher execution. All rules are in the Defense Kit.

How to defend against AdaptixC2 intrusions

  1. Close the help-desk door. Block or warn on external Teams chats, restrict Quick Assist and other remote tools to approved support staff, and train users to verify IT contacts. See social engineering.
  2. Constrain PowerShell. Turn on script block logging and constrained language mode where you can. Both loader chains Unit 42 described used PowerShell.
  3. Watch for tunnels. SOCKS proxying through an agent lets an operator reach internal services. Segment networks and alert on workstations that open many new internal connections. See lateral movement.
  4. Treat open-source C2 like commercial C2. A free framework is not a sign of a harmless actor. Respond to a confirmed AdaptixC2 beacon as you would to a ransomware precursor.

AdaptixC2 compared with other C2 frameworks

FrameworkServer and clientLicensingNotes
AdaptixC2Go teamserver, C++ and Qt clientOpen sourcePlugin extenders and BOF support; default port 4321 common
Cobalt StrikeJava teamserver and clientCommercialThe model AdaptixC2 beacons and BOFs resemble; widely cracked
SliverGo server and clientOpen sourceOperator gRPC often on 31337 with CN=multiplayer
HavocGo teamserver, Qt clientOpen sourceSimilar team model and Windows agent
MythicDocker services, web UIOpen sourceAgents are separate projects; seen on the same hosts as AdaptixC2

Frequently asked questions about AdaptixC2

What is AdaptixC2?

AdaptixC2 is an open-source command-and-control and post-exploitation framework for authorized penetration testing. It has a Go teamserver, a C++ and Qt operator client, and plugin-based listeners and agents.

Is AdaptixC2 malware?

No. AdaptixC2 is a red-team framework. Its beacons behave like malware when an attacker deploys them without permission, and Unit 42, Silent Push and Zscaler have reported real intrusions that used it.

Is AdaptixC2 legal?

Downloading and using it in an authorized test is legal. Deploying its agents on systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal in most countries.

Who uses AdaptixC2 maliciously?

Vendor reports link it to Fog ransomware activity (Unit 42), an Akira ransomware affiliate and CountLoader (Silent Push) and the Tropic Trooper group (Zscaler ThreatLabz). Many other installs belong to testers and students.

What port does AdaptixC2 use?

There is no fixed port, but Odin Research found 35 of 101 AdaptixC2 endpoints on port 4321. Kaspersky lists 9000 as the default peer-to-peer TCP port for agents. Operators can change both.

How do I detect AdaptixC2?

Look for default certificate names such as CN=adaptix, the X-Beacon-Id header, traffic to port 4321, in-memory PowerShell loaders and help-desk chats followed by remote assistance tools. Odin Research publishes Suricata, KQL, Sigma and YARA rules in its Defense Kit.

AdaptixC2 vs Cobalt Strike: what is the difference?

Cobalt Strike is a commercial product with a Java teamserver. AdaptixC2 is free and open source, with a Go teamserver and a C++ client. Both offer beacon-style agents, BOFs and SOCKS pivoting.

Should I block every AdaptixC2 server I find?

Block servers confirmed by a second signal, such as a beacon on your own hosts. Odin Research found none of 101 public AdaptixC2 endpoints confirmed as hostile, so treat unconfirmed listeners as watchlist items.

Sources

  1. Adaptix-Framework, AdaptixC2 README, GitHub. raw.githubusercontent.com/Adaptix-Framework/AdaptixC2/main/README.md (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, AdaptixC2 post-exploitation framework research, 10 September 2025. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/adaptixc2-post-exploitation-framework/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. Silent Push, "Silent Push Unearths AdaptixC2's Ties to Russian Criminal Underworld", 30 October 2025. www.silentpush.com/?p=14117 (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. Kaspersky Securelist, "Adapt or pay: an analysis of the AdaptixC2 framework", 17 April 2026. securelist.com/adaptixc2-network-and-host-detection/119424/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  5. Zscaler ThreatLabz, "Tropic Trooper Pivots to AdaptixC2 and Custom Beacon Listener", 22 April 2026. www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/tropic-trooper-pivots-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener (checked 21 November 2026)

Related tools and terms

All Odin Research explanations · Brandefense glossary

Odin Research

Get the rules, not just the definition

Every Odin Research report ships with verified indicators and detection rules you can load today.

Open the Defense Kit