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Brandefense Cybercrime Report 2026 · Ransomware

Inside The Ransomware Economy.

Ransomware has a public claim trail and an advertised service economy. We read the crews’ own ads beside 9,203 leak-site claims collected by Brandefense Blackhole, our cybercrime database.

1 January–27 October 2026 · Research edition 1.3
The persistent core 64.7%
of claims came from just 33 of 177 groups.
One square = one group. Coral = claims in eight or more months. 5,950 of 9,203 claims; activity within our collection.
Claims ≠ confirmed breachesOctober is partial22–28 July is sampled Read the method →
01The visible claims

A Crowded Field. A Concentrated Output.

177 groups appear in the collection. Qilin and The Gentlemen alone account for 23.4% of its claims. A changing list of names does not mean activity is evenly distributed.

9,203 canonical group–victim claims
50 groups appear in only one month, accounting for 260 claims
85.4% of claims appear in multiple relays; repetition is not independent confirmation
Observed claims · monthly

August has the highest observed monthly count.

January–July range: 761–963 claims. August: 1,321. The series measures the collected relay posts; it is not a global incident trend.

Canonical group–victim claims
Observed monthHighest observed month† Sampled week · * Partial month
† July includes a sampled week. * October ends on 27 October. No extrapolation. Recruitment timing does not establish that an ad caused later claims. Source: Brandefense Blackhole, 1 Jan–27 Oct 2026. Claims, not confirmed breaches. Coverage varies; the series is not a global incident census.
Download monthly dataCSV · 324 BOriginal chartSVG · 99.8 KB
+View as table
Month (2026)ClaimsActive groupsNote
Jan78458
Feb79360
Mar96362
Apr84460
May76163
Jun82069
Jul87466sampled week
Aug1,32192
Sep95485
Oct1,08985partial month
02The advertised business

The Locker Is Only Part Of The Offer.

The posts describe recruitment, tools, negotiation and publication as separate services. These are seller statements from selected posts, not verified purchases or estimates of the whole market.

01 · Recruit 70–95% Advertised partner shares in six programme ads
02 · Equip $50 One advertised builder with decryptor and web panel; no currency named
03 · Negotiate $100 setup One hosted portal offer; $30 monthly is separate

The underground review uses 60 retained catalogue items from a keyword-led selection; some items combine multiple posts or threads.

04From observation to decision

What Should Change In A Defender’s Workflow?

Our interpretation follows the evidence. It does not promise a fixed warning window or establish when a compromise began.

  1. Treat a claim as a verification trigger.

    Preserve the observation time, validate it against internal evidence, and involve incident response. Multiple relays can repeat the same allegation.

    Evidence85.4% of claims appeared in more than one relay.
  2. Track the persistent groups and their services.

    Prioritise relevant group activity, advertised access requirements and negotiation patterns. Keep observed activity separate from a seller’s claimed capability.

    Evidence33 groups produced 64.7% of this collection’s claims.
  3. Bring earlier public signals into the same record.

    Pair vulnerability and exploitation notices with exposure checks and response ownership. A public advisory and a relayed claim need an event-level join before their dates can define an incident interval.

    Evidenceclaim timing measures first relay observation; it does not identify compromise.
Read the evidence and decision checklist →
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05 / From research to monitoring

From Research To Monitoring.

06Method & limits

Every Number Has A Boundary.

Source
Brandefense Blackhole.
Period
1 January–27 October 2026, UTC.
Version
1.3.
Read the full methodology →HTML · 10.3 KB

One canonical group–victim pair, assigned to its first UTC appearance in the collected relay posts. Aliases are merged before de-duplication. We removed 171 duplicate pairs and excluded 190 claims attributed to 0APT.

Victim names, contact handles and illicit service links are omitted.

07The research, ready to inspect

Read It. Check It. Use The Evidence.

Original aggregate data and chart assets: CC BY 4.0. Retain the source, period and limitations when reusing them.

31 October 2026 · Brandefense Research Team · Brandefense Blackhole data · Prepared by Claude Opus 5.5, checked by Codex Astra and approved by Brandefense analysts.