APT Groups. Who, How And Why.
An APT group is a team of attackers that goes after chosen targets for months or years, usually for a state. Each profile says who attributes the group, what it targets and when it was last reported.
Every Group. Attributed By A Named Source.
56 of 56 shownLatest report is the newest dated source that describes the group’s activity, in each profile or in our news coverage where the profile has not caught up, as read on 11 November 2026. Sector tags sum up the targets each profile lists. A group with no recent report may still be active.
What Is An APT Group? A Working Definition.
An APT group is a team of attackers that goes after chosen targets for months or years, most often on behalf of a state. APT stands for advanced persistent threat. NIST describes it as an adversary with “sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources” that pursues its objectives “repeatedly over an extended period of time”.
MITRE ATT&CK, the catalogue most security teams map their detections to, calls groups “activity clusters that are tracked by a common name in the security community”. It listed 182 of them on 10 November 2026. The list above profiles state-backed groups, plus long-running criminal groups such as FIN7 and ShinyHunters that defenders track the same way.
For the longer definition and the history of the term, see the glossary entry advanced persistent threat (APT).
- Advanced
It can build or buy what a target needs, up to unpatched flaws. Google Threat Intelligence Group ties zero-day use of CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support, from late August 2026, to ARMORY CASTLE. Advanced does not mean every tool is new: government advisories list password guessing and phishing as the main ways in for APT28.
- Persistent
It plans to stay. US agencies describe Volt Typhoon as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks, so that it can disrupt operations in a crisis. Turla has been active since at least 2004, per MITRE ATT&CK.
- A threat with a mission
Its tasks come from a state. APT29 collects intelligence for Russia’s SVR, and Sandworm runs destructive attacks for the GRU. APT38 steals money for North Korea: the US Department of Justice ties it to four cryptocurrency heists in 2023.
| Type | Who directs it | Main goal | What you tend to see | Examples in this list |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State APT group. | An intelligence or military service, or contractors it hires. | Espionage, sabotage and sometimes revenue. | Quiet, long access through edge devices, email and cloud accounts. | APT29, Volt Typhoon, Kimsuky. |
| Criminal group. | Its own members and affiliates. | Money from ransom, extortion or fraud. | Fast theft, leak-site threats and help-desk tricks. | FIN7, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters. |
| Hacktivist persona. | A cause, or a state that uses the persona as a front. | Publicity, disruption and leaks. | Claims on Telegram, defaced screens and posted personal data. | CyberAv3ngers, Handala. |
Personas blur the line. US agencies tie CyberAv3ngers to the Cyber Electronic Command of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US Department of Justice says the Handala domains were controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
In the hacktivism chapter of our Cybercrime Report 2026, Brandefense Blackhole counted 564 collected posts matching the word “handala” in March 2026, up from 21 in February. March was the month the persona claimed a destructive attack on a US medical technology firm. The report warns that the word is ambiguous and that a post count is not an attack count.
The ways in vary by group: phishing and password guessing for APT28, a zero-day in remote support software for ARMORY CASTLE, routers for Volt Typhoon. For how these groups break in and stay hidden, see our analysis of APT group tactics.
APT Groups By Country. Who Backs Them.
Four states account for most of the groups in this list: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Each origin is the one a named source states, such as a government advisory, an indictment or MITRE ATT&CK. Where no source states one, the group is listed as not attributed. The origin filter in the list above always shows the groups for each country as they stand today.
| Origin | Services and units named | Groups in this list | What they mostly go after |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia. | GRU military intelligence (units 26165, 74455 and 29155), SVR foreign intelligence, FSB Centers 16 and 18. | APT28, APT29, Sandworm, Turla, Gamaredon, Star Blizzard, Ember Bear, Dragonfly, LAUNDRY BEAR; criminal: Wizard Spider, Indrik Spider. | Governments, defense and NATO members, Ukraine, energy networks and network devices. |
| China, plus one suspected. | Ministry of State Security and its Hainan, Hubei, Tianjin and Shanghai bureaus, PLA Unit 61398 and named contractors. | APT1, APT19, APT27, APT30, APT31, APT40, APT41, BlackTech, HAFNIUM, menuPass, Mustang Panda, Salt Typhoon, VAPOR PANDA, Volt Typhoon; suspected: ARMORY CASTLE. | Telecoms, governments and parliaments, defense and research, journalists, edge devices and critical infrastructure. |
| Iran. | Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). | APT33, APT34, APT35, APT39, APT42, CyberAv3ngers, Handala, MuddyWater. | Israel and the Gulf, dissidents and journalists, and industrial controllers. |
| North Korea. | Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), including its 3rd Bureau and its 63rd Research Center. | Andariel, APT37, APT38, Kimsuky, Lazarus Group. | Cryptocurrency and banks, defense secrets, think tanks and South Korea. |
| India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan. | No agency named: MITRE ATT&CK or researchers call the origin suspected. | SideWinder (India), APT36 (Pakistan), APT32 (Vietnam), Silent Lynx (Kazakhstan, suspected). | Governments, militaries and diplomats in their own region. |
| Not attributed. | No state sponsor named in the profile (criminal groups may have a stated base, such as LAPSUS$ in the UK and Brazil). | APT-C-60, APT18, BITTER, MirrorFace, UNC3886, k0t; criminal: FIN7, LAPSUS$, Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, TA505, TeamPCP. | Varies by group. |
Not attributed does not mean unknown. Japan’s National Police Agency suspects Chinese involvement in MirrorFace, and MITRE ATT&CK calls UNC3886 China-nexus. Open each profile for the exact wording.
Russian APT Groups. Three Services, Named Units.
Russia’s three intelligence services each run their own groups. The GRU is military intelligence, the SVR is foreign intelligence and the FSB is the security service. Governments have named the unit behind most of the Russian state groups in this list.
| Group | Service and unit | Named by | Also known as | Known for | Latest report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| APT28. | GRU, 85th Main Special Service Center (unit 26165). | US, UK, EU and Czech governments. | Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy. | Password spraying and phishing against governments, militaries, parties and logistics firms. | Oct 2026, Symantec. |
| Sandworm. | GRU Unit 74455 (GTsST). | US, UK and EU governments. | Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, APT44. | Power grid attacks in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, and NotPetya in 2017. | Dec 2023, UK government. |
| Ember Bear. | GRU 161st Specialist Training Center (unit 29155). | US, UK, EU and Estonian governments. | Cadet Blizzard, UAC-0056. | Spying, leaks and wiping data, aimed at Ukraine and those who aid it. | Sep 2024, joint advisory. |
| APT29. | SVR foreign intelligence. | US and UK governments. | Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM. | The 2020 SolarWinds Orion compromise, then a move to cloud access. | Nov 2026, Sekoia. |
| Turla. | FSB Center 16 (per CISA and the EU). | US, UK and EU. | Venomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, Snake. | The Snake implant and victims in over 50 countries. | Jul 2026, EU statement. |
| Dragonfly. | FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330). | US and UK governments. | Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear, Ghost Blizzard. | Energy and industrial control system firms, and weak routers. | Jul 2026, joint advisory. |
| Star Blizzard. | FSB Center 18. | UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments. | SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER, Callisto Group. | Patient email phishing of politicians, researchers and journalists. | Oct 2024, US Department of Justice. |
| Gamaredon. | FSB Center 18, with officers of the FSB office in Crimea. | Ukraine’s Security Service (SSU). | Primitive Bear, Aqua Blizzard, Armageddon. | Emails with Office files or archives sent to Ukrainian state bodies. | Sep 2025, CERT-EU. |
| LAUNDRY BEAR. | Russian state-supported; no agency named. | Dutch AIVD and MIVD, then US, UK, Canadian and allied agencies. | Void Blizzard. | A Zimbra webmail attack that took 90 days of mail without a click. | Jul 2026, joint advisory. |
| Wizard Spider. | Russia-based criminal group. | US Department of Justice and Treasury, UK government, Germany’s BKA. | Trickbot group, Grim Spider, UNC1878. | The Trickbot malware and the Ryuk and Conti ransomware. | Sep 2023, US Department of Justice. |
| Indrik Spider. | Russia-based criminal group. | MITRE ATT&CK, US Treasury and Department of Justice, UK government. | Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest. | The Dridex banking malware, later ransomware. | Oct 2024, UK government. |
Among the Russian groups here, the destructive attacks trace to GRU units: Sandworm’s grid attacks and Ember Bear’s wipers. The US charged GRU officers over the 2016 US election hacks. The FSB groups lean to espionage: Turla against governments and embassies, Star Blizzard against inboxes and Dragonfly against energy networks.
Organizations that support Ukraine, run energy networks or hold government and defense data in NATO countries come up again and again in these target lists. If that is you, read APT28, Sandworm and Star Blizzard first.
Why One Group Has Many Names. A Name Key.
Each security company names the activity it tracks in its own way, so one group can carry ten names. MITRE ATT&CK says so itself: some groups have several names because different organizations track similar activity under different names. The names also carry hints about origin.
| Scheme | How it works | Example |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK. | A G number for each group, plus the other names it has seen used. | G0007 is APT28. |
| Mandiant (Google). | APT and FIN numbers for classified groups, UNC for a cluster not yet classified; an UNC can later “graduate” into a named group. | UNC902 became FIN11; ARMORY CASTLE was tracked as UNC5221. |
| Microsoft. | A weather family for each origin or motive: Blizzard is Russia, Typhoon China, Sandstorm Iran and Sleet North Korea; Tempest is financial crime and Storm-#### a group still in development. | Forest Blizzard is APT28. |
| CrowdStrike. | An animal for each origin or motive: Bear for Russia, Panda for China, Kitten for Iran and Chollima for North Korea; Spider marks eCrime. | Fancy Bear is APT28. |
The same group under each scheme, for the names asked about most:
| Group | MITRE ID | Weather name (Microsoft) | Animal name | Other names |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| APT28. | G0007. | Forest Blizzard. | Fancy Bear. | Sofacy, Sednit, Pawn Storm. |
| APT29. | G0016. | Midnight Blizzard. | Cozy Bear. | NOBELIUM, UNC2452, The Dukes. |
| Sandworm. | G0034. | Seashell Blizzard. | Voodoo Bear. | APT44, IRIDIUM, Telebots. |
| Turla. | G0010. | Secret Blizzard. | Venomous Bear. | Snake, Waterbug, Krypton. |
| APT41. | G0096. | Brass Typhoon. | Wicked Panda. | BARIUM. |
| Volt Typhoon. | G1017. | Volt Typhoon. | Vanguard Panda. | BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Voltzite. |
| APT35. | G0059. | Mint Sandstorm. | Charming Kitten. | Magic Hound, Phosphorus. |
| Lazarus Group. | G0032. | Diamond Sleet. | Labyrinth Chollima. | HIDDEN COBRA, ZINC. |
| Kimsuky. | G0094. | Emerald Sleet. | Velvet Chollima. | APT43, THALLIUM. |
Microsoft publishes its full name key, with other vendors’ names, as a JSON file and gives a query to load it in Microsoft Defender XDR. Our threat actor dataset on GitHub lists the names each of our profiles uses.
Reported Most Recently. Newest Dated Reports First.
These groups have a dated report since August 2026, in their profiles or in our news coverage, newest first. A date shows when a source described the activity, not when the group stopped.
| Group | Date | Reported by | What the report describes |
|---|---|---|---|
| APT29. | 4 Nov 2026. | Sekoia. | A mobile watering hole against iPhone and Android users, found in mid-October 2026 (our analysis). |
| BITTER. | 2 Nov 2026. | FortiGuard Labs. | Diplomatic lures that install the PapRAT and WmRAT remote access trojans. |
| VAPOR PANDA. | 29 Oct 2026. | CrowdStrike. | The ARTEX agentic AI framework used against more than 200 targets, with nine confirmed intrusions. |
| Volt Typhoon. | 28 Oct 2026. | Lumen Black Lotus Labs. | Silent Train, a covert relay network of hacked routers and other devices. |
| Lazarus Group. | 21 Oct 2026. | Kaspersky. | Operation FlashHole against software, construction and communication equipment firms in South Korea. |
| k0t. | 21 Oct 2026. | Group-IB and NyxLab. | FortiGate and GlobalProtect compromises, many dated February to June 2026. |
| APT28. | 20 Oct 2026. | Symantec. | HOOKEDGE intrusions at a law enforcement agency, a naval shipbuilder and an aircraft engine maker in two NATO countries. |
| ARMORY CASTLE. | 15 Oct 2026. | Google Threat Intelligence Group. | Zero-day use of CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support. |
| Silent Lynx. | 14 Oct 2026. | Cisco Talos and Recorded Future. | Campaigns against governments and diplomats in Central Asia, with activity through August 2026. |
| ShinyHunters. | 29 Sep 2026. | FBI and Dutch National Police. | An arrest in Amsterdam; the FBI counts more than 140 organizations breached since 2025. |
| Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters. | 25 Sep 2026. | Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group. | A renewed wave of Oracle PeopleSoft attacks by UNC6240, the ShinyHunters-branded cluster, with a firewall bypass and web shells on dozens of systems in several sectors. |
| APT31. | 9 Sep 2026. | Proofpoint. | First use of the BlueMoon exploit kit, a chain of Chrome and Windows zero-days, seen from 28 August 2026 in emails to US non-governmental organizations, mining and commodity trading firms. |
| TeamPCP. | 27 Aug 2026. | Australian Federal Police and US Department of Justice. | Arrests and charges over supply chain compromises of widely used developer and security tools. |
Several of these reports concern internet-facing systems: FortiGate and GlobalProtect for k0t, BeyondTrust Remote Support for ARMORY CASTLE, routers for Volt Typhoon and Oracle PeopleSoft for the ShinyHunters-branded cluster. Patch and watch those first. A group missing from this table may still be active; use Sort by in the list above to see every group by its latest report.
How To Use This List. Five Steps For A Security Team.
- Filter by your sector and region.
Pick your sector in the list above and read the targets in each profile. Germany’s BSI publishes its own list of groups active against German targets, so that teams can “prioritize their own threat intelligence research”.
- Map their techniques to your detections.
Each profile lists MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs. MITRE also offers a layer file for each group in the ATT&CK Navigator: the APT28 layer (G0007) holds 139 technique entries. Load it next to your own coverage layer and look for gaps.
- Patch what they exploit first.
Profiles name the flaws each group used, such as CVE-2023-23397 in Outlook for APT28 and CVE-2025-66376 in Zimbra for LAUNDRY BEAR. Check each one against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and your own asset list.
- Hunt for the behaviour in the advisories.
Government advisories such as AA24-207A on Andariel and AA26-204A on LAUNDRY BEAR describe the techniques and give fixes. Search your logs for that behaviour over the period each advisory covers.
- Watch the signs outside your network.
Many of these groups start with a stolen password or a look-alike login page. Watch for leaked credentials for your domains and for new domains that imitate your sign-in pages; the APT28 profile gives both as defenses.
Our open dataset on GitHub holds the profiles as CSV, JSON and STIX 2.1, under the CC BY 4.0 license. These commands download it, print the Russian groups with their MITRE IDs, find a group by any of its names and fetch the APT28 layer for the ATT&CK Navigator.
curl -sL -o apt-groups.csv https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BRANDEFENSE/threat-actor-dataset/main/data/apt-groups.csv
python3 -c "import csv; [print(r['name'], r['mitre_attack_id'], sep=' | ') for r in csv.DictReader(open('apt-groups.csv')) if r['suspected_origin'] == 'Russia']"
python3 -c "import csv, sys; q = sys.argv[1].lower(); [print(r['name'], r['url']) for r in csv.DictReader(open('apt-groups.csv')) if q in r['aliases'].lower()]" "forest blizzard"
curl -sL -o G0007-layer.json https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/G0007-enterprise-layer.jsonThe dataset is rebuilt from the profiles, so it carries the same names, origins and sources; a profile published in the last days may not be in it yet. Inside the platform, Brandefense Threat Actor Landscape keeps profiles like these current and tracks active campaigns aligned to your industry and region, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.
Questions. Short Answers.
What are APT groups?
APT groups are teams of attackers that target chosen organizations for months or years, most often for a state’s intelligence or military services. APT stands for advanced persistent threat. Security companies and governments track each group by its tools, targets and infrastructure.
How many APT groups are there?
There is no single count. MITRE ATT&CK listed 182 groups on 10 November 2026, and each security company tracks its own set. The count above the list shows how many profiles we hold today; each profile names its sources.
Which APT groups are Russian?
In this list, APT28, Sandworm and Ember Bear are tied to the GRU, and APT29 to the SVR. Turla, Dragonfly, Star Blizzard and Gamaredon are tied to the FSB. No source names an agency for LAUNDRY BEAR, and Wizard Spider and Indrik Spider are Russia-based criminal groups.
What is the most dangerous APT group?
It depends on who you are. A telecom operator should look first at Salt Typhoon, a water utility at CyberAv3ngers and Volt Typhoon, and a crypto exchange at APT38 and Lazarus Group. Filter the list by your sector to see the groups whose profiles name it.
Why do APT groups have so many names?
Each security company names the activity it tracks in its own way, and MITRE ATT&CK records the overlaps. APT28, for example, is Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy and Sednit in other reports. The name key above shows the main schemes.
Are all APT groups state-sponsored?
No. The term is used mostly for state-backed groups, but some criminal groups work the same way for years. This list includes FIN7, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters and their alleged alliance Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters. The Not Attributed filter shows every group whose profile names no state sponsor.
How do I know if an APT group is targeting my organization?
Match the groups that hit your sector and region against your own logs: their techniques, the flaws they exploit and their known infrastructure. Outside your network, watch for leaked credentials and look-alike domains, which many of these groups use first.
- NIST CSRC Glossary: advanced persistent threat.
- MITRE ATT&CK: Groups (content v20.1).
- Microsoft: How Microsoft names threat actors.
- CrowdStrike: Adversary Universe.
- Mandiant: How Mandiant tracks uncategorized threat actors.
- BSI: Active APT groups in Germany.
- Brandefense: threat actor dataset (GitHub).
- Brandefense Cybercrime Report 2026: Hacktivism and DDoS.
Facts about each group come from its profile and the sources listed there.
More In The Library.
Counts as of 17 November 2026
Stay Ahead Of Digital Threats.
Take control of your digital security with an exclusive demo of our AI-driven threat intelligence platform.