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Odin Research / What is / C2 and post-exploitation

What Is SuperShell C2? The Browser-Based Reverse SSH Platform

A Docker-packaged web console that turns reverse SSH into a shared attack panel: how it works, who has used it, and what gives it away on the wire.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
5 min read
Type
C2 framework

In short

SuperShell C2 is an open-source command-and-control platform published on GitHub that manages reverse SSH shells from a web browser. Its implants call home over TLS-wrapped SSH, so targets need no open inbound port. Mandiant reported that the China-nexus actor UNC5174 used SuperShell infrastructure after exploiting F5 BIG-IP and ScreenConnect flaws.

Key takeaways

What it is
A publicly available C2 platform that wraps a reverse SSH listener in a web portal with a built-in implant builder.
How it works
An implant on the target dials out over TLS-wrapped SSH. The operator gets a browser terminal, file transfer and SOCKS5 tunnels.
Why it matters
Mandiant tied SuperShell infrastructure to UNC5174, an actor that exploited F5 BIG-IP and ConnectWise ScreenConnect flaws.
What Odin Research saw
180 SuperShell endpoints in one study, but only 2 confirmed consoles. 169 sat in one Hong Kong hosting cluster and stay suspected.
What to do first
Hunt the default certificate CN=:3232 and /supershell/ web paths, and alert on servers that open outbound sessions to ports 3232 or 8888.

What is SuperShell C2?

SuperShell C2 is an open-source command-and-control platform that manages reverse SSH shells from a web browser. An operator builds an implant in the portal, runs it on a target, and then works through a browser terminal. Mandiant describes it as a publicly available C2 framework published on GitHub.

The project is published as tdragon6/Supershell. It belongs to a newer class of "team C2" consoles. These tools package the listener, the payload builder and a shared web interface in one Docker stack, so several operators can work side by side.

SuperShell is not as widely known as Cobalt Strike or Sliver. It matters because it is simple to deploy, its implants need no inbound port on the target, and at least one state-linked access broker has used it.

How SuperShell C2 works

Odin Research's analysis in Monograph 22 breaks SuperShell into three parts:

  1. Web portal. A Flask and Nginx management site, by default on port 8888, with a login page under /supershell/login.
  2. Reverse SSH listener. An embedded rssh multiplexer, by default on port 3232. It wraps SSH in TLS and presents a self-signed certificate with the subject CN=:3232.
  3. Implant builder. Built into the browser interface. It produces statically linked implants for Windows and Linux.

The implant dials out to the listener over TLS-wrapped SSH. Through that one session, the operator gets a shell, file transfer, SOCKS5 tunnelling and shellcode injection. Because the target opens the connection, firewalls that only filter inbound traffic do not stop it.

This design maps to Encrypted Channel (T1573) and to protocol tunneling. From the network, a session looks like an ordinary TLS connection to a high port. That is why the listener's default certificate and the portal's URL paths are the best signals.

How attackers use SuperShell C2

In March 2024, Mandiant reported on UNC5174, a China-nexus actor it assessed with moderate confidence as a possible access broker for China's Ministry of State Security. Mandiant described this chain:

  • UNC5174 exploited CVE-2023-46747, an F5 BIG-IP configuration utility flaw that NVD rates CVSS 3.1 9.8 and that is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • In February 2024, it exploited ConnectWise ScreenConnect flaw CVE-2024-1709 (CVSS 3.1 10.0) against hundreds of institutions, mainly in the United States and Canada.
  • After access, a downloader fetched a Go tunneler called GOHEAVY from infrastructure linked to SuperShell administrators. GOHEAVY kept in touch with an external SuperShell C2 server.
  • A Go SSH reverse shell, GOREVERSE, called back to infrastructure previously seen hosting SuperShell.

Mandiant assessed that the custom tooling and the SuperShell framework in those incidents were used uniquely by UNC5174. That is an assessment about one set of intrusions, not about every SuperShell user. The tool is public, and anyone can run it.

The pattern is typical for an initial access broker: exploit an internet-facing application, then plant a light reverse shell that survives until the access is sold or used.

What Odin Research observed

  • 180 endpoints, 2 confirmed. Monograph 22 mapped 180 SuperShell endpoints. Two web consoles on port 8888 were confirmed, one on Shenzhen Tencent in China and one on Cloudie Limited in Hong Kong. Their addresses are in the report's indicator list.
  • One Hong Kong cluster. 169 of the 180 sat in one Hong Kong hosting network on port 443. They shared TLS fingerprints, but nothing else tied them to SuperShell, so they stay suspected. Overall, 171 of 180 endpoints (95.0%) were in Hong Kong and 6 in China.
  • Default certificate on candidates. Two candidate consoles in China presented the default CN=:3232 listener certificate. A third used a Chinese-language certificate name meaning "inventory management system". Their addresses are withheld.
  • Shared TLS stacks. Monograph 02 found that 126 of 171 SuperShell records (73.7%) shared one TLS fingerprint with 174 DarkSword records. The overlap fits either a shared C2 bundle or a provider's standard server image.

The lesson: a SuperShell label on a scan result is weak on its own. The confirmed consoles were the ones whose web portal answered as SuperShell.

How to detect SuperShell C2

  • The listener certificate. Alert on TLS server certificates with the subject CN=:3232 from external hosts. Note that ReverseSSH listeners also present this certificate, as Monograph 27 found, so treat it as a reverse SSH signal first.
  • Portal paths. Outbound requests to URIs starting with /supershell/, such as the login, client, shell or compile pages, point to someone using a SuperShell console.
  • Server egress. Servers rarely need to open outbound sessions to ports 3232, 8888 or 18888. Alert when they do, and check which process opened the socket.
  • Process command lines. On Linux, look for command lines that name tdragon6/supershell, /supershell/login or the SSH-2.0-rssh banner.

Monograph 22 carries a Suricata rule set (including signatures for /supershell/ URIs and the CN=:3232 certificate), a Sentinel KQL hunt, a Sigma rule for rssh callbacks and a YARA rule for SuperShell implant and console files. All are in the Defense Kit.

How to defend against and respond to SuperShell C2

  1. Patch edge systems fast. UNC5174 reached its targets through known flaws in F5 BIG-IP and ScreenConnect. Prioritize known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems.
  2. Keep management interfaces off the internet. Mandiant recommended restricting internet access to the F5 management interface.
  3. Default-deny server egress. Allow servers to reach only the destinations they need. A reverse shell that cannot dial out cannot work.
  4. Respond as to a backdoor. If you find an implant, isolate the host, collect memory and disk, and look for other backdoors and tunnels before you rebuild.
  5. Block confirmed consoles only. Block confirmed SuperShell addresses. Send suspected cluster members to a watchlist, since shared hosting creates many false positives.

SuperShell C2 compared with other team C2 consoles

PlatformWorking styleWhat Odin Research saw
SuperShell C2Browser console over reverse SSH180 endpoints, 2 confirmed (Monograph 22)
MetasploitExploit framework with shell sessions17 confirmed endpoints in Monograph 22
AdaptixC2Plugin teamserver that runs work in memoryNo confirmed endpoints in Monograph 22
MITRE CalderaAdversary emulation planner239 of 257 endpoints were vendor banner look-alikes
VShellImplant and listener on high portsOften on port 9999 (Monograph 02)

Frequently asked questions about SuperShell C2

What is SuperShell?

SuperShell is an open-source C2 platform published on GitHub. It manages reverse SSH shells from a web portal and builds implants for Windows and Linux that call home over TLS-wrapped SSH.

Is SuperShell malware?

SuperShell is a public tool, not malware by itself. Its implants act as backdoors, though, and Mandiant reported that the China-nexus actor UNC5174 used SuperShell infrastructure in real intrusions.

Who made SuperShell?

The project is published on GitHub under the account tdragon6. Mandiant describes it as a publicly available C2 framework.

Which threat actors use SuperShell?

Mandiant reported in March 2024 that UNC5174 used SuperShell infrastructure after exploiting CVE-2023-46747 in F5 BIG-IP and CVE-2024-1709 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect. Because the tool is public, other actors can use it too.

What ports does SuperShell use?

Odin Research found the web portal on port 8888 by default and the reverse SSH listener on port 3232. Some operators move the portal to 443, 8443 or 18888.

How do I detect SuperShell?

Look for TLS certificates with the subject CN=:3232, requests to /supershell/ paths, and servers opening outbound sessions to ports 3232 or 8888. Odin Research publishes Suricata, Sigma, KQL and YARA rules in its Defense Kit.

SuperShell vs ReverseSSH: what is the difference?

ReverseSSH is a single reverse SSH binary. SuperShell wraps a reverse SSH listener in a shared web portal with an implant builder. Both can present the same default CN=:3232 certificate.

Sources

  1. Mandiant (Google Cloud), "Bringing Access Back: Initial Access Brokers Exploit F5 BIG-IP (CVE-2023-46747) and ScreenConnect", 21 March 2024. cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/initial-access-brokers-exploit-f5-screenconnect (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. NVD, CVE-2023-46747. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46747 (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. NVD, CVE-2024-1709. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1709 (checked 21 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK, T1572 Protocol Tunneling. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/ (checked 21 November 2026)

Related tools and terms

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