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Threat Library

APT Groups. Who, How And Why.

An APT group is a team of attackers that goes after chosen targets for months or years, usually for a state. Each profile says who attributes the group, what it targets and when it was last reported.

56Groups
01Groups

Every Group. Attributed By A Named Source.

56 of 56 shown
Origin
GroupWho says whatOrigin · Active since
Andariel Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Andariel is described in a July 2024 joint advisory as stealing defense, aerospace and nuclear secrets and funding that work with ransomware against US healthcare. DefenseHealthcareGovernmentFinance and crypto Attributed to North Korea Active since 2009 Latest report Jul 2024 APT-C-60 APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. Not Attributed Latest report Jul 2026 APT1 Comment Crew, Comment Panda, Comment Group Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. EnergyManufacturing Attributed to China Active since 2006 Latest report May 2014 APT18 APT18 (MITRE G0026) is described by MITRE ATT&CK as a threat group active since at least 2009, with targets in technology, manufacturing, government and medical sectors. TechnologyManufacturingGovernmentHealthcareMedia and civil society Not Attributed Active since 2009 APT19 MITRE ATT&CK describes APT19 (also Codoso) as a Chinese-based group that has targeted defense, finance, legal and other industries, with activity reported in 2014 and 2017. DefenseFinance and cryptoEnergyHealthcareTelecoms Attributed to China Latest report 2017 APT27 Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK and by the US Department of Justice (5 March 2025) to a Chinese group, also called Threat Group-3390 and Emissary Panda, that targets governments and companies. GovernmentDefenseTechnologyEnergyManufacturing Attributed to China Active since 2010 Latest report Mar 2025 APT28 Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy The US, UK, EU and other governments attribute APT28 to Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, specifically its 85th Main Special Service Center (military unit 26165). EspionageInfluence operationsGovernmentDefenseMedia and civil society Attributed to Russia Active since 2004 Latest report Oct 2026 APT29 Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM The US, UK and other governments have attributed APT29 to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). EspionageGovernmentResearch and think tanksTechnologyHealthcare Attributed to Russia Active since 2008 Latest report Nov 2026 APT30 APT30 is an espionage group attributed by FireEye in 2015 to a state sponsor, most likely the Chinese government. EspionageGovernmentMedia and civil societyDefenseFinance and crypto Attributed to China Active since 2005 Latest report Feb 2023 APT31 (Violet Typhoon, Judgment Panda) APT31 is a China-based espionage group attributed by the US and UK governments to China's Ministry of State Security. EspionageGovernmentDefenseEnergyTechnology Attributed to China Active since 2010 Latest report Sep 2026 APT32 MITRE ATT&CK describes APT32 (OceanLotus) as a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014 that targets governments, dissidents, journalists and companies, mainly in Southeast Asia. GovernmentMedia and civil societyTechnology Attributed to Vietnam Active since 2014 Latest report Jan 2025 APT33 MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, with a particular interest in aviation and energy in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. EnergyTransport Attributed to Iran Active since 2013 Latest report Mar 2024 APT34 MITRE ATT&CK describes OilRig, also tracked as APT34, as a suspected Iranian group working on behalf of the Iranian government since at least 2014, and the UAE Cyber Security Council issued advisories on it in October and December 2024. GovernmentEnergyFinance and cryptoTelecomsTechnology Attributed to Iran Active since 2014 Latest report Dec 2024 APT35 MITRE ATT&CK describes APT35, also called Charming Kitten or Magic Hound, as an Iranian-sponsored espionage group likely working for the IRGC, and the UK NCSC and Germany's BfV describe its spear-phishing of academics, journalists, NGOs and critics of Iran. GovernmentDefenseResearch and think tanksMedia and civil societyHealthcare Attributed to Iran Active since 2014 Latest report Nov 2025 APT36 Transparent Tribe, Mythic Leopard, ProjectM MITRE ATT&CK describes Transparent Tribe, also called APT36, as a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013. GovernmentDefenseResearch and think tanks Attributed to Pakistan Active since 2013 Latest report Jul 2022 APT37 ScarCruft, InkySquid MITRE ATT&CK describes APT37, also called ScarCruft, as a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. GovernmentDefenseResearch and think tanksMedia and civil society Attributed to North Korea Active since 2012 Latest report Jan 2024 APT38 Bluenoroff, Stardust Chollima, NICKEL GLADSTONE APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored group focused on financial theft, attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau. Finance and crypto Attributed to North Korea Active since 2014 Latest report Nov 2025 APT39 Chafer, ITG07, Remix Kitten The US Treasury, FBI and Department of Justice attributed APT39, also called Chafer, to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), working through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing Company, in September 2020. TransportTelecomsResearch and think tanksMedia and civil societyGovernment Attributed to Iran Active since 2014 Latest report Sep 2022 APT40 Leviathan, Kryptonite Panda, Gingham Typhoon APT40 (tracked by MITRE as Leviathan) is attributed by the US and UK governments (2021) and by agencies in eight countries (2024) to China's Ministry of State Security. DefenseGovernmentResearch and think tanksHealthcareTransport Attributed to China Active since 2009 Latest report Jul 2024 APT41 Wicked Panda, Brass Typhoon, BARIUM MITRE describes APT41 as a Chinese state-sponsored espionage group, as researchers have assessed it, that also runs financially motivated operations. EspionageFinancial gainTechnologyTelecomsHealthcare Attributed to China Active since 2012 Latest report Early 2026 APT42 MITRE ATT&CK describes APT42 as an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance, active since at least 2015. Research and think tanksDefenseGovernmentMedia and civil society Attributed to Iran Active since 2015 Latest report Nov 2025 ARMORY CASTLE UNC5221 Google Threat Intelligence Group attributes the zero-day exploitation of BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764), which it dates to late August 2026, to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected China-linked spying group it formerly tracked as UNC5221. EspionageTechnology Attributed to China (suspected) Latest report Oct 2026 BITTER T-APT-17 MITRE ATT&CK describes BITTER as a suspected South Asian cyber espionage group, active since at least 2013, that has targeted government, energy and engineering organizations in Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. EspionageGovernmentEnergyMedia and civil society Not Attributed Active since 2013 Latest report Nov 2026 BlackTech Palmerworm, Temp.Overboard, Circuit Panda Attributed by the US and Japanese governments (joint advisory, 27 September 2023) to cyber actors linked to the People's Republic of China, BlackTech is described as targeting government, technology, media, electronics and telecommunication organizations in East Asia and the US. EspionageGovernmentDefenseMedia and civil societyManufacturing Attributed to China Active since 2010 Latest report Sep 2023 CyberAv3ngers Shahid Kaveh Group CyberAv3ngers (also called Shahid Kaveh Group in a 2026 advisory) is attributed by US, Israeli, Canadian and UK agencies to the Iranian IRGC, and is tied to defacing internet-exposed industrial controllers at US water facilities from November 2023. Critical infrastructureEnergy Attributed to Iran Active since 2020 Latest report Dec 2024 Dragonfly Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear, Crouching Yeti Attributed by the US and UK governments to Russia's FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330), this group is tied to supply chain, phishing and website attacks on energy and industrial control system companies, and to the abuse of weak routers. EnergyCritical infrastructureGovernmentDefenseManufacturing Attributed to Russia Active since 2010 Latest report Jul 2026 Ember Bear Cadet Blizzard, UAC-0056, Bleeding Bear The US, UK, EU and Estonian governments attribute this activity to GRU Unit 29155, a Russian military intelligence unit, and MITRE tracks it as Ember Bear. Critical infrastructureTechnologyGovernmentDefenseResearch and think tanks Attributed to Russia Active since 2020 Latest report Sep 2024 FIN7 Carbon Spider, Sangria Tempest, GOLD NIAGARA Attributed by the US Department of Justice to a financially motivated criminal conspiracy of dozens of computer specialists, FIN7 is described in US court papers as stealing tens of millions of payment card records from US businesses, and the FBI has warned about its mailed USB devices used to deliver ransomware. Retail and hospitalityTransportFinance and cryptoDefense Not Attributed Active since 2013 Latest report Jan 2022 Gamaredon Attributed by Ukraine's Security Service (SSU, 2021) to Russia's FSB, and described by MITRE ATT&CK as a suspected Russian group that has targeted Ukrainian organizations since at least 2013. GovernmentDefenseCritical infrastructureMedia and civil society Attributed to Russia Active since 2013 Latest report Sep 2025 HAFNIUM Silk Typhoon HAFNIUM is Microsoft's name for the actor behind the 2021 Exchange Server attacks. EspionageHealthcareResearch and think tanksDefenseMedia and civil society Attributed to China Active since 2021 Latest report Jul 2025 Handala Handala Hack is a persona that MITRE ATT&CK lists under VOID MANTICORE (G1055). GovernmentCritical infrastructureHealthcareDefenseMedia and civil society Attributed to Iran Active since 2022 Latest report Mar 2026 Indrik Spider Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to a Russia-based criminal group, which it also lists as Evil Corp. Finance and cryptoHealthcareGovernmentCritical infrastructureManufacturing Attributed to Russia Active since 2014 Latest report Oct 2024 k0t k0t is a threat actor that Group-IB and NyxLab, in a joint report of 21 October 2026, describe as likely one of the main operators of a large campaign. Not Attributed Latest report Oct 2026 Kimsuky Attributed by the US and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Kimsuky sends convincing fake emails to think tanks, researchers, media and government staff to steal documents and email. Research and think tanksGovernmentMedia and civil societyFinance and cryptoManufacturing Attributed to North Korea Active since 2012 Latest report Jan 2026 LAPSUS$ DEV-0537, Strawberry Tempest, Lapsus Group The US Cyber Safety Review Board describes Lapsus$ as a loosely organized, extortion-focused criminal group based mainly in the United Kingdom and Brazil, and UK and Brazilian police have made arrests in cases linked to it. TelecomsTechnologyGovernmentHealthcareEnergy Not Attributed Active since 2021 Latest report Aug 2023 LAUNDRY BEAR Attributed by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD (2025) and by US, UK, Canadian and other allied agencies (July 2026) to Russian state-supported actors, LAUNDRY BEAR steals email from government, defense and technology bodies. DefenseGovernmentTechnologyMedia and civil societyEnergy Attributed to Russia Active since 2024 Latest report Jul 2026 Lazarus Group HIDDEN COBRA, Diamond Sleet, ZINC Lazarus Group is the name used by MITRE, the US Treasury and the US Department of Justice for North Korean hacking units. EspionageSabotageFinance and cryptoDefenseEnergy Attributed to North Korea Active since 2009 Latest report Oct 2026 menuPass APT10, Stone Panda, Red Apollo Attributed by the US, UK and EU governments to a China-based group working with the Ministry of State Security, menuPass (APT10) is known for reaching companies through their managed service providers. TechnologyDefenseGovernmentFinance and cryptoHealthcare Attributed to China Active since 2006 Latest report Oct 2020 MirrorFace Earth Kasha Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC (8 January 2025) describe MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) as an organized group with suspected Chinese involvement. EspionageResearch and think tanksGovernmentMedia and civil societyManufacturing Not Attributed Active since 2019 Latest report Jan 2025 MuddyWater MITRE ATT&CK, the FBI, CISA, NCSC-UK and the US Treasury attribute this group to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). TelecomsDefenseGovernmentEnergyFinance and crypto Attributed to Iran Active since 2017 Latest report Early 2026 Mustang Panda MITRE ATT&CK describes Mustang Panda as a China-based cyber espionage threat actor, and the US Department of Justice, citing court documents, says the PRC government paid the group to develop a version of PlugX. GovernmentResearch and think tanksMedia and civil societyTransportFinance and crypto Attributed to China Active since 2012 Latest report Jul 2026 Salt Typhoon MITRE ATT&CK attributes Salt Typhoon to the PRC state and says it has been active since at least 2019. TelecomsGovernmentTransportDefenseRetail and hospitality Attributed to China Active since 2019 Latest report Aug 2025 Sandworm Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUM The US, UK and EU governments attribute this group to Russian military intelligence (GRU Unit 74455). EspionageSabotageEnergyGovernmentCritical infrastructure Attributed to Russia Active since 2009 Latest report Dec 2023 Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters Europol describes Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLSH) as an alleged alliance of the Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters and LAPSUS$ collectives, first seen in August 2025. Financial gainTechnologyFinance and cryptoRetail and hospitalityHealthcare Not Attributed Active since August 2025 Latest report Sep 2026 Scattered Spider Scattered Spider is described by MITRE ATT&CK and by the FBI, CISA and partner agencies as a cybercriminal group that targets large companies and their IT help desks, mainly by tricking staff into resetting passwords and MFA. TelecomsTechnologyRetail and hospitalityFinance and cryptoHealthcare Not Attributed Active since 2022 Latest report Jul 2025 ShinyHunters The FBI describes ShinyHunters as a cyber criminal group that specializes in large-scale data breaches and extortion, and Europol describes a coalition of it with Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ called Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLSH). TechnologyFinance and cryptoRetail and hospitalityResearch and think tanks Not Attributed Active since 2019 Latest report Sep 2026 SideWinder MITRE ATT&CK describes SideWinder as a suspected Indian threat actor group active since at least 2012. GovernmentDefenseTransportTelecoms Attributed to India Active since 2012 Latest report Jul 2026 Silent Lynx Silent Lynx is a cyber espionage group that targets government bodies in Central Asia and nearby countries. Cisco Talos, which tracks it as UAT-6275, assesses with medium confidence that it has a Kazakhstan nexus. EspionageGovernmentEnergyCritical infrastructureTransport Attributed to Kazakhstan (suspected) Latest report Oct 2026 Star Blizzard SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER, Callisto Group The UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments attribute this group to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18. Research and think tanksDefenseGovernmentMedia and civil societyEnergy Attributed to Russia Active since 2019 Latest report Oct 2024 TA505 Hive0065, Spandex Tempest, CHIMBORAZO CISA and the FBI say, "according to open source information", that the CL0P ransomware gang is also known as TA505, and MITRE ATT&CK describes TA505 as a cyber criminal group active since at least 2014. TechnologyGovernmentFinance and cryptoResearch and think tanksCritical infrastructure Not Attributed Active since 2014 Latest report Jul 2023 TeamPCP PCPCat, DeadCatx3, ShellForce The US FBI (July 2026) describes TeamPCP as a cyber criminal group behind large-scale software supply chain compromises of widely used developer and security tools. TechnologyGovernment Not Attributed Active since 2025 Latest report Aug 2026 Turla Venomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, Snake Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to Russia's FSB, Turla has run espionage against governments, embassies and the military since at least 2004. EspionageGovernmentDefenseResearch and think tanksHealthcare Attributed to Russia Active since 2004 Latest report Jul 2026 UNC3886 Singapore's cyber agency (CSA) calls UNC3886 a state-sponsored group without naming a state, and MITRE ATT&CK describes it as China-nexus, in entries dated 2025 and 2026. EspionageTelecomsCritical infrastructureDefenseTechnology Not Attributed Active since late 2021 Latest report Jun 2026 VAPOR PANDA CrowdStrike tracks VAPOR PANDA as a China-based, state-sponsored targeted intrusion adversary and first saw it in February 2021. EspionageGovernmentResearch and think tanksEnergyDefense Attributed to China Latest report Oct 2026 Volt Typhoon Vanguard Panda, Voltzite, Insidious Taurus Attributed by the US government and its Five Eyes partners to a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor, Volt Typhoon is described in US advisories as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks to be able to disrupt operations in a crisis. TelecomsEnergyTransportCritical infrastructureTechnology Attributed to China Active since 2021 Latest report Oct 2026 Wizard Spider UNC1878, Grim Spider, GOLD BLACKBURN Wizard Spider is a Russia-based criminal group behind the Trickbot malware, attributed by the US Department of Justice and Treasury, the UK government and Germany's BKA. HealthcareGovernmentFinance and cryptoResearch and think tanksCritical infrastructure Attributed to Russia Active since 2016 Latest report Sep 2023

Latest report is the newest dated source that describes the group’s activity, in each profile or in our news coverage where the profile has not caught up, as read on 11 November 2026. Sector tags sum up the targets each profile lists. A group with no recent report may still be active.

02Definition

What Is An APT Group? A Working Definition.

An APT group is a team of attackers that goes after chosen targets for months or years, most often on behalf of a state. APT stands for advanced persistent threat. NIST describes it as an adversary with “sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources” that pursues its objectives “repeatedly over an extended period of time”.

MITRE ATT&CK, the catalogue most security teams map their detections to, calls groups “activity clusters that are tracked by a common name in the security community”. It listed 182 of them on 10 November 2026. The list above profiles state-backed groups, plus long-running criminal groups such as FIN7 and ShinyHunters that defenders track the same way.

For the longer definition and the history of the term, see the glossary entry advanced persistent threat (APT).

  • Advanced

    It can build or buy what a target needs, up to unpatched flaws. Google Threat Intelligence Group ties zero-day use of CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support, from late August 2026, to ARMORY CASTLE. Advanced does not mean every tool is new: government advisories list password guessing and phishing as the main ways in for APT28.

  • Persistent

    It plans to stay. US agencies describe Volt Typhoon as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks, so that it can disrupt operations in a crisis. Turla has been active since at least 2004, per MITRE ATT&CK.

  • A threat with a mission

    Its tasks come from a state. APT29 collects intelligence for Russia’s SVR, and Sandworm runs destructive attacks for the GRU. APT38 steals money for North Korea: the US Department of Justice ties it to four cryptocurrency heists in 2023.

APT group, criminal group or hacktivist?
TypeWho directs itMain goalWhat you tend to seeExamples in this list
State APT group.An intelligence or military service, or contractors it hires.Espionage, sabotage and sometimes revenue.Quiet, long access through edge devices, email and cloud accounts.APT29, Volt Typhoon, Kimsuky.
Criminal group.Its own members and affiliates.Money from ransom, extortion or fraud.Fast theft, leak-site threats and help-desk tricks.FIN7, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters.
Hacktivist persona.A cause, or a state that uses the persona as a front.Publicity, disruption and leaks.Claims on Telegram, defaced screens and posted personal data.CyberAv3ngers, Handala.

Personas blur the line. US agencies tie CyberAv3ngers to the Cyber Electronic Command of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US Department of Justice says the Handala domains were controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

In the hacktivism chapter of our Cybercrime Report 2026, Brandefense Blackhole counted 564 collected posts matching the word “handala” in March 2026, up from 21 in February. March was the month the persona claimed a destructive attack on a US medical technology firm. The report warns that the word is ambiguous and that a post count is not an attack count.

The ways in vary by group: phishing and password guessing for APT28, a zero-day in remote support software for ARMORY CASTLE, routers for Volt Typhoon. For how these groups break in and stay hidden, see our analysis of APT group tactics.

03By Country

APT Groups By Country. Who Backs Them.

Four states account for most of the groups in this list: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Each origin is the one a named source states, such as a government advisory, an indictment or MITRE ATT&CK. Where no source states one, the group is listed as not attributed. The origin filter in the list above always shows the groups for each country as they stand today.

APT groups by attributed origin
OriginServices and units namedGroups in this listWhat they mostly go after
Russia.GRU military intelligence (units 26165, 74455 and 29155), SVR foreign intelligence, FSB Centers 16 and 18.APT28, APT29, Sandworm, Turla, Gamaredon, Star Blizzard, Ember Bear, Dragonfly, LAUNDRY BEAR; criminal: Wizard Spider, Indrik Spider.Governments, defense and NATO members, Ukraine, energy networks and network devices.
China, plus one suspected.Ministry of State Security and its Hainan, Hubei, Tianjin and Shanghai bureaus, PLA Unit 61398 and named contractors.APT1, APT19, APT27, APT30, APT31, APT40, APT41, BlackTech, HAFNIUM, menuPass, Mustang Panda, Salt Typhoon, VAPOR PANDA, Volt Typhoon; suspected: ARMORY CASTLE.Telecoms, governments and parliaments, defense and research, journalists, edge devices and critical infrastructure.
Iran.Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).APT33, APT34, APT35, APT39, APT42, CyberAv3ngers, Handala, MuddyWater.Israel and the Gulf, dissidents and journalists, and industrial controllers.
North Korea.Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), including its 3rd Bureau and its 63rd Research Center.Andariel, APT37, APT38, Kimsuky, Lazarus Group.Cryptocurrency and banks, defense secrets, think tanks and South Korea.
India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan.No agency named: MITRE ATT&CK or researchers call the origin suspected.SideWinder (India), APT36 (Pakistan), APT32 (Vietnam), Silent Lynx (Kazakhstan, suspected).Governments, militaries and diplomats in their own region.
Not attributed.No state sponsor named in the profile (criminal groups may have a stated base, such as LAPSUS$ in the UK and Brazil).APT-C-60, APT18, BITTER, MirrorFace, UNC3886, k0t; criminal: FIN7, LAPSUS$, Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, TA505, TeamPCP.Varies by group.

Not attributed does not mean unknown. Japan’s National Police Agency suspects Chinese involvement in MirrorFace, and MITRE ATT&CK calls UNC3886 China-nexus. Open each profile for the exact wording.

04Russia

Russian APT Groups. Three Services, Named Units.

Russia’s three intelligence services each run their own groups. The GRU is military intelligence, the SVR is foreign intelligence and the FSB is the security service. Governments have named the unit behind most of the Russian state groups in this list.

Russian APT groups in this list
GroupService and unitNamed byAlso known asKnown forLatest report
APT28.GRU, 85th Main Special Service Center (unit 26165).US, UK, EU and Czech governments.Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy.Password spraying and phishing against governments, militaries, parties and logistics firms.Oct 2026, Symantec.
Sandworm.GRU Unit 74455 (GTsST).US, UK and EU governments.Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, APT44.Power grid attacks in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, and NotPetya in 2017.Dec 2023, UK government.
Ember Bear.GRU 161st Specialist Training Center (unit 29155).US, UK, EU and Estonian governments.Cadet Blizzard, UAC-0056.Spying, leaks and wiping data, aimed at Ukraine and those who aid it.Sep 2024, joint advisory.
APT29.SVR foreign intelligence.US and UK governments.Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM.The 2020 SolarWinds Orion compromise, then a move to cloud access.Nov 2026, Sekoia.
Turla.FSB Center 16 (per CISA and the EU).US, UK and EU.Venomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, Snake.The Snake implant and victims in over 50 countries.Jul 2026, EU statement.
Dragonfly.FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330).US and UK governments.Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear, Ghost Blizzard.Energy and industrial control system firms, and weak routers.Jul 2026, joint advisory.
Star Blizzard.FSB Center 18.UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments.SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER, Callisto Group.Patient email phishing of politicians, researchers and journalists.Oct 2024, US Department of Justice.
Gamaredon.FSB Center 18, with officers of the FSB office in Crimea.Ukraine’s Security Service (SSU).Primitive Bear, Aqua Blizzard, Armageddon.Emails with Office files or archives sent to Ukrainian state bodies.Sep 2025, CERT-EU.
LAUNDRY BEAR.Russian state-supported; no agency named.Dutch AIVD and MIVD, then US, UK, Canadian and allied agencies.Void Blizzard.A Zimbra webmail attack that took 90 days of mail without a click.Jul 2026, joint advisory.
Wizard Spider.Russia-based criminal group.US Department of Justice and Treasury, UK government, Germany’s BKA.Trickbot group, Grim Spider, UNC1878.The Trickbot malware and the Ryuk and Conti ransomware.Sep 2023, US Department of Justice.
Indrik Spider.Russia-based criminal group.MITRE ATT&CK, US Treasury and Department of Justice, UK government.Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest.The Dridex banking malware, later ransomware.Oct 2024, UK government.

Among the Russian groups here, the destructive attacks trace to GRU units: Sandworm’s grid attacks and Ember Bear’s wipers. The US charged GRU officers over the 2016 US election hacks. The FSB groups lean to espionage: Turla against governments and embassies, Star Blizzard against inboxes and Dragonfly against energy networks.

Organizations that support Ukraine, run energy networks or hold government and defense data in NATO countries come up again and again in these target lists. If that is you, read APT28, Sandworm and Star Blizzard first.

05Names

Why One Group Has Many Names. A Name Key.

Each security company names the activity it tracks in its own way, so one group can carry ten names. MITRE ATT&CK says so itself: some groups have several names because different organizations track similar activity under different names. The names also carry hints about origin.

Naming schemes
SchemeHow it worksExample
MITRE ATT&CK.A G number for each group, plus the other names it has seen used.G0007 is APT28.
Mandiant (Google).APT and FIN numbers for classified groups, UNC for a cluster not yet classified; an UNC can later “graduate” into a named group.UNC902 became FIN11; ARMORY CASTLE was tracked as UNC5221.
Microsoft.A weather family for each origin or motive: Blizzard is Russia, Typhoon China, Sandstorm Iran and Sleet North Korea; Tempest is financial crime and Storm-#### a group still in development.Forest Blizzard is APT28.
CrowdStrike.An animal for each origin or motive: Bear for Russia, Panda for China, Kitten for Iran and Chollima for North Korea; Spider marks eCrime.Fancy Bear is APT28.

The same group under each scheme, for the names asked about most:

Name key for nine groups
GroupMITRE IDWeather name (Microsoft)Animal nameOther names
APT28.G0007.Forest Blizzard.Fancy Bear.Sofacy, Sednit, Pawn Storm.
APT29.G0016.Midnight Blizzard.Cozy Bear.NOBELIUM, UNC2452, The Dukes.
Sandworm.G0034.Seashell Blizzard.Voodoo Bear.APT44, IRIDIUM, Telebots.
Turla.G0010.Secret Blizzard.Venomous Bear.Snake, Waterbug, Krypton.
APT41.G0096.Brass Typhoon.Wicked Panda.BARIUM.
Volt Typhoon.G1017.Volt Typhoon.Vanguard Panda.BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Voltzite.
APT35.G0059.Mint Sandstorm.Charming Kitten.Magic Hound, Phosphorus.
Lazarus Group.G0032.Diamond Sleet.Labyrinth Chollima.HIDDEN COBRA, ZINC.
Kimsuky.G0094.Emerald Sleet.Velvet Chollima.APT43, THALLIUM.

Microsoft publishes its full name key, with other vendors’ names, as a JSON file and gives a query to load it in Microsoft Defender XDR. Our threat actor dataset on GitHub lists the names each of our profiles uses.

06Latest

Reported Most Recently. Newest Dated Reports First.

These groups have a dated report since August 2026, in their profiles or in our news coverage, newest first. A date shows when a source described the activity, not when the group stopped.

APT groups with a report since August 2026
GroupDateReported byWhat the report describes
APT29.4 Nov 2026.Sekoia.A mobile watering hole against iPhone and Android users, found in mid-October 2026 (our analysis).
BITTER.2 Nov 2026.FortiGuard Labs.Diplomatic lures that install the PapRAT and WmRAT remote access trojans.
VAPOR PANDA.29 Oct 2026.CrowdStrike.The ARTEX agentic AI framework used against more than 200 targets, with nine confirmed intrusions.
Volt Typhoon.28 Oct 2026.Lumen Black Lotus Labs.Silent Train, a covert relay network of hacked routers and other devices.
Lazarus Group.21 Oct 2026.Kaspersky.Operation FlashHole against software, construction and communication equipment firms in South Korea.
k0t.21 Oct 2026.Group-IB and NyxLab.FortiGate and GlobalProtect compromises, many dated February to June 2026.
APT28.20 Oct 2026.Symantec.HOOKEDGE intrusions at a law enforcement agency, a naval shipbuilder and an aircraft engine maker in two NATO countries.
ARMORY CASTLE.15 Oct 2026.Google Threat Intelligence Group.Zero-day use of CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support.
Silent Lynx.14 Oct 2026.Cisco Talos and Recorded Future.Campaigns against governments and diplomats in Central Asia, with activity through August 2026.
ShinyHunters.29 Sep 2026.FBI and Dutch National Police.An arrest in Amsterdam; the FBI counts more than 140 organizations breached since 2025.
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters.25 Sep 2026.Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group.A renewed wave of Oracle PeopleSoft attacks by UNC6240, the ShinyHunters-branded cluster, with a firewall bypass and web shells on dozens of systems in several sectors.
APT31.9 Sep 2026.Proofpoint.First use of the BlueMoon exploit kit, a chain of Chrome and Windows zero-days, seen from 28 August 2026 in emails to US non-governmental organizations, mining and commodity trading firms.
TeamPCP.27 Aug 2026.Australian Federal Police and US Department of Justice.Arrests and charges over supply chain compromises of widely used developer and security tools.

Several of these reports concern internet-facing systems: FortiGate and GlobalProtect for k0t, BeyondTrust Remote Support for ARMORY CASTLE, routers for Volt Typhoon and Oracle PeopleSoft for the ShinyHunters-branded cluster. Patch and watch those first. A group missing from this table may still be active; use Sort by in the list above to see every group by its latest report.

07Use It

How To Use This List. Five Steps For A Security Team.

  1. Filter by your sector and region.

    Pick your sector in the list above and read the targets in each profile. Germany’s BSI publishes its own list of groups active against German targets, so that teams can “prioritize their own threat intelligence research”.

  2. Map their techniques to your detections.

    Each profile lists MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs. MITRE also offers a layer file for each group in the ATT&CK Navigator: the APT28 layer (G0007) holds 139 technique entries. Load it next to your own coverage layer and look for gaps.

  3. Patch what they exploit first.

    Profiles name the flaws each group used, such as CVE-2023-23397 in Outlook for APT28 and CVE-2025-66376 in Zimbra for LAUNDRY BEAR. Check each one against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and your own asset list.

  4. Hunt for the behaviour in the advisories.

    Government advisories such as AA24-207A on Andariel and AA26-204A on LAUNDRY BEAR describe the techniques and give fixes. Search your logs for that behaviour over the period each advisory covers.

  5. Watch the signs outside your network.

    Many of these groups start with a stolen password or a look-alike login page. Watch for leaked credentials for your domains and for new domains that imitate your sign-in pages; the APT28 profile gives both as defenses.

Pull the list into your own tools

Our open dataset on GitHub holds the profiles as CSV, JSON and STIX 2.1, under the CC BY 4.0 license. These commands download it, print the Russian groups with their MITRE IDs, find a group by any of its names and fetch the APT28 layer for the ATT&CK Navigator.

curl -sL -o apt-groups.csv https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BRANDEFENSE/threat-actor-dataset/main/data/apt-groups.csv
python3 -c "import csv; [print(r['name'], r['mitre_attack_id'], sep=' | ') for r in csv.DictReader(open('apt-groups.csv')) if r['suspected_origin'] == 'Russia']"
python3 -c "import csv, sys; q = sys.argv[1].lower(); [print(r['name'], r['url']) for r in csv.DictReader(open('apt-groups.csv')) if q in r['aliases'].lower()]" "forest blizzard"
curl -sL -o G0007-layer.json https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/G0007-enterprise-layer.json

The dataset is rebuilt from the profiles, so it carries the same names, origins and sources; a profile published in the last days may not be in it yet. Inside the platform, Brandefense Threat Actor Landscape keeps profiles like these current and tracks active campaigns aligned to your industry and region, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

08Questions

Questions. Short Answers.

What are APT groups?

APT groups are teams of attackers that target chosen organizations for months or years, most often for a state’s intelligence or military services. APT stands for advanced persistent threat. Security companies and governments track each group by its tools, targets and infrastructure.

How many APT groups are there?

There is no single count. MITRE ATT&CK listed 182 groups on 10 November 2026, and each security company tracks its own set. The count above the list shows how many profiles we hold today; each profile names its sources.

Which APT groups are Russian?

In this list, APT28, Sandworm and Ember Bear are tied to the GRU, and APT29 to the SVR. Turla, Dragonfly, Star Blizzard and Gamaredon are tied to the FSB. No source names an agency for LAUNDRY BEAR, and Wizard Spider and Indrik Spider are Russia-based criminal groups.

What is the most dangerous APT group?

It depends on who you are. A telecom operator should look first at Salt Typhoon, a water utility at CyberAv3ngers and Volt Typhoon, and a crypto exchange at APT38 and Lazarus Group. Filter the list by your sector to see the groups whose profiles name it.

Why do APT groups have so many names?

Each security company names the activity it tracks in its own way, and MITRE ATT&CK records the overlaps. APT28, for example, is Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy and Sednit in other reports. The name key above shows the main schemes.

Are all APT groups state-sponsored?

No. The term is used mostly for state-backed groups, but some criminal groups work the same way for years. This list includes FIN7, Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters and their alleged alliance Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters. The Not Attributed filter shows every group whose profile names no state sponsor.

How do I know if an APT group is targeting my organization?

Match the groups that hit your sector and region against your own logs: their techniques, the flaws they exploit and their known infrastructure. Outside your network, watch for leaked credentials and look-alike domains, which many of these groups use first.

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